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ABSTRACT
“THE LABORATORY OF THE MIND’S EYE”: NINETEENTH-CENTURY SCIENCE AND THE EMERGENCE
OF SCIENCE FICTION
Anastasia Klimchynskaya
Andrea Goulet

This dissertation addresses the question of why science fiction arose in the nineteenth century,
arguing that this literary form emerged to express a new technoscientific paradigm ushered in
by the Industrial Revolution, and which could not be sufficiently represented by already-existing
literary forms. Situating itself firmly in the history of ideas, this dissertation proceeds from Darko
Suvin’s seminal theoretical framework of science fiction, with each chapter considering one of
the defining characteristics of the genre and tying them to social, technoscientific, and
ideological transformations happening primarily in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The
first chapter argues for understanding science fiction as a thought experiment in the literal
sense of the world, drawing on the history of experimental science rather than the philosophical
tradition of the Gedankenexeriment, and uses Jules Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires to illustrate
the spread of scientific popularization that makes such an understanding possible. The second
chapter, which also focuses on the Voyages extraordinaires, more extensively investigates the
“results” of such experiments, as well as how they contribute to the beliefs and practices that
make up social life. The third chapter argues that science fiction serves as a virtual “flight
simulator” that allows the reader a sustained, immersive experience of technological novelty,
and uses Albert Robida’s 1882 novel Le Vingtième Siècle to demonstrate how such an
experience prepares readers to confront technological novelty in their lives by simultaneously
allowing them to practice experiencing estrangement and familiarizing specific novelties. The
fourth chapter uses H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine to illustrate how the disciplines of geology
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and evolutionary theory emerging in the nineteenth century, as well as the revelations of
thermodynamics, created a sense of the “contingency of humanity” that maps onto what Suvin
terms the “cognitive glance” of science fiction – that is, a perspective predicated on change and
the instability of the known and familiar world. Finally, this project gestures towards the ways in
which science fiction’s role in nineteenth-century culture can elucidate its significance in our
contemporary, techno-centric culture.
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INTRODUCTION
“We shape our tools and thereafter they shape us,” wrote John Culkin, and indeed,
human identity, behavior, and society have always existed in relation to our inventions. The rise
of industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe and America transformed human life, both on
the level of the everyday and on the grandest of scales. Consequently, human behavior and
notions of identity shifted in new ways. The invention of photography, the phonograph, and the
telephone challenged basic ontological distinctions between life and death, presence and
absence, stillness and movement. The rise of the factory system meant a shift from preindustrial “organic” time to “mechanical” time, forcing individuals to reconceive their very
experience of the physical world, as basic realities such as night and day, the change of the
seasons, and rising and setting of the sun came to be perceived through the lens of precise
timekeeping. And the increased prominence of the Machine within human society led to it
coalescing as an entity – a kind of “Other” – against which human identity could be defined.
Science fiction is generally accepted, by scholars, critics, and writers, to have emerged
around this time. Darko Suvin, perhaps the critic of the genre, argues that science fiction
“clusters in the great whirlpool periods of history,” (2017, 118) such as the 19th-20th centuries. In
1926, Hugo Gernsback coined the term “scientifiction,” which would eventually become science
fiction, when he founded Amazing Stories, a pulp magazine devoted to the genre. Introducing
the first issue, he wrote that “we live in an entirely new world. Two hundred years ago, stories
of this kind were not possible…..Our entire mode of living has changed with the present
progress, and it is little wonder, therefore, that many fantastic situations – impossible 100 years
ago- are brought about today. It is in these situations that the new romancers find their great
1

inspiration.” (11) In essence, both suggest that the advent of a new technoscientific paradigm
made possible the existence of this literary form.
These claims reflect nineteenth-century rhetoric about literature becoming scientific.
For Emile Zola, the novel was an experiment, the natural result of an evolution in which science
conquers more and more domains for itself until it enters “dans le domaine qui, jusqu'à présent,
appartenait à la philosophie et à la littérature.” (15) In this he echoes August Comte, whose
scientific and philosophical system of positivism – rooted in the precepts of Descartes and Bacon
– purported to encompass all the areas of the physical and human world. “Maintenant que
l’esprit humain a fondé la physique céleste, la physique terrestre, soit mécanique, soit chimique;
la physique organique, soit végétale, soit animale, il lui reste à terminer le system des sciences
d’observation en fondant la physique sociale,” (29) he writes in the Cours de Philosophie Positive
(1830-1842), insisting, much like Zola, that the time has come for every domain to be subject to
scientific thought. And in his study of the overlap between scientific and literary writing of the
period, Devin Griffiths emphasizes how “naturalists and literary authors turned toward each
other in their efforts to shape a historical understanding suited to their different ends.” (9) As
science and technology overtook human life, they also overtook literature, which is concerned
with representing the nature of that life.
The emergence of science fiction therefore correlates with technoscience’s
transformation of both life and literature as it burst onto the world at an unprecedented scale.
But correlation is not causation, and so this dissertation addresses the question of why science
fiction arose in reaction to these transformations within human life. That is, how did this
particular literary form, with its specific set of modalities and preoccupations, respond to the
needs, anxieties, and possibilities of a drastically new epoch in human history? New forms of art
2

frequently arise in response to new paradigms, new epistemologies, and new discoveries. In the
visual arts, for example, photography liberated painting from the demands of mimetically
representing reality, leaving it free to render impression and feeling; Impressionist art, with its
quick strokes, pointillist techniques, and eschewing of detail, quickly arose to represent the
fleeting nature of modern, industrial life. Later, modernist art represented the cacophony and
chaos of modernization through its paintings, which again function less on the level of
representation than emotion and experience. Science fiction, as I will argue throughout this
dissertation, similarly emerged to express the transformations – technoscientific, social and
cultural – of industrialization and modernity, thus representing, at the level of form, a new
scientific and technological paradigm.
What Is Science Fiction?
Claiming that science fiction arose in the nineteenth century necessitates a definition of
what it is, given that the term itself came into being only in the twentieth century. To claim that
science fiction emerged before the term existed is therefore to retroactively apply it to works
that did not define themselves as such. To overcome this difficulty, I define science fiction
through a historical/genealogical approach. Quite simply, literary works in the early nineteenth
century – not all, of course, but some - began to do something literature had not previously
done: depict the possibility of things occurring through technological and scientific means that,
in fiction, had previously only occurred through magical and fantastic means. This was the
emergence of what seminal science fiction critic Darko Suvin terms cognitive estrangement, and
which he argues lies at the foundation of the form. I therefore adopt Suvin’s framework, but
root it in the history, both literary and technoscientific, of the early nineteenth century, to make
the argument that what he defines as the core of science fiction is something novel that
3

literature began to do at this moment in time. This continues to be the foundation of what is
understood as science fiction to this day, and it is on this basis that I retroactively apply the term
to works of fiction from the nineteenth century.
Estrangement lies at the foundation of science fiction and its literary siblings of fairy
tale, myth, and fantasy. As Suvin writes, “a representation which estranges is one which allows
us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar. It relies on a novum
that, added to a fictional world, transforms it utterly from that which we are familiar with, “with
a point of view or look implying a new set of norms.” (2016, 19) All of these genres depict worlds
that, through either magical or technological means, have a different set of laws, norms, and
possibilities. This difference creates wonder while also estranging – making strange – that which
we find familiar by eliciting a comparison between our world and the fictional one.
What differentiates these genres is the form of that estrangement. As Suvin notes,
“cognition differentiates [science fiction] not only from myth, but also from the fairy tale and
the fantasy.” (2017, 119) That is, while fairy tales, myth, and fantasy all create an effect of
estrangement, it is only science fiction that creates an effect of cognitive estrangement. Suvin’s
use of the word “cognitive” bears clarifying, particularly in relation to the cognitive studies of
literature that are emerging in both the broader field of science and literature and this
dissertation. “Cognitive” here does not refer to the intellectual processes that form a natural
part of any act of reading, but rather, as a way to approach understanding the norms, laws, and
possibilities of a fictional world. The myth, fantasy, and fairytale posit a world that is static,
“fixed and supernaturally determined,” (ibid) and whose rules are arbitrary; they “absolutize[]
and even personif[y] apparently constant motifs from the sluggish periods with low social
dynamics.” (Ibid). That is, those very phenomena that cause estrangement in that fictional
4

world, being fixed and supernatural, simply are; the world depicted is different from ours, but
those differences are understood to exist once and for all time. The mode of the story never
elicits an interrogation of how magic has come to be, or how our world might become like the
one portrayed.
By contrast, science fiction “sees the norms of any age, including emphatically its own,
as unique, changeable, and therefore subject to cognitive glance.” (Ibid) The strikingly different
and alien norms and assumptions of a fictional world are contingent, dependent upon a variety
of variables, subject to change, and often do throughout the course of the story. The mode of
the story therefore provokes a “cognitive” glance: an interrogation of how these norms and
assumptions might change, how the fictional world has come to be as it is, and how our own
world might one day become like it. Consequently, I refer to the fairytale, myth, and fantasy as
forms of non-cognitive estrangement, though Suvin does not term them such, to differentiate
them from science fiction’s estrangement effect. We might therefore visualize this delineation
of estrangement through the following chart:
Modes of Estrangement
Non-Cognitive (ahistorical)

Cognitive (historical)

Fairytale, myth, fantasy

Science Fiction

However, this classification implies atemorality and assumes the basic stability of these
categories. By contrast, the noted science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke coined a phrase
commonly known among readers of science fiction: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from magic.” Significantly, this law posits the magical and the technological not
as irreconcilable opposites, but rather as a matter of perspective, defined relative to a society’s
5

level of scientific and technological development. That is, what is, for us, a commonplace
technology (a smartphone, for instance) would likely seem to be magical and supernatural to an
inhabitant of the middle ages. This law also aptly summarizes the formal foundation of science
fiction and hints at the reasons for its emergence at a particular technoscientific moment.
Clarke’s law suggests that there is a moment in time at which what was previously only possible
through magical or supernatural means becomes possible through technoscientific ones – all
while retaining a similar ability to produce wonder and estrangement. The early nineteenth
century, with the advent of industrialization, was this moment, and it produced science fiction
as a literary form in which estrangement becomes “rationalized” and begins to be produced
through technoscientific rather than magical means.
Following Clarke’s lead, therefore, I historicize – that is, temporalize - Suvin’s
categorization and trace the way cognitive estrangement emerged out of non-cognitive
estrangement in the nineteenth century and developed by staging and interrogating cognition
to produce science fiction. This process of literary evolution represents the advent of a new,
rationalistic paradigm ushered in with industrialization – and I mean paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s
sense of the word, an “accepted model or pattern,” (23) but even more than that, a way of
seeing things. Like the novel, which, as George Lukacs stressed, was an expression of capitalist
modernity, science fiction can be understood as – and, indeed, I argue for understanding it as –
an expression of modernity, a literary form that incarnates the industrialization and
“technologization” of the world. Thus, as science fiction transforms the nineteenth century’s
experiences of technology and rhetoric around technological novelty into literary form, it
becomes the formal expression of this new, rationalistic paradigm.
At the start of my timeline lie the myth, fantasy, and fairytale, genres which existed for
6

millennia before the emergence of science fiction. These depict alternate worlds in which the
supernatural simply is; as Suvin writes of the fairytale, “it just posits another world beside yours
where some carpets do, magically, fly, and some paupers do, magically, become princes.” (2017,
119) The myth, similarly, “claims to explain once and for all the essence of phenomena,” (2017,
118) this explanation usually having something of the magical and supernatural to it. These align
with the category of “le merveilleux,” which theorist Tzvetan Todorov defines as that genre of
literature in which magical and supernatural occurrences, such as invisibility, immortality,
physical transformations, and control of the elements, do not have a rational explanation, and
the mode of the story does not necessitate one.
The next step forward is the fantastic, which narrowly precedes and overlaps with the
emergence of science fiction. This category is absent from Suvin’s delineation, but it forms the
logical midpoint between cognitive and non-cognitive estrangement, both temporally and
theoretically. Todorov defines the fantastic as a hesitation between the rational and the
supernatural; as he writes, the fantastic
must oblige the reader to consider the world of the characters as a world of living
persons and to hesitate between a natural or supernatural explanation of the events
described. Second, this hesitation may also be experienced by a character…at the same
time the hesitation is represented, it becomes one of the themes of the work. (33)
In the fantastic, that is, there is a tug-of-war between supernatural and rational explanations for
strange, inexplicable, and estrangement-creating phenomena, with neither one winning out.
Instead of the above graph, therefore, I propose instead to understand the various
modes of estrangement through the following timeline:
non-cognitive estrangement ------(myth, fairytale, fantasy)

interrogation of cognition -------(the fantastic)
7

cognitive estrangement
(science fiction)

That is, if the two ends of the spectrum are a fictional world in which supernatural events just
are (left), and a world in which supernatural events have a distinctly rational explanation (right),
then the logical midpoint between them is a fictional world marked by an oscillation between
rational and supernatural explanations.
And indeed, this timeline can be mapped onto the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. The fantastic emerged around this time, intertwining with and preceding the
emergence of the science fiction,1 and it is particularly on this transition from the fantastic to
science fiction that I want to focus. To do so, I draw on the work of Eric Rabkin, who traces the
emergence of science fiction to the Gothic novels of Ann Radcliffe in the late eighteenth
century. Many, if not most, Gothic novels exist in the mode of non-cognitive estrangement: set
in distant, anachronistically-depicted periods of history, they exist in the mode of the strange
and eternal worlds of the fairytale, while the supernatural events that make up its generic
conventions - hauntings, reanimations, voices from the beyond – tend not to have rational
explanations. Radcliffe departed from her predecessors in that she incorporated into her stories
the seemingly supernatural events that had become the conventions of the genre, only to reveal
at the end that they were natural after all. Her novels therefore exist in the mode of the
fantastic, in an oscillation between natural and supernatural, until a “naturalizing explanation”
(Rabkin) is finally offered. They also reveal a distinction, which will be significant throughout this
section, between the Gothic, as a literary genre, and the fantastic, as a literary mode: a genre is
a set of tropes, conventions, and expectations, while a mode is a positioning vis-à-vis rationality

1

It is necessary to note, however, that science fiction and cognitive estrangement did not replace or
supersede the magical and supernatural, or the earlier forms of fantasy, fairytale, and myth. Rather, to
use the Darwinian metaphor of a genealogical tree, science fiction grew out of these earlier genres,
forming another branch that developed alongside and in parallel to these forms, which also continued to
grow and develop on their own.
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and the supernatural. As we will see throughout this introduction, many Gothic novels and
stories possess the modality of the fantastic (e.g. the stories of Edgar Allan Poe), while many
others (e.g. Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto) exist in the mode of non-cognitive
estrangement, where the supernatural simply is.
As Rabkin argues, in science fiction the “naturalizing explanation” that occurs at the end
of Radcliffe’s novels - which he terms the Gothic expliqué - moves to the beginning and becomes
the implicit foundation of the story. To illustrate this, he points to the Preface of Frankenstein
(1818), which is generally critically accepted to be the first work of science fiction:
“The event on which this fiction is founded, has been supposed, by Dr. [Erasmus] Darwin, and
some of the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence.” (Shelley, 11)
The novel’s story draws from myth to depict a golem-like creature, animated by a “spark” of life
by a Promethean student who dabbles in alchemy. By evoking the authority of Erasmus Darwin
and his contemporaries to assert the possibility of the events to follow, this phrase performs a
kind of scientific rigor (a performance I will more extensively explore in chapter one). Through
the performance of that scientific rigor, these seemingly supernatural events acquire a
naturalistic explanation. Importantly, that explanation is not explicitly given, but rather
presupposed to exist through the performative use of scientific language. The reader is asked to
invest in the fiction that, however magical or mythical the events of the story, they have a
rational and scientific explanation. If the hallmark of the fantastic is the hesitation between the
supernatural and the rational, then these words come down firmly on the side of the rational.
They embody the moment when the fantastic is rationalized and estrangement gains its

9

cognitive characteristic to lay the foundation for science fiction.2
Moreover, if – as Clarke suggested - the distinction between magic and science is a
matter of the historical passing of time and the development of technoscience, then the birth of
science fiction represents the moment of transition from the magical into the technological – a
transition made possible through the performance of scientific rigor. This is well illustrated by
the way the early science fiction texts of the nineteenth century adapt and rationalize century
adapts the supernatural motifs of the myth, the fairytale, and the fantasy to translate them into
a cognitive framework. Invisibility appears frequently in the fairytale, for example, through
spells and invisibility cloaks; in H.G. Wells’ 1897 novel The Invisible Man, it becomes possible not
through magic but through an optical discovery. The dichotomy of good and evil is an age-old
myth; in Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, it is through
scientific means (a medical concoction) that man’s soul is split into two. Characters can
frequently fly or travel great distances in fairytale and myth; in science fiction, teleportation or
flying cars replace magic in allowing for the same possibilities. Time travel had been the stuff of
dreams and prophecies for millennia, but Wells was the first to invent a time machine and
consequently make it possible through the means of modernity. And, in the case of
Frankenstein, the creation of life itself moves is no longer purely mythical, but scientific – a myth
of creation compatible with modernity. 3

2

Frankenstein also draws heavily from the Gothic tradition, but unlike most Gothic novels, it exists in the
mode of cognitive estrangement, rather than in the modes of the fantastic, or of non-cognitive
estrangement.
3
H. G. Wells would later explicitly articulate this notion in his 1933 preface to The Scientific Romances,
writing “Hitherto, except in exploration fantasies, the fantastic element was brought in by magic…It
occurred to me that instead of the usual interview with the devil or a magician, an ingenious use of
scientific patter might with advantage be substituted.” (2017, 14) Wells’ “scientific patter” – his
equivalent of what science fiction fans today refer to as “technobabble” - is the performance of scientific
rigor that asks (or tricks) the reader into participating in the illusion that what was previously only
magically possible is now scientifically so.
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On the converse side of the equation, the various stage adaptations of Frankenstein
abandon Shelley’s science and return to magic, placing into relief the porousness between
magical and scientific explanations of the same phenomena. The advent of modernity made
possible both options, and the choice lies in the mode of the story. At this early moment of
science fiction’s development, non-cognitive estrangement tended to be the dominant mode;
Mary Shelley’s innovation was unprecedented, and it would take much of the century for that to
change. Thus, the 1826 French stage adaptation, for example, bore the title Le Monstre et le
magician; Frankenstein became a magician rather than a scientist, and the action was moved to
sixteenth-century Venice. In the play, Frankenstein calls upon a genie to bring the monster to
life in exchange for his happiness – a Faustian bargain that exists between the lines of the novel,
but which is here returned in all of its magical and folkloric force. These returns to the mode of
pre-cognitive estrangement aptly showcase Clarke’s law: the idea of the same marvelous
phenomena being possible either through magic or science. The former is the stuff of fantasy
and fairytale; the latter creates science fiction.
Rather than understand the nineteenth century as a period of disenchantment due to
the advent of technology, secularism, and rationality, as Max Weber suggested, it becomes
more apt to understand it as a period that made wonder possible through the tools of
modernity. As Rosalind Williams argues, for example, consumer culture and the Expositions
Universelles did not disenchant the world, but rather “made possible the material realization of
fantasies which had hitherto existed only in the realm of the imagination” (84) through
technologies such as electricity. In the world of the theatre and entertainment, new
technologies enabled a wide variety of special effects that brought to life fantasy locales and
fantastic experiences. As John Tresch writes, “the fantastic arts were heavily invested in new
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technical apparatus to produce illusions and to bring about uncanny visual and auditory
metamorphoses. To do so, in many cases they used the same technologies as scientists did,”
(127) including the camera obscura, the panorama, and electromagnetism. Estrangement and
wonder continued to be produced in both fiction and reality through technoscience as much as
magic.4
Science fiction’s mode of cognitive estrangement thus represents the advent of a new,
rationalistic paradigm, epitomized nowhere better than in the landmark nineteenth-century
literary figure of Sherlock Holmes, who made his first appearance in the 1887 novel A Study in
Scarlet. The Holmes stories are not, in themselves, science fiction, but as a character, Holmes
embodies its modality.5 He “represented and celebrated the central tenets of modernity
adumbrated at the time – not just rationalism and secularism, but also urbanism and
consumerism. The stories made these tenets magical without introducing magic: Holmes
demonstrated how the modern world could be re-enchanted through means entirely consistent
with modernity.” (Saler, 108) Throughout the stories, Holmes is frequently referred to as a
wizard by Watson, but his is a magic revealed to be rational, “a paradigm of the fantastic
naturalized: first he amazes his hearer by revealing unknowable information, then he further
amazes the hearer by showing that his information was logically knowable after all.” (Rabkin,
68) In fact, what differentiates the Sherlock Holmes stories from previous detective tales is the
detective’s use of a scientific method: Doyle had been frustrated that the fictional detective
4

Many scholars in recent years have challenged Weber’s claims about the disenchantment of the world to
argue for the compatibility of enchantment and modernity; John Tresch’s The Romantic Machine, which
challenges the opposition between industrialization and romanticism, and Rosalind Williams’ Dream
Worlds, which showcases how nineteenth-century technologies brought magic to life, are two particularly
remarkable texts. See also Michael Saler’s As If (cited below) and Jason Josephson Storm’s The Myth of
Disenchantment.
5
For this reason, Holmes appears frequently in works of science fiction, most notably as Spock’s ancestor
in the original Star Trek series, and the Encyclopedia of Science Fiction contains, under the entry “Sherlock
Holmes,” an extensive list of his appearances in works of the genre.
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always seemed to stumble upon the solution through chance, and so he made his detective a
scientist, who has perfected the science of deduction and is at the forefront of the period’s
forensic science6.
Many of the Holmes stories explicitly foreground this paradigm of the fantastic
naturalized. In “The Adventure of the Devil’s Foot,” a rational explanation is found for what
appears to be the devil himself, when a family is found dead sitting in their places at the dinner
table and with no apparent cause of death; in “The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire,” the
attack of a vampire that turns out to be a mother sucking poison from a baby bitten by a snake,
prompting Holmes to utter what might well be the epitome of Victorian rationality: “the world is
big enough for us. No ghosts need apply.” (594) But the most striking example is the most
famous of Holmes novels, the 1901 The Hound of the Baskervilles. In it, the last descendant of
the Baskerville line is plagued by the seemingly supernatural omen of a spectral hound, an omen
of death. Holmes’ task is to demystify these supernatural events, which are “hard to reconcile
with the settled order of nature.” (21) The opening of the novel explicitly poses that as the
question to be explored: “Of course, if Dr. Mortimer's surmise should be correct, and we are
dealing with forces outside the ordinary laws of Nature, there is an end of our investigation. But
we are bound to exhaust all other hypotheses before falling back upon this one.” (26) This is the
very question that lies at the heart of the fantastic: whether the explanation lies in the rational
or supernatural realm. Unlike in the fantastic, however, here the oscillation between rationality
and the supernatural does not exist, as Holmes had by this point become established in the

6

Holmes is based in part on Dr. Joseph Bell, one of Doyle’s teachers at the University of Edinburgh
Medical School. There has also been extensive scholarship on Holmes’ use of the period’s cutting-edge
forensic technologies; in some cases, the stories even predate the first known use of particular forensic
methodologies, most notably the use of fingerprints. See, for example, James O’Brien, The Scientific
Sherlock Holmes, and E.J. Wagner, The Science of Sherlock Holmes.
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collective imagination as the ultimate man of reason. Thus, by the end of the story, Holmes
predictably reveals that the spectral hound glows through the use of phosphorus, the death it
caused was through the fear it caused in a man already possessing a heart condition, while the
mysterious voices and lights on the moors are due to a convict hiding there. Despite this
predictability, there is a reason this novel had become one of the most famous of the Holmes
stories: it explicitly stages the rejection of the supernatural in favor of scientific reason that so
defined the Victorian worldview.7
All these stories adapt Ann Radcliffe’s Gothic expliqué for technological modernity,
offering not just rational explanations for seemingly supernatural events, but scientific and
technological ones that draw on the chemical properties of matter (phosphorus), medicine (a
heart condition), and biology (poison). They stage explicitly the rationalistic paradigm that lies
implicitly at the foundation of every science fiction story. The possibility of the supernatural is
evoked only to be laid to rest, as the reader is nudged towards a definitive stance in favor of
science rather than superstition. In science fiction, this explanation of the strange and
impossible through the scientific exists implicitly in a state of having always already happened.
The reader knows, when entering into the story, that the phenomena depicted, even if
impossible in the present reality they know, are possible in the fictional world through
technoscientific means. And while explanations of the technologies within science fiction are
frequent (and necessary for the purposes of exposition), they are not given to put to rest the
oscillation between supernatural and rational, but rather to engage in the performance of
scientific rigor that confirms the work’s modality as existing within the paradigm of cognitive

7

For more on the confrontation between the supernatural and the rational in The Hound of the
Baskervilles, see Klimchynskaya, “The Hound of the Baskervilles,” in About Sixty: Why Every Sherlock
Holmes Story is the Best.
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estrangement.
Across the Channel, Jules Verne’s 1893 novel Le Chateau des Carpathes performs a
similar function for French readers that The Hound of the Baskervilles did for English readers.
Written towards the end of Verne’s career, it, too, stages a story of the Gothic expliqué; as such,
though it is generally considered an outlier in Verne criticism, it serves, for the purposes of this
dissertation, as a kind of manifesto for the copious oeuvre of science fiction Verne had penned
by this point in his life. In this story, a dead singer named La Stilla appears to return to life in a
mysterious, secluded castle, as a former lover, Count Franz de Telek, sees both her image and
her voice. It turns out that she is no ghost, however, as the inventor Orfanik reveals at the end
that he has been projecting her image and playing a high-quality phonograph recording of her
voice. Resembling Holmes’ predictable rejection of the supernatural, the novel opens with an
equally adamant statement regarding the events in question:
Cette histoire n’est pas fantastique, elle n’est que romanesque. Faut-il en conclure
qu’elle ne soit pas vraie, étant donnée son invraisemblance ? Ce serait une erreur. Nous
sommes d’un temps où tout arrive, — on a presque le droit de dire où tout est arrivé. Si
notre récit n’est point vraisemblable aujourd’hui, il peut l’être demain, grâce aux
ressources scientifiques qui sont le lot de l’avenir, et personne ne s’aviserait de le
mettre au rang des légendes. D’ailleurs, il ne se crée plus de légendes au déclin de ce
pratique et positif dix-neuvième siècle…. (19)
Differing from Ann Radcliffe’s novels, which allow the reader to wonder whether the
supernatural truly exists, Le Chateau des Carpathes appears to preclude this line of inquiry from
the very beginning. There can be no oscillation between the supernatural and the rational, as
there is in the fantastic: the reader is asked to believe, when entering into the story, that the
supernatural will be scientifically explained. Though numerous characters in the story – largely
superstitious villagers – insist on the otherworldly nature of the phenomena described, its
framing differs from that of most Gothic and fantastic fiction, which tends to leave that
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possibility open. Unlike, for example, Alexandre Dumas’ Les Mille et un fantomes (which we will
consider in chapter three), the story is framed at the beginning and end by matter-of fact
rationality. Recreating many of the tropes of Gothic fiction - the secluded castle, the ghost, the
hauntings – it subsequently explicates them through technologies of the period (in particular,
Edison’s phonograph). Like The Hound of the Baskervilles, Le Chateau des Carpathes explicitly
stages the explanation that in science fiction always exists implicitly as the premise of the fiction
itself.8
Science fiction thus reveals itself as a literary form predicated on creating the same
effects of awe and estrangement that used to be the purview of the myth, fairy tale, fantasy,
and the fantastic, but doing so through means consistent with technological modernity. Darko
Suvin has argued that the formal framework of science fiction lies in Bertolt Brecht’s pioneering
attitude of estrangement - the attitude of a detached scientist, which enabled Brecht “to write
‘plays for a scientific age,’” (Suvin 2017, 118) Science fiction, in other words, is founded on the
modality of scientific rationality, and this trajectory of the supernatural rationalized shows how
it came into being when a new technoscientific paradigm was brought to bear upon fictions of
strangeness, otherness, and difference.
Enchantment and Time

The emergence of science fiction is also a transition from what might be termed the
mode of enchantment to the mode of cognitive estrangement. Enchantment here is an

8

Contemporary science fiction continues, from time to time, to stage this process of rationalization and
the movement from the fantastic to science fiction. The Star Trek: The Next Generation episode “Sub
Rosa,” for example, is a Radcliffian Gothic story, as Starfleet officer Beverly Crusher inherits an ancestral
home and appears to be haunted by a ghost. Bringing to bear the scientific and technological knowledge
of the future, however, it is soon discovered that the ghost in question is a life form that feeds on a
particular kind of energy, consequently rationalizing the Gothic trope of the haunting.
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illuminating word, because it suggests not only the strange and magical, but also the fixed and
eternal. It is the stuff of the fairytale and the fantasy. By contrast, science fiction is heavily
concerned with change, both temporary and permanent. As we saw above, it is predicated upon
the idea that the source of estrangement must not only be created through technoscientific
means, but must also be subject to change and manipulation. Its strange and unfamiliar worlds
and the possibilities they represent cannot simply exist for the sake of existing, but rather must
be the product of tangible forces and processes. Difference is always the product of change, and
science fiction elicits a way of thinking – what Suvin terms a “cognitive glance” - founded upon
exploring the transience of that which exists and its eternal potential to become something
“other.”
In the nineteenth century, this glance became possible due to new scientific disciplines
and the new understanding they offered of the human place within time. In 1785, James Hutton
published his Theory of the Earth, followed in 1830-1833 by Charles Lyell’s The Principles of
Geology. Both expounded Uniformitarianism – the idea that the Earth had been slowly and
uniformly changing over millennia. Their texts, as well as the paleontological discoveries being
made in the period, led to the emergence of the notion of deep time: that is, geological time
that suggested that the Earth was much older than had been previously believed. On the basis
of the geological and fossil record, these disciplines revealed that humanity had not been in
existence for nearly as long as the Earth itself – and therefore that on this very planet, strange,
other worlds populated by unfamiliar creatures had existed before humanity had. This led to a
whole genre of prehistoric art, such as Edouard Riou’s illustrations for Louis Figuier’s 1863 La
Terre avant le deluge (Image 1). At the same time, Darwin’s 1859 On the Origin of Species, which
drew heavily on Lyell’s work, continued this trajectory of challenging humanity’s place in the
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order of things. It corroborated the idea that other species had existed before humanity;
insisting that humanity’s dominant place in the world was the product of lengthy processes
dictated by nothing more than chance, it suggested “that man was not fully equipped to
understand the history of life on earth and that he might not be central to that history.” (Beer,
15) Just as geology hinted at the possibility of strange, past worlds in which the human played
no role, evolution suggested strange, future worlds in which humanity no longer had a part.
What both geology and paleontology revealed was therefore the “contingency of
humanity,” as I term it. Prior to evolutionary and geological discoveries, it was believed that
humanity occupied a particular place in the hierarchy of the natural world. The “great chain of
being” was a fundamental metaphor, in which each species had its particular place, given to it
through a divine act of creation. But now that humanity’s place at the top of this chain was not a
given, but rather a temporary product of chance processes, “humankind was demoted. No
longer lord of the world, a special creation with a special mission in history, it was simply a
random and temporarily successful adaptation of the primal world-stuff in its ceaseless blind
struggle to survive. And it was, on the cosmic scale of things, a temporary and perishable
commodity.” (McConnell, 10) In other words, humanity’s place in the world was not fixed and
eternal, but rather subject to change. The narrative of humanity’s history shifted from the mode
of enchantment (that is, the eternal and unchangeable) to the mode of cognition (the temporal
and changeable).
These new disciplines were interested in studying the nature of these processes of
change, and in elucidating how the random, ephemeral dominance of humanity might give way
to strange new worlds. Most obviously, evolution has as its most basic premise a world in flux;
Darwin “rejected the idea of a stable or static world, and would not accept equilibrium as a
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sufficient description of the relationship between the forces of change and continuance,” (Beer,
59) and evolution was primarily concerned with understanding these processes of change. In
fact, as Beer points out, On the Origin of Species, to which the full title is frequently shortened, is
deceptive in that it implies a focus on a particular moment of creation, of origin. The full title, On
the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the
Struggle for Life, by contrast emphasizes process. Lyell, too, notes in the opening of his Principles
of Geology that it is “the science which investigates the successive changes that have taken
place in the organic and inorganic kingdoms of nature.” Or, more briefly: geology is the study of
change.
A similar transformation occurred in the field of history. The French Revolution and the
subsequent series of revolutions throughout the nineteenth century inaugurated a new
historical consciousness: a “recognition of the past as different and of the present as dislodged
from what had gone before.” (Samuels, 4) Replacing a sense of continuity with the past was a
sense of rupture, as the past was felt to be distinctly different, “alienating” (Ibid, 5) – or, in other
words, estranging. Maurice Samuels argues that this new conception of history was also
fundamentally “spectacular”- that is, having an emphasis on the visual as a means of recording
and displaying history. And the visual, by its very nature, “allows for an apprehension of the
difference of the past on a concrete, material level.” (173) Visuality placed into relief the
concrete material differences between epochs, furthering the idea that the present was
surrounded by strange and different worlds in both the past and the future. The rise of the
historical novel, which was usually written in this spectacular mode, in England and France
allowed for narratives about how the past was different, and also influenced science fiction. For
example, Albert Robida’s visions of the future, which I examine in chapter three, illustrate the
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material changes that Paris undergoes by drawing on familiar historical monuments and
historical novels. These depictions are palimpsestic, however, with the new built quite literally
atop the old, highlighting the future as both significantly different from the present and yet a
product of it. H.G. Wells, whose works I consider in chapter four, penned numerous “histories of
the future,” as most of his texts have come to be categorized, while The Time Machine
references the familiar locales and monuments of the Victorian era while set in the distant
future. And the past is almost always present in Verne’s novels, in the form of shipwrecks and
lost cities in Vingt mille lieues sous les mers or a metaphorical descent into the past in Voyage au
centre de la terre. All three authors show pasts and futures visibly different from the present,
while emphasizing that difference as the product of ongoing processes of change.
Outside the swiftly professionalizing sphere of science, too, the nineteenth century was
preoccupied with questions of change, process, and transformation, and even time itself was a
major concern. With the creation of new technologies of communication and transportation, it
seemed, quite literally, to pass more quickly (Koselleck, Schivelbusch). The nature of modern life
seemed momentary and fleeting, so much so that an entire artistic movement – Impressionism
– arose around capturing this instantaneity. At the same time, “philosophical and literary
interest in the future increased over the course of the nineteenth century,” (Grubbs, 14) as the
future ceased to be the domain of prophets and astrologers to became a serious consideration.
These new experiences of time created a new subjectivity: “as such fundamentals as space and
time were challenged, the Victorians were existing differently.” (Childers, quoted in Ferguson, 4)
Consequently, the century following the French Revolution was marked by what Francois Hartog
calls a new “régime d’historicité,” wherein “la compréhension du présent découle alors moins
de l’analyse du passé qui l’a produit que d’une projection vers le future qui contribue, en retour,
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à l’élaboration du présent.” (Barel-Moisan, 174)
As a consequence, the portrayal of unfamiliar worlds, societies, and norms intended to
cause estrangement through their difference– from socialist utopias to prehistoric earths
populated by dinosaurs and futures when man had become extinct – became subject to a
cognitive glance, the direct products of processes of change and evolution visible in the present
moment. This is most evident in the shift in the nature of utopian romance during its vogue
following Edward Bellamy’s 1887 publication of Looking Backward. Darwinistic thinking
“compel[led] unprecedented realism in the prognostications of utopian romances,”
(Wittenberg, 39) and this realism “beg[an] to inflect the framing plots of utopian romances.”
(Ibid) Rather than setting their utopias in a parallel world that simply is (Bacon’s New Atlantis or
Thomas More’s Utopia come to mind), authors felt the need to make these utopian futures a
product of the present. As Wittenberg writes,
Any creditable utopian (or dystopian) society informed by Darwinistic sociopolitics must
extrapolate its conjectured polis from actual present social conditions, since that polis
will necessarily have evolved precisely from them. A utopia can no longer be situated in
a fantastical setting or alternative local such as a lost island, distant planet, or
subterranean crevice…Indeed, utopias very likely can no longer be “spatial” at all.
Instead, scientifically realistic utopian romance, consistent with the paradigm of
evolution and its continuity with physics and mechanics, is set in our future. (40)
Utopian romances are necessarily estranging: they portray a world different from our own in its
very foundation. In moving toward setting utopias in a future derived from our present, rather
than in a “spatially” alternate world, this genre adopted the cognitive glance inherent in the
evolutionary thought that they are based on, as the strangeness of the utopian setting became
the product of social and evolutionary changes linked to the writer’s present.
This is the context in which science fiction arose as a literary form premised on change
and process, and the new theories that revealed the contingency of humanity and of the world
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as it presently was therefore map neatly onto its emergence. There is extensive scholarship on
the way the nineteenth century’s new experiences of time were transformed into literary form.
For example, Trish Ferguson summarizes the way the increased cultural presence of
chronometry in the public sphere “led to the creation of innovative literary forms from the
seventeenth century on, such as the diary and the newspaper, journals and travel-books, which
closely replicated the diurnal form of clocks and calendars.” (5) Similarly, Nicholas Daly suggests
that the suspense novel provided a kind of “temporal training”: “Just as the cinema would later
‘train’ people in the mode of distracted perception necessary to navigate the modern
metropolis, in the 1860s the sensation novel trained its readers to live within the temporality of
the railway age,” (50) he writes. As a literary form quintessentially interested in exploring how
strangeness and difference might be the result of traceable processes of transformation, science
fiction is similarly founded upon these new experiences of time and change, but one whose
formal foundation in these new experiences has been slightly less explored. Thus, I aim to fill in
this slight gap by connecting the nineteenth century’s concerns with time and change with a
formal framework of science fiction as a literary form predicated on them. (And, as we will see
in chapter four, The Time Machine makes this its central concern).
An Overview of the Literature

As the above overview has demonstrated, this dissertation aims to provide a theoretical
framework for science fiction anchored in the technoscientific history from which it arose. In
other words, I argue that, in the nineteenth century, aspects of technoscientific thought and
experience became literary form, and therefore show how a literary framework of the genre can
be connected directly to the historical moment of that form’s emergence. As such, I rely heavily
22

on previous theoretical frameworks of the genre, and each chapter connects an aspect of these
frameworks to social and scientific history. However, previous scholarship on science fiction is
generally either theoretical and historical in nature. I aim instead to synthesize these two
approaches, showing how the theoretical frameworks of science fiction that we rely on today
can be understood as the product of technoscientific history and its embodiment as literary
form.
The seminal text of science fiction studies is Darko Suvin’s 1979 Metamorphoses of
Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre, which lays out a theoretical
foundation for science fiction as the literature of cognitive estrangement. It is this framework
that I take as my starting point for defining science fiction. Suvin’s approach to science fiction
emerges out of a tradition of Marxist criticism, however, and therefore privileges the powerful
political potential that lies in its ability to present alternatives to the hegemonic status quo. He
therefore draws for his concept of estrangement on Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt and
Viktor Shklovsky’s ostranenie, both of which emphasize language as a way to shock the reader
or viewer out of complacency and make the most “normal” aspects of reality visible and
strange. Consequently, while Suvin’s text offers a history of science fiction, this is a history told
through a Marxist lens, examining each moment of science fiction’s history as either a reification
or a rejection of hegemony. Still, his theoretical framework maps neatly onto nineteenthcentury technoscientific history, and in chapters three and four, I consider more extensively
estrangement and cognition, respectively, as products of a particular historical moment.
In sharp contrast to Suvin, Roger Luckhurst’s 2005 Science Fiction offers a cultural
history of science fiction, situating science fiction “as part of a constantly shifting network that
ties together science, technology, social history and cultural expression with different emphases
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at different times.”(6) He argues for four conditions that made possible science fiction in the
nineteenth century: the rise of mass literacy, new forms of mass culture that forced formal
innovation, a coherent ideology and emergent profession of science, and, most importantly,
"everyday experience transformed by machines and mechanical processes" (29). Though all four
play a role in my own argument, the fourth is particularly significant: it allows Luckhurst to cast
science fiction as “a literature of technologically saturated societies,” (6) and this articulation of
science fiction as the literary form of industrialization and technologization aligns with my own
argument. Luckhurst’s work is decidedly light on theory, however: “SF will not conform to a
particular literary typology or formalist definition: rather, it will be marked by a sensitivity to the
ways in which Mechanism is connected into different historical contexts,” he writes. (6) While
Suvin privileges theory at the expense of history, Luckhurst does the converse, leaving out a
theoretical framework in order to tease out how the technoscientific saturation of society
manifests as literary form. This dissertation therefore takes its cue from Luckhurst in treating
the emergence of science fiction as, in part, a kind of cultural history, but returns theoretical and
formalist concerns to the forefront.
In recent years, there has been a particularly heavy emphasis on science fiction’s ability
to imagine new horizons of possibility and alternative, better futures. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay’s
2008 The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction falls into this category as it focuses on the seven
“habits of mind” or “cognitive attractions” of science fiction which allow for such productive
speculation. The study therefore considers science fiction less as a form per se, but rather as a
mode of awareness, a “science-fictionality” made up of the cognitive attractions of fictive
neology, fictive novums, future history, imaginary science, the science-fictional sublime, the
science-fictional grotesque, and the Technologiade, or the epic of technsocience’s development
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into a global regime. This approach to science fiction as a modality resembles my own
consideration of it as representing a new, technoscientific, paradigm, and throughout this
dissertation, Csicsery-Ronay’s observations help me bridge the theoretical and the historical.
Methodology

This dissertation deals with broad questions: not only the emergence of a new literary
form in the context of technological, scientific, and social history, but also the advent of a new
paradigm as represented by this nascent form. I conceive of the nineteenth century as a kind of
laboratory: a moment when the forces of technoscience burst into a pre-industrial world in an
unprecedented way to reshape it. In this laboratory, I map the vectors through which such a
sweeping transformation manifests culturally and reshapes the very symbolic order – an
investigation that can only be conducted through an interdisciplinary approach. The
predominant mode of this dissertation is therefore that of a history of ideas: I draw on
sociology, the history and philosophy of science and technology, cognitive science, and literary
theory to illustrate how a literary form incarnates a new paradigm. Each chapter focuses on a
salient characteristic of science fiction and connects it to techno-social phenomena using the
frameworks and methodologies of a different discipline. For this same reason, I privilege the
term literary form rather than genre when referring to science fiction: while genre implies
“merely” a set of conventions and expectations, form is a broader term, implying its own
modality and attitude vis-à-vis reality. In tracing the emergence of science fiction, I am
attempting not to describe the birth of a new set of generic conventions, but rather to articulate
a new technoscientific paradigm by examining its manifestation as literary form.
The first chapter argues for understanding science fiction as a thought experiment in the
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literal sense of the world, drawing on the history of experimental science rather than the
philosophical tradition of the Gedankenexeriment, and uses Jules Verne’s Voyages
extraordinaires to illustrate this argument. Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer’s seminal work
Leviathan and the Air Pump forms the crux of my argument: their theory of the rise of
experimentation as a collective practice whose results require the assent of a community of
“witnesses” allows me to theorize science fiction as a collective virtual laboratory in which a
society can interrogate the consequences of integrating technoscience into the social sphere.
The “results” of these experiments subsequently enter into the collective cultural lexicon,
shaping beliefs and behavior.
The second chapter, which also focuses on Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires, more
extensively investigates the “results” of such experiments, as well as how they contribute to the
beliefs and practices that make up social life. Drawing from sociology, and particularly the
sociology of science, the idea of a sociotechnical imaginary – a collective understanding of the
social whole and the individual’s role in it, which incorporates technoscience – I argue that
science fiction plays a fundamental role in constructing and maintaining such imaginaries.
Through a careful examination of periodicals from the period, I show how Verne’s novels
contributed to these imaginaries, which, in turn, performed the work of making technological
modernity coherent and serving as blueprints for the future.
While the second chapter takes a broader sociological approach, the third chapter uses
cognitive science to consider the effect of science fiction on the individual, cognitive and
affective, level. Focusing on Albert Robida’s science fiction novel Le Vingtième Siècle, it proposes
understanding it as a virtual “flight simulator” that allows the reader a sustained, immersive
experience of technological novelty. Demonstrating how Robida’s text transforms the content
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and modalities of popular writings and satires on science, technology, and progress into literary
form, I argue that this immersive experience prepares the reader to confront technological
novelty in their lives by simultaneously allowing them to practice experiencing estrangement in
response to it and familiarizing specific novelties.
Finally, the fourth chapter considers H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine to illustrate how the
emerging disciplines of geology and evolutionary theory, as well as the revelations of
thermodynamics, created a sense of the “contingency of humanity” that maps onto the
cognitive glance of science fiction. Arguing that The Time Machine is primarily concerned with
the legibility of change over vast processes of time, it argues that this story is a human narrative
that reveals the possibility of narrative that goes beyond the human, and in which the role of
humanity is marginal.
In all four chapters, the visual plays a significant role. For two of the authors I explore,
Albert Robida and Jules Verne, imagery is a substantial part of the texts themselves: Verne
worked closely with his illustrators, while Robida was a caricaturist who illustrated his own
novels. Beyond these illustrations, the visual forms an important component of my argument
because of this dissertation’s concern with tracing a history of ideas. Both visual and literary
culture serve a reflection of socio-political and technoscientific trends, and I use a wide variety
of illustrations, paintings, caricatures, advertisements, and scientific renderings to illuminate the
emergence of a new paradigm and its anchoring in the culture of the period.
Additionally, to borrow the canonical phrase of Marshall McLuhan, “the medium is the
message,” (1994) or, in other words, the medium always embeds itself in the message it conveys
and affects it. With industrialization, a variety of new technologies – print and the telegraph
among them – reshaped the transmission of information and cultural production. Since science
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fiction is concerned with the role of technoscience in society, it finds its medium, reception, and
circulation are inseparable from its subject. Attending to the material aspects of the texts I
examine therefore proves to be fundamental to investigating the symbiosis between
technoscientific development and its cultural expression.
A Transnational Approach

The approach of this dissertation cannot be truly interdisciplinary without also being
transnational, leading me to consider the emergence of science fiction across the boundaries of
language, culture, and nationality. In particular, I focus on French and British texts, thus
approaching this study by drawing on the concept of the Channel zone, enunciated by Margaret
Cohen and Carolyn Dever as the “intersections and interactions among texts, readers, writers,
and publishing and critical institutions that linked together Britain and France…[it] is
characterized by the agglomeration of a range of formal and informal institutions that produce
and distribute symbolic and economic capital.” (2) Ideas and texts were exchanged across the
Channel, contributing to the development of the novel (Dever and Cohen’s subject of study),
and science fiction was part of this exchange. The majority of Jules Verne’s science fiction (De la
Terre a la lune, Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, L’ile mysterieuse et al) was translated into
English almost immediately; Wells’ scientific romances (The Time Machine, []) were almost
immediately translated into French.9 (Albert Robida’s Le Vingtieme Siècle, however, was not
translated into English until 2004).
Just as important, however, was exchange in the political, social, and technoscientific
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For a list of Verne’s English translations, see Evans, “A Bibliography of Jules Verne’s English Translations,”
in Science Fiction Studies, 95 (March 2005), 105-141. For Wells, see The Reception of H.G. Wells in Europe,
edited by Patrick Parrinder and John S. Partington, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005.
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spheres. Britain industrialized faster than France, leading to differences in the literary traditions
of the two nations; for example, if the novel is an expression of capitalist modernity, then
“variations in the practice of capitalist modernity from nation to nation explain differences in
national practices of the novel as a form.” (Dever and Cohen, 5) Despite this unevenness and
national differences, however, the circulation of technologies, ideas, and trade between these
two nations continued: “in the mid-nineteenth-century the cross-Channel literary zone persisted
as a sociological institution even as national literary fields became strengthened in conjunction
with an increasing devotion to the nation as an imagined community.” (24) Whatever their
differences, that is, the new paradigms of industrialization and modernity marked both nations,
and the exchange between them facilitated the development of science fiction above and
beyond the boundaries between nation-states.
In addition to English and French texts, I also necessarily mention American and
German writers and publications, because new technologies also enabled a swifter and more
effective circulation of people and ideas not just across continents, but also across the Atlantic.
A transatlantic telegraph cable was laid and functional by 1866, cutting communication time
from weeks to minutes (Arronax and Captain Nemo visit it in one of the final chapters of Vingt
mille lieues sous les mers). In chapters one and two, I consider the kinds of virtual national and
world communities this kind of communication enabled, and explore in particular Verne’s
depiction of the “global village” (McLuhan) in Robur-le-conquérant; for now, it suffices to say
that the very technologies whose consequences science fiction is concerned with enabled a
circulation of technoscientific achievements and writings that contributed to science fiction
coalescing as a literary form across national and linguistic boundaries. Moreover, the Expositions
Universelles, held in a new European or American city every few years, were also international
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endeavors. Intended in large part to showcase cutting-edge technologies, they facilitated an
exchange of ideas and the adoption of new inventions; most notably, Edison’s inventions were
demonstrated at Expositions in Paris, leading to an “electromania” sweeping the nation.
On the literary front, too, America inspired the French literary tradition, particularly in
the realms of fantastic literature and science fiction. Charles Baudelaire translated Edgar Allan
Poe’s works into French between 1847 and 1865, and Poe’s hoax story of a balloon crossing the
Atlantic, published in The Sun in 1844, inspired Verne’s Cinq semaines en ballon. Verne himself
also made a brief journey to America in 1867, visiting New York and Niagara Falls. As Jean
Chesneaux writes:
Verne was fascinated by the nineteenth-century United States, by the American
character, and by American society. For him it was as if the United States stood on the
frontier between “known worlds” and “unknown worlds” ... [W]ith hardly any ties to the
past and its rapid demographic, technical, and economic development, it constituted a
futurist theme in itself. In the world of the mid-nineteenth century, it was the United
States which came closest to the “model for development” which Verne dreamed for
humanity. (Quoted in Evans 2007, 35)
The trip would go on to have “an indelible influence on his writing,” (Evans 2007, 35) as more
than a third of his novels would later be set in America (Ibid). Rightly or wrongly, the United
States was perceived to be at the forefront of technological innovation, and an admiration of its
technical accomplishments unequivocally influenced French science fiction.
This transnational approach allows me to begin putting in conversation not only French
and British science fiction, but the critical traditions around each nation’s literature, which have,
unfortunately, remained largely separate. Even seemingly comprehensive histories that include
Wells, Verne, and their successors treat them in separate chapters (Luckhurst’s history, it should
be noted, elides any mention of Verne). In particular, critics tend to juxtapose Wells and Verne,
as well as the national contexts their oeuvres came out of. In his study of the scientific romance,
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for example, Brian Stableford insists that “there has always been a close relationship between
British scientific romance and a typically British species of speculative essays.” (5) This “typically
British” tradition of the speculative essay allows Stableford and other critics to position Wells as
the father of futurology, despite the strong tradition of the roman d’anticipation in France. This
juxtaposition of the two authors stems back to their own day: in a 1904 interview with the
periodical Temple Bar, Verne insists “our methods are entirely different. I have always made a
point in my romances of basing my so-called inventions upon a groundwork of actual fact…The
creations of Mr. Wells, on the other hand, belong unreservedly to an age and degree of scientific
knowledge far removed from the present, though I will not say entirely beyond the limits of the
possible.” (Jones, 670) Critics subsequently latched on to this opposition.
By contrast, although my dissertation devotes separate chapters to each author, I also
emphasize the ways in which these early pioneers of science fiction and their contexts speak to
each other. Thus, for example, I consider both Wells and Verne’s positioning of their fictions in
time as emerging out of a similar orientation toward the future, which privileges the mode of
cognition over that of enchantment. In the first and second chapters, I argue for understanding
science fiction as a thought experiment, made possible by the popularization of science in the
nineteenth century. This kind of popularization took place in both England and France, though it
took different forms, and so The Time Machine and Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires can equally
well be understood as thought experiments, as we will see in chapters one and four. Not only
does this allow me to put into meaningful conversation a variety of rich critical works on science
fiction, but it also serves as a necessary complement to my interdisciplinary approach. Since
science fiction represents a new paradigm that lies at the intersection of cultural, social, and
technoscientific history, and which marked the various nations of Western Europe, it is only
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through an interdisciplinary and transnational history that I can trace the emergence of this
paradigm and its representation in literary form.
The Past and the Present, Future Directions

I suggested above that the nineteenth century can serve as a laboratory for tracing the
way the explosion of technoscience into human life reshaped such fundamental categories as
identity, behavior, and cognitive processes. Technologically speaking, much of Europe was a
“blank slate” prior to industrialization, and this laboratory offers a space for mapping how the
forces of technoscience write on this blank slate. This blankness is a sharp contrast to today’s
technologically-saturated world, offering a mirror through which to understand our experiences
of novelty, and our construction of the future, in the present moment. Moreover, since science
fiction represents the advent of a new paradigm, I naturally anchor my framework of this
literary form in its technoscientific moment, which can allow for a versatility that makes it
applicable to illuminating the role of technoscience within our culture today. Throughout the
ensuing chapters, I therefore indicate moments when my claims about cultures of science in the
nineteenth century parallel the present and offer ways to understand it.
An apt example is the “imponderables” – light, heat, electricity, and magnetism – which
were the predominant subjects of Victorian scientific inquiry. As Sarah Alexander writes,
“imponderable matter, then, was for the Victorians invisible, undetectable, yet the very fabric of
the cosmos. It could explain simple phenomena such as the transmission of light and heat, and it
could provide physical explanation for what once seemed supernatural.” (2) These were physical
forces subject to human control, yet invisible and intangible; they entered the home, provided
illumination, enabled communication, and facilitated travel, yet could not be seen, touched, or
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perhaps even understood. Due to their invisibility and intangibility as they reshaped every
aspect of human life, they had something of the supernatural about them. In this sense, they are
not dissimilar from today’s machine learning: these powerful algorithms are trained on
enormous amounts of data to autonomously make decisions, performing tasks that range from
identifying people in photos to predicting rates or recidivism, driving cars, or calculating risk. In
fact, they cannot truly be said to “think,” while their probability-based decision-making process
is a black box, not understood by even the best computer scientists. Just like the Victorian
imponderables, they cannot be seen, touched, or understood, even as they similarly rework our
existence on every level, recommending the routes of our commutes and travels, tailoring the
information we consume, and deciding our eligibility for jobs and loans.10
But there are significant differences between these two moments in time. For one thing,
the rhetoric around novelty today possesses less of the supernatural bent that it did two
centuries ago. The physician Henry Morley wrote of the imponderables, for example, “In plain
words…I do believe in ghosts – or, rather spectres – only I do not believe them to be
supernatural.” (quoted in Alexander, 1) It is difficult to imagine a similar rhetoric around
machine learning today. Smart homes and personal assistants such as Alexa and Echo, though
occasionally the stuff of terrifying science-fictional plots, have become sufficiently normalized
that they do not seem uncanny when they enter the sphere of the home, as electricity did when
it first illuminated interiors. The present moment is significantly more saturated with
technology; thus, though a constant stream of technoscientific innovation inundates our lives,
its strangeness and wonder are articulated in different terms than uncanniness and the
supernatural. Juxtaposing the nineteenth century’s responses to the technologization of a pre10

For more on the pervasiveness of machine learning and Big Data in our lives, as well as its automation
of bias, see Cathy O’Neil’s Weapons of Math Destruction.
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industrial world with our technologically-saturated world can therefore place into relief our
contemporary attitudes towards innovation and its shaping of our lives.
A particularly fruitful point of comparison lies in the visibility of technoscience per se.
Steven Shapin has argued that, though science is everywhere, embedded in our lives, “We tend
to think of science happening in a small number of special places, purposely set aside for
scientific inquiry and instruction, but there’s a case for saying that science is now everywhere,
and that understanding its pervasiveness is important to describing both late modern science
and late modern society.” (2016) In fact, he argues, we rarely recognize it as science, and the
same, in his view, is true of technology: it is only visible to us as technology if it is cutting edge
(Shapin 2017). Tom Gunning, on the other hand, suggests that (technological) novelty is visible
not because it is new, but because our discourses prime us to see that novelty. Pointing to the
fact that the advent of electric lighting to St. Petersburg went largely unrecorded in the press
because “journalists lacked a discursive context, or tradition, for the expressing of such
astonishment,” he argues that “we must learn to be surprised, at least as recorded in print,
astonishment is not simply a natural phenomenon.” This raises multiple questions: do our
contemporary discourses around novelty foreground its strangeness, or has our saturation with
technoscience – in life and in the popular imagination - made novelty itself less remarkable?
And, given how powerfully technologies shape our lives (as the example of the machine learning
makes clear), what discursive tools might we use to make novelty visible again?
But, before we can think about the future, let us take a step back into the past.
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CHAPTER ONE
“THE LABORATORY OF THE MIND’S EYE”: SCIENCE FICTION AS THOUGHT
EXPERIMENT AND JULES VERNE’S VOYAGES EXTRAORDINAIRES
Science fiction is often referred to as a thought experiment, but this term is generally
used loosely, and there is no rigorous theoretical framework for understanding the form as a
thought experiment either within literary studies or the history and philosophy of science. This
chapter proposes such a framework and explores the possibilities it offers through an
interdisciplinary approach that brings together literary study and the study of the history of
science, technology, and society (STS). Drawing on the rise of collective experimental practice in
the seventeenth century as a theoretical foundation, I consider how the social and
technoscientific innovations of the nineteenth century allowed science fiction to function as a
virtual laboratory that interrogates the role of science and technology (technoscience) within
society. In this exploration, Jules Verne’s Extraordinary Voyages serve as a paradigmatic
example due to their popularity, revealing the relationship between science fiction and the
collective cultural imagination regarding technoscience in society.
The Virtual Laboratory and the Rise of Experimental Science

In science, particularly physics, a thought experiment explores the implications of
scientific assumptions without resorting to actual apparatus. The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction
suggests that some works of science fiction are thought experiments based on the same
principle: “any story which uses sf devices to expound or illuminate a scientific principle may be
described as a thought experiment.” This naturally delimits which works of science fiction
stories might be considered thought experiments. Similarly, Thomas Kuhn, in asking how a
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thought experiment, “relying exclusively upon familiar data,” can lead to new knowledge,
argues that its function is to force the scientist to “recognize contradictions that had been
inherent in his way of thinking from the start.” (1964, 242) Such a definition, which falls into the
more philosophical tradition of Gedankenexperiments, is obviously similarly restrictive. I set
myself apart from this tradition, and instead propose a framework for science fiction as a
thought experiment based in the history of experimental science. This framework is less
restrictive than the ones just outlined, and encompasses most science fiction.
Rather than expounding scientific principles or exposing the contradictions in a reader’s
conceptual apparatus, science fiction is, quite literally, a virtual laboratory. In their canonical
Leviathan and the Air Pump, Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer trace the rise of the experimental
method to the Scientific Revolution and, crucially, link it to the rise of science as a collective
practice. In contrast to the alchemist’s private closet, the laboratory became a semi-public
space; closed off to the masses, it was nonetheless accessible to fellow scientists. As they write,
“the experimental laboratory was contrasted to the alchemist’s closet precisely in that the
former was said to be a public and the latter a private space.” (57) In fact, the presence of other
scientists was crucial to the production of knowledge; in order for the results of an experiment
to become “matter of fact” – that is, accepted as knowledge, “experimental performances and
their products had to be attested by the testimony of eye witnesses.” (56) A scientist should
strive to multiply witnesses – other scientists – in order to secure assent for the results of his
experiment, significantly transforming science from private to collective.
Often, that collective endeavor entailed the witnesses being physically in the same
room, viewing the experiment, as in Image 2. Robert Boyle’s air pump trials, for example, “were
routinely performed in the Royal Society’s …. assembly rooms.” (56) However, only a limited
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number of scientists could be physically present at these demonstrations, and not all
experiments could be physically replicated by other scientists due to the prohibitive costs of the
materials and labor. Thus, since these experiments could not always be physically replicated or
directly witnessed, Robert Boyle created a practice Shapin and Shaffer term “virtual witnessing.”
This involved
the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates
the necessity for either direct witness or replication. Through virtual witnessing the
multiplication of witnesses could be in principle unlimited. It was therefore the most
powerful technology for constituting matters of fact. The validation of experiments, and
the crediting of their outcomes as matters of fact, necessarily entailed their realization
in the laboratory of the mind and the mind’s eye. (491)
Put more succinctly, it called for an experiment to be described in such detail that it could be
virtually replicated in a reader’s mind.
This was generally done through print and publication, creating a virtual laboratory
(Image 3). Robert Boyle, for example, “elected to publish several of his experimental series in
the form of letters to other experimentalists or potential experimentalists,” (Shapin & Shaffer,
59) although scientific records in this period often took the form of unpublished
correspondence. Boyle emphasized the use of various “literary technologies,” including
verisimilitude, the avoidance of a “the ‘florid’ style,” (66) and the use of mimetic images, making
it “as if that reader had been present at the proceedings.” (62) These literary technologies, as
well as the choice to publish, thus created a virtual laboratory that could be inhabited by
scientists anywhere, as well as a scientific community born of such collective inhabiting of a
virtual space, “as if” they were all present in the same laboratory.
Thus, in the period, an experiment and its results could be produced in a “real”
laboratory (Image 2) or in a “laboratory of the mind and the mind’s eye.” (60) (Image 3) This
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allows Shapin and Shaffer to draw a parallel between the physical and the virtual space of the
laboratory:
Matters of fact were to be produced in a public space: a particular physical space in
which experiments were collectively performed and directly witnessed and an abstract
space constituted through virtual witnessing. (69)
In short, they draw an equivalent between Image 1 and Image 2. Through the technology of the
air pump and the literary technology of virtual witnessing, the laboratory could exist both
physically and virtually; the virtual laboratory, created through print, was equivalent to the
physical laboratory visited and inhabited by scientists. And, equally importantly, the physical
space of the laboratory and the virtual space of the experimental records were both public
spaces; the latter was collectively inhabited through the possibilities of print, while the former
allowed for the physical presence of scientists as witnesses.
I want to suggest this paradigm as a framework for understanding science fiction as a
thought experiment: that is, as a collective experiment, performed virtually. In this framework,
the science fiction text (Image 4) becomes the equivalent of the scientific publication (Image 3).
However, while the questions Boyle’s virtual community of scientists sought to answer had to
do with the natural world around them, the concern of the thought experiment of science
fiction is a collective exploration and interrogation of the role and consequences of
technoscience in society – a difference rooted in the new role technoscience began to play in
the nineteenth century. Though seventeenth-century science became collective in
unprecedented ways, it was nonetheless limited to a community of gentlemen within enclosed
laboratories. It remained inaccessible to the public, and only aristocrats and royalty were able to
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visit the Royal Society’s assembly rooms for demonstrations11. In the early eighteenth century,
science continued to be a “divertissement raffiné” (Bensaude-Vincent, 50) for the well-to-do.
The lecture-demonstration, the primary form of scientific popularization during the period, was
targeted towards educated, aristocratic audiences and became the vogue in polite society and
took place in the enclosed domestic spaces of the aristocracy.
This is visible in the very nature of the scientific instruments used for these
demonstrations: they were objets d’art as much as tools for the teaching of science. Image 5
shows an air pump used by one of the most famous of the eighteenth century lecturedemonstrators, the Abbé Nollet, and Image 6 a similar air pump by Francis Hauksbee, dating
from 1709. (I chose the air pump, in particular, for the continuity this provides between Boyle’s
air-pump experiments of the Royal Society and the later popularization of science through the
air pump). The Nollet pump, in particular, has become recognizable for its fine red and black
finish and its gilding; Hauksbee’s pump, meanwhile, is made of fine, polished, engraved wood.
These are expensive objects, often belonging to private collections of instruments. It was only
when toward the end of the eighteenth century that the lecture-demonstration and its
instruments began to reach a wider audience, particularly through the efforts of itinerant
lecturers – as in Image 2, where such a lecturer offers a lecture-demonstration of Boyle’s air
pump.
Here, a brief note must be made about the images I use. There are no images of the
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By contrast, for example, Thomas Edison’s laboratory in Menlo Park became a tourist attraction in the
1870s, with visitors coming to watch the great inventor every day of the week. They could not be kept
out, forcing the newspapers to intervene and suggest the public allow the great inventor quiet and privacy
to continue his work.
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collective experiments or demonstrations of the Royal Society,12 a fact that reveals their
inaccessibility to anyone not part of the chosen elite invited to participate. Image 2 is thus a
placeholder showing a recreation of Boyle’s experiment with the air pump for a broader
audience than the one that would have been allowed into the Royal Society’s chambers, but
which nonetheless reveals the collective nature of Boyle’s air-pump demonstrations. By the time
Joseph Wright painted this picture in 1768, air pumps (which had been an expensive instrument
to build in Boyle’s day, costing 35 pounds – the yearly salary of the Curator of the Royal Society)
were relatively commonplace, and often used by lecturers in natural philosophy at public
demonstrations, which were performed in town halls or other large buildings for a ticket-buying
audience. It was in this second half of the eighteenth century that scientific instruments ceased
to be expensive objects limited to aristocratic collections, and were able to be purchased by a
wider public.
Then came the Industrial Revolution, to England and then to France. Science and
technology became not only more accessible but more relevant to the public. Enlightenment
demonstrations were about scientific principles and conceptual apparatus, and the view of
experimental philosophy “as a means towards a deeper understanding of the majesty of God is
typical of the eighteenth century.” (Turner, 5) But with the Industrial Revolution, “the eruption
of what Mumford called ‘technics’ into the social structures of nineteenth-century France
drastically altered the bases upon which this society had functioned for hundreds of years.”
(Evans 1988, 9) No longer the purview of gentleman-scientists in their enclosed laboratories or
aristocrats in salons, technoscience fundamentally reshaped the way people existed in every
aspect of their lives, and it became necessary to understand not just scientific principles but
12

I have been unable to find any such images after searching in numerous science history libraries,
including that of the Royal Society, and consulting with their archivists.
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their uses, the technologies they could produce, and their implications on a social scale.
A useful way to understand the scope and significance of this new role played by
technoscience is to draw on the concept of “technosocial engineering,” a term coined by Brett
Frischmann to refer to “designing and using technological and social tools to construct,
influence, shape, manipulate, nudge, or otherwise design human beings.” (2015) These tools
can be anything from architecture to legal institutions and technologies like GPS. Such
engineering has obviously always existed in various ways, such as the layout of cities that orders
how people move through space and interact with each other, and is even arguably inevitable.
Frischmann argues, however, that such “human construction through technological means has
not been uniform over time, and … we’ve experienced acceleration over the past few decades
with the near-ubiquitous deployment of various information and communications
technologies.” (2016, 2) Technosocial engineering is also a useful framework to understand the
unmatched technologization and transformation of urban and social spaces in the nineteenth
century, and, in fact, contemporaries of these social and technological changes articulated them
in highly similar terms. For example, journalist and science popularizer Victor Meunier wrote
how “la science tend à la constitution d’une société nouvelle.” (176) Later in the century,
journalists would similarly write of how air flight would transform everything from warfare to
bourgeois pastimes. Naturally, given these all-encompassing transformations, contemporaries
worried about the consequences, and their concerns were myriad: the ugliness of
industrialization, the destruction of history through urbanization, and the upending of gender
roles as women went to work in factories are but a few. The new accessibility of print and the
mass production of literature discomforted many, while later in the century, there was
pushback against widespread gas and electric lighting due to the possibility of fire.
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The increased relevance of technoscience in the public sphere led to even greater
scientific popularization in both France and England. The aim of “mettre la science à la portée de
tous” (Bensaude Vincent 50) took every available form, from books, books, lectures,
demonstrations, courses, museums, and international Expositions, targeting every demographic
from children to professionals. Nonfiction books explained scientific concepts to children using
fairies or demonstrated practical applications to manual workers and fiction that taught science,
such as the novels of Jules Verne, became bestsellers. The Expositions Universelles, though
highly entertaining, were also motivated by the need to demonstrate new technologies to the
public and familiarize them with new inventions. Bensaude-Vincent points out that around this
period, newspapers began to regularly publish ‘comptes rendus’ of the meetings of the
Académie des Sciences, “côtoyant les rubriques politiques, mondaines, économiques, et
littéraires.” (50) Thus, “la science s’installe dans les colonnes de l’actualité. Elle participe pleinpied à l’univers quotidien tissé par la presse quotidienne. » (Ibid) This created a model in which
innovations in science and technology were part of “l’actualité,” just as important to keep up
with as political or economic news.
In short, science and technology were no longer the elegant entertainments of high
society, or theatrical demonstrations for aristocrats lucky enough to visit the Royal Society;
instead, they became practical and social concerns on a daily basis. This increased relevance of
technoscience in the social sphere and its concomitant popularization hugely enlarged the
community of those interested in and concerned with technoscience. Boyle’s scientific
community, despite his emphasis on the “multiplication of witnesses,” was a limited one, as he
required that witnesses be both scientifically educated and morally upstanding – limiting them
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to gentlemen-scientists. But in the nineteenth century, this virtual community of witnesses
increased greatly.
The Sociotechnical Imaginary
To better understand the newfound significance of technoscience as a collective
concern, STS provides a useful framework: that of the sociotechnical imaginary. Sheila Jasanoff
emphasizes how crucial it is not to treat “the material apart from the social,” (2) urging the
importance of “conceptual frameworks that situate technologies within the integrated material,
moral, and social landscape.” (3) She provides one such framework, that of the sociotechnical
imaginary, which is useful for understanding both transformations of European society with the
advent of industrialization and the emergence of science fiction.
Jasanoff defines sociotechnical imaginaries as “collectively held, institutionally
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of,
advances in science and technology.” (6) This collective aspect bears emphasizing: Charles
Taylor notes that the social imaginary is “that which enables us to carry out the collective
practices that make up our social life,” (108) and Appadurai refers to the imaginary as a
“constructed landscape of collective aspirations.” (31) That is, an imaginary is not an individual
vision of the future, but the collective visions, aspirations, hopes, and fears of the future of a
nation, community, or institution.
Sociotechnical imaginaries are collective visions of the future that simultaneously shape,
and are shaped by, technoscience; they are the embodiment of “co-production,” which
describes the way “knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work
and constitutive of forms of social life.” (Jasanoff, 2-3) More explicitly, the relationship between
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the imagination and technoscientific production functions in two directions, as social and
cultural forms influence the directions of technoscientific progress, which in turn shapes society.
Technoscience thus forms an indelible part of the cultural imagination and, consequently, of
social practice.
These imaginaries, I argue, came into being in the nineteenth century due to a
combination of factors. Significant among them is the fact that the future became a realistic
concern in this period. As Caroline Grubbs notes, “philosophical and literary interest in the
future increased over the course of the nineteenth century as a response, in particular, to
scientific discoveries.” (14) Where, previously, the future had been the realm of prophets and
astrologers, the “collective, philosophical future” (ibid) became a serious, and realistic, concern,
in part because new technologies of communication and transportation caused a perceived
acceleration of time. As Reinhart Koselleck notes, “if a particular contemporary becomes aware
of an increase in the weight of the future in his range of experience, this is certainly the effect of
the technical-industrial transformation of the world that forces upon its inhabitants ever briefer
intervals of time in which to gather new experiences and adapt to changes induced at an ever
increasing pace.” (3) Koselleck here brings together two forces: the technical-industrial
transformation of the world, and a new attitude towards temporality and the future, both of
which caused paradigm shifts in how technology, society, and the future were understood.
Sociotechnical imaginaries, I argue, arose as a result: the combination of technoscience
transforming society and a new concern about the future made necessary social imaginaries
that were realistically concerned with technoscience, the future, and the way the former shapes
the latter. Since a sociotechnical imaginary is, necessarily, a collective vision of the future and
the social order, inflected by science and technology, it follows that a sociotechnical imaginary
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cannot exist at a moment when science and technology do not significantly shape collective
existence. The nineteenth century, as the moment of industrialization in France, therefore offers
a landmark moment for studying sociotechnical imaginaries, for it focuses on a moment when
they became necessary. Technoscience, in transforming social existence at every level and
causing significant paradigm shifts, needed to be made coherent, and new understandings of
the social sphere that accounted for technoscience were necessary.
For Jasanoff, sociotechnical imaginaries are “associated with active exercises of state
power,” but it is useful to expand her definition by returning to Charles Taylor’s broader
definition of social imaginaries and therefore collective action. He describes the social imaginary
as:
…the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met,
and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. (22)
That is, an imaginary defines how individuals understand society as a totality and their
relationship to it, which in turn defines their expectations and their behaviors and aids their
participation in society. With the explosion of technoscience into society in the nineteenth
century, interpersonal and social relationships, norms, expectations, and collective practices
naturally transformed. New understandings of “how things fit together” that included
technoscience were required – much in the same way that, in our contemporary moment, our
understanding of society and the relationships of individuals to this whole is dependent on our
conceptions of technologies such as social media, Big Data, and surveillance. New sociotechnical
imaginaries emerged that were not always engaged in active exercises of state power, but which
performed the necessary work of maintaining social order in a changing world and providing
individuals with a crucial understanding of the social (and global) whole.
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Through sociotechnical imaginaries, we can begin to understand why science fiction
arose at this moment in time. Though Jasanoff refers to science fiction as “a repository of
sociotechnical imaginaries,” (337) the literary form plays no role in her scholarship on such
imaginaries.13 But science fiction can and does play a crucial role not only in shaping collective
visions of the future, but also in helping normalize and constitute the expectations and
behaviors that allow us to exist within a modernity. As such, science fiction emerged at the same
moment when sociotechnical imaginaries arose to bring coherence to living within modernity.
As a literary form concerned with possibility, the future, and the role of technoscience in
society, science fiction plays a pivotal role in our conceptions of the future, particularly as
shaped by science and technology; it naturally intertwines with our sociotechnical imaginaries,
contributing to them and serving as a locus for articulating collective hopes and fears about the
future. Consequently, a major intention of the frameworks I propose in this chapter is to return
it to its rightful place in discussions of the intersection between society, culture, and
technoscientific practice.
Social Imaginaries and Imagined Realities

Collective visions of the future can only be constituted if there is a defined collective,
and social theorists point to the nineteenth century as the emergence of nationalism and the
due to transformations in literacy, print, and education. The nation, an imagined community the link to the word “imaginary” is obvious – is constituted largely in the virtual space of print,
which becomes a locus for uniting a nation and collectively interrogating its future. At the same

13

The anthology Dreamscapes of Modernity, edited by Jasanoff, and from which many of the above
quotations are drawn, does not contain a single chapter that is devoted to or considers science fiction as a
cultural and imaginative force that can contribute to the production of sociotechnical imaginaries.
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time, a different set of imagined communities emerged through print in this period: those of
fiction, as new understandings of the imagination and the new possibilities of print culture
allowed for newly collective imagined spaces. A crucial link I want to draw is therefore between
the imagined community of the nation and the imaginary space of fiction, both of which were
collective and virtual, and both of which were, crucially, constituted through print.
On the social front, the nineteenth century is understood to be the period of the birth of
nationalism, with the nation now classically defined by Benedict Anderson as an imagined
community. A number of factors contributed, but the most significant of these is related to
print, as the new affordability of newspapers allowed for its circulation and accessibility to
almost any individual in the nation. Furthermore, the standardization of the French language
and of education meant both a rise in literacy and the possibility that citizens from every
province would speak – and read- the same standardized French. What Anderson termed
“national print-languages,” combined with the new affordability of newspapers, allowed print
culture to constitute the imagined community of the nation, whose citizens could access
national culture and politics. Consequently, though it was impossible for any citizen to meet all
of their fellow citizens, a sense of belonging to the abstract idea of “the nation,” constituted
virtually, became possible.
At the same time, similarly virtual and collective fictional spaces were being constituted
through print. Michael Saler points out that a new acceptance of the imagination, and of
imaginary worlds as places for adults to “play,” arose in this period, leading to the rise of
collectively inhabited fictional spaces. Such imaginary worlds- a phrase evocative of Anderson’s
imagined communities - were constructed through a variety of literary technologies, such as
maps, footnotes, charts, and glossaries. These technologies, generally used to map the real
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world, were applied by these authors to the fictional one. Such encyclopedic and documentary
practices not only fleshed out these fictional worlds, but gave them the impression that these
worlds were real, even if they were not literally tangible -– just as the imagined community of
the nation was similarly real, and yet not tangible except through the material records of its
existence. Print again played a significant role, as the newfound accessibility of print and the
invention of letters pages in newspapers gave these fictional worlds a communal character that
likened them to the imagined community of the nation. These fictional worlds were welldeveloped and believable, a sort of pre-digital virtual reality that could be collectively and
virtually inhabited in the same way as the nation.
The imagined community of the nation and the imaginary world of fiction are thus both
collective and virtual, in that they do not exist in physical space, but in the virtual space of print.
Furthermore, the nation and the fictional world did not simply exist in parallel in the world of
print, but were intertwined. Saler emphasizes this, drawing on Habermas’ concept of the public
sphere to note that it became “possible to inhabit…imaginary worlds communally and
persistently as a result of new public spheres of the imagination.” (17) Habermas charted the
emergence of new public venues for discussion, such as coffee-houses, in the eighteenth
century, and in borrowing his expression, Saler draws a parallel not only between collective
physical and abstract spaces (as do Shapin and Shaffer), but also between collective social and
fictional spaces. In coffee houses and salons, newspapers circulated and matters both literary
and political were discussed, a clear forerunner of the public space of print.
Additionally, in the nineteenth century, political concerns and literary matters were
printed in the same space: a newspaper reporting on social, political, and economic news – that
is, matters of the state – would often simultaneously include literary reviews, discussions, and
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even serialized novels (romans-feuilletons) Just as scientific matters appeared alongside political
matters, literary matters played a prominent role in the same space. An individual could
consequently participate in the imagined community of the nation (by keeping up with the
news) and the imaginary world of fiction (by reading a roman-feuilleton) in the same
publication, written in the same standardized French.
This marked a transition from the eighteenth century Republic of Letters, which serves
as a logical middle point between the seventeenth-century laboratory and the imagined
communities and imaginary worlds of the nineteenth century. The Republic of Letters was a
collective virtual space that dealt with questions of scientific and social interest – a “certain
empire which holds sway over only the mind” and within which knowledge is exchanged,
collaborated upon, verified, and critiqued. One of its hallmarks, too, was comparisons between
“the powers of sovereign states and the powers of the mind,” (Daston, 368) suggestive as a
precursor of the nation state as an imagined community. But the Republic of Letters also
differed from the imagined community of the nation, for “neither nationality nor language was
the primary unit of style or affiliation,” (Ibid) at least ideally. Though participants in the Republic
of Letters “sometimes attached themselves to the ideal of national glory,” (378) this “thirst for
national glory among scientists rarely impeded international exchanges and collaborations, in
contrast to the more virulent nationalism initiated under Napoleon.” (Ibid) There are other
differences too, which reveal both the trajectory and its nineteenth-century endpoints. Most
obviously, this is a “Republic” that existed through letters, though scientific journals also played
a part, deriving from the epistolary nature of many of the Royal Society’s experimental records.
As Daston notes, “the transition between learned letter and learned article was not always
smooth,” (Ibid, 371) and we shall see in Verne’s Voyages Extraordinaires a similar tension
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between the scientific record and the first-person narrative. The Republic of Letters was also
limited to intellectuals and their patrons, with little trust for “the general public,” (Ibid, 380)
which is strikingly different from the ubiquity of affordable print matter in the nineteenth
century.
The printing press thus becomes both cause and symbol. Innovations in printing
technology due to the Industrial Revolution are one of the reasons that access to printed matter
became affordable and widespread, allowing for the creation of imagined communities and
imaginary worlds. Additionally, another technology, the telegraph, made communication almost
instantaneous, bolstering journalism and allowing the rapid spread of news through print. The
virtual communities of print culture, including virtual laboratories that considered the role of
technoscience in society, were thus made possible by the very same technoscientific
advancements they collectively interrogate.
This returns us to Boyle’s virtual laboratory, and consequently to the thought
experiment. The “laboratory of the mind’s eye” that Shapin and Shaffer introduce was a sort of
circumscribed virtual reality: virtual witnessing allowed multiple scientists to inhabit the same
virtual laboratory to verify the same experimental results, forging a communal virtual reality for
the imagined community of experimental scientists. Like an imaginary world, the laboratory of
the mind’s eye was a virtual reality; like the nation, it was an imagined community. And like both
of them, it was made possible through print. Science fiction similarly allows collective
participation in an imagined experiment within a virtual reality constituted through print – that
is, it allows an equivalence between Image 3 and Image 4. Like Boyle’s experimental records, the
fictional worlds of nineteenth century print culture allowed a collective inhabiting of the virtual
laboratory of science fiction. Aided by the spread and popularization of technoscience in the
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period, the same spaces of print that educated individuals about technoscience permitted them
entry into a quasi-scientific experimental community, positioning the reader as the experimental
witness within a virtual laboratory in which visions of the future could be realized, their
implications explored, their premises taken to their extreme and tested.
With this framework, we can begin to understand how works of science fiction can
function as thought experiments through a case study of the Voyages Extraordinaires. Verne’s
novels were virtual realities created through print culture, and Michael Saler notes how Verne’s
extensive use of numerous paratexts created a reality effect:
The lavish editions issued by Verne’s publisher Hetzel included maps, charts, and
footnotes as well as numerous full-page illustrations. These sumptuous volumes lacked
the photographs that were to impart a greater degree of realism to many of the works
of the New Romance. Nevertheless, from their colorful bindings to their graphic
interiors, they exuded a theatrical quality that framed the narratives as artificial worlds
unto themselves. (62)
Artificial worlds, indeed, but ones so well developed, and so realistically portrayed that they
permit a truly immersive experience in a virtual world. Daniel Compère, too, notes the Voyages’
intertextuality and references to existing scientific texts, arguing that “par ces autoréférences,
Verne bâtit une œuvre qui se constitue en un univers clos,” (145) an imaginary world that is
enclosed yet habitable.
This enclosed world creates perfect experimental conditions to test not the scientific,
but the social consequences of technoscientific innovations. Any valid experiment must, by
definition, be bounded and tightly controlled: it isolates those features of physical reality that
are relevant to its scope, changes or controls them, and leaves out the rest. In fact, a laboratory
experiment by its nature cannot replicate the world in all of its complexity, and nor does it seek
to. An experiment dealing with the laws of mechanics, for example, finds both relativity and the
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quantum level irrelevant to its work. The ensuing results only describe one layer of reality, yet
remain valid –to again use the example of the laws of motion, Newtonian mechanics perfectly
describes the motion of objects at the “regular” level, but fails at the large or small scale, where
relativity and quantum physics intervene.
An experiment is, in this way, not dissimilar to a diagram as John Bender and Michael
Marrinan define it. Drawing on Diderot’s Encyclopedia, they point to the way its diagrams do not
propose to illustrate every detail of a machine or every step of a process, but “have restricted
them to the important movements of the worker and to only those phases of the operation that
are very easy to portray and very difficult to explain.” (12) Presenting a variety of métiers, the
Encyclopedia’s diagrams allow the reader to grasp the processes inherent in each of these
trades, rather than merely facts and figures, through correlation of a variety of pictorial
information – from tableaux to discrete images of the tools of the trade –across a “virtual” space
of whiteness. Rather than being immersed in a mimetic world of representation, the reader thus
actively acquires information about the process inherent in the activities being described.
Verne’s novels thus create perfect laboratory conditions for experimentation while
functioning as diagrams. They have often been called “microcosms” by critics, for they take
place within an enclosed space and represent a circular trajectory. These microcosms, whether a
steamship (Une Ville Flottante) or a hypothetical city (Les Cinq Cents Millions de la Bégum),
isolate that which is significant to their work – technologies and their effects - while leaving out
ancillary concerns that it leaves to other novelists: the social and urban spaces that writers such
as Balzac, Hugo, and Zola have so extensively explored. They have the encyclopedic aim of,
Hetzel’s words, “résumer toutes les connaissances géographiques, géologiques, physiques,
astronomiques, amassées par la science moderne,” and each novel is like an entry in an
52

encyclopedia, dedicated to a particular trade, or, more aptly, a particular field of scientific study.
And indeed, each of Verne’s novels focuses on one “SF concept” (Suvin, 176)– that is, one field,
such as geology, gravity, evolution, or the prehistoric past, and the theories and possibilities
within it. Other fields of scientific thought and knowledge remain largely irrelevant.
Consequently, as Unwin points out, “Verne’s scientists…seek above all to find the answer to a
single question,” (9, 2005) only ever add “one technical innovation” (Suvin, 173) and end with
the addition of “one discrete fact.” (Ibid, 174) This is not a shortcoming of the novels, but the
hallmark of a successful experiment: the creation of a microcosm wherein variables are
controlled and one discrete fact is elicited is precisely the procedure of experimental science.
And, as diagrams reveal processes rather than concrete facts and figures, each novel distills a
particular scientific or technological field to examine the processes through which the
technoscience particular to that field enters into and affects the social sphere.
In this way, Verne’s enclosed microcosms are not unlike the virtual experimentation of
his contemporary, Emile Zola. Zola’s experimental novel similarly purports to be, in novelistic
form, an experiment in the rigorous sense of the word: a virtual world created based on careful
observation of the physical and social world. Based on those observations, the writer gives
impetus to his variables – characters and social forces – to see what results are produced, much
like a mathematical model or a diagram. But where Zola’s experimental novelist observes and
painstakingly describes the world as it is, the science fiction author inserts a “novum” – literally,
“something new” - into the human world and considers the effects. This novum is always a piece
of technology in the Voyages Extraordinaires, as it usually is in science fiction more largely. And
though science fiction requires imaginative extrapolation that ventures beyond the pure
observation Zola prescribes, it is usually based on careful documentation and research: just as
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Zola is famous for the hundreds of pages of research for each of his novels, Verne also
conducted extensive research in the books and publications of the day.14 In more rigorously
scientific terms, this novum is the independent variable, while the outcome is the dependent
variable. Everything else is a control variable that remains the same.
For the same reason, Verne’s novels demonstrate, on the whole, social stasis. Arthur
Evans notes that Verne “embed[ed] his science and technological extrapolations in easily
recognizable social institutions and mores,” thus portraying “technological change with social
stasis.” (1988, 34) Unwin, too, claims that “Jules Verne is not quite the father of science fiction
that he is so often claimed to be, for when he writes of global travel and technological wizardry,
it is firmly in the context of nineteenth-century values and expectations, and almost always
within contemporary developments in mind.”(2005, 6) Rather than functioning as a
counterweight to technological novums, however, this stasis allows Verne to control his
variables, and to focus on isolating and exploring the vectors of influence that interest him while
removing the noise15.
Additionally, the Vernian machine often functions, in itself, as a laboratory for the
story’s characters. Martin Willis notes, for example, that the Nautilus “performs the function of
both laboratory and expeditionary vehicle,” (151) existing “both in the field of oceanology and
the enclosed space of the closet.” (150) By being mobile, it is able to delve quite literally into its
field of study, making it possible to study the specimens of the field within the conditions of the
laboratory. The protagonists of De la terre à la lune are able to test Newtonian mechanics as
they fly from the Earth to the moon. But though the experimental space is isolated and
14

Verne used extensive note cards to index his research, which are currently held in the Della Riva
collection in Amiens.
15
Additionally, this social stasis remains a hallmark of science fiction today, wherein technology usually
changes faster than social mores or cultural assumptions.
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enclosed, the public is nonetheless able to participate in that experiment through print. The
physical laboratories within the novels may be accessible only to Verne’s heroes and their
companions, just as only a limited number of witnesses were physically present at Boyle’s
experiments and in early experimental spaces, but these laboratories become virtual and
multiply their witnesses through the possibilities of print – as well as the telegraph, upon which
journalism was heavily dependent in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the end of De
la Terre à la lune, for example, “la palpitante nouvelle si impatiemment attendue éclata comme
un coup de foudre dans les Etats de l’Union, et, de la, s’élançant à travers l’Océan, elle courut
sur tous les fils télégraphiques du globe.” (241) Although the moon canon is inhabited by a trio
of Vernian heroes – just as the laboratory is the space of scientific professionals – that
laboratory becomes virtually public.
The ending of Verne’s novels frequently follows this pattern. Professor Arronax, having
escaped the Nautilus, writes down the story of his adventures, emphasizing that “il est exact.
Pas un fait n’a été omis, pas un détail n’a été exagère. C’est la narration fidèle de cette
invraisemblable expédition…” (593) Evoking Boyle’s virtual witnessing, Arronax’s record is so
“exact” as to enable a perfect reproduction, in the mind of the viewer, of his journey. Nemo’s
submarine may be an inaccessible microcosm, but like a laboratory, it is rendered virtually
accessible to the reader through print. Professor Lindebrock, at first an aloof scientist in Voyage
au centre de la terre, becomes “membre correspondant de toutes les sociétés scientifiques,
géographiques et minéralogiques des cinq parties du monde” (306) upon publication of his
expedition to the center of the Earth. Axel writes “je dois ajouter que ce voyage au centre de la
terre fit une énorme sensation dans le monde. Il fut imprimé et traduit dans toutes les langues ;
les journaux les plus accrédités s’en arrachèrent les principaux épisodes, qui furent commentés,
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discutés, attaqués, soutenus … » (305) The record of the expedition enters into the virtual
community of science.
Just as these physical laboratories are made accessible to the public within the stories,
they become virtual laboratories for the reader of the novels. For example, the publication that
allows Professor Lidenbrock entry into all the scientific societies shares a title with the novel
itself: Voyage au centre de la terre. This identity between the text the reader is perusing and
that which is published within the world of the novel positions Verne’s reader as the
experimental public within the novels, virtually participating in an experiment they do not
physically have access to. That is, the Voyages Extraordinaires posit themselves as scientific
texts – as records of experiments – that the virtual community of print created by Verne’s
novels can participate in. They mimic both the scientific text and the creation of a scientific
community engaged in collective experimentation. Just as Boyle constituted his virtual
community of scientists through the publication of experimental record, Verne makes use of the
possibilities afforded by print culture to create a collectively-inhabited virtual space of
experimentation.
The Extradiegetic Space of Print and Verne’s Novels as Scientific Journals

Nineteenth-century print culture created overlap between two virtual communities:
that of readers of fiction, existing in the virtual realities created by literary worldbuilding, and
the quasi-scientific community of scientifically literate readers of scientific texts. In fact, literary
texts at the time often positioned themselves as scientific texts and were even mistaken for
them. Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” a quasi-scientific story about
the moment of death, was reprinted in London as the pamphlet “Mesmerism ‘in articulo
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mortis’,” (Image 7) and believed by many to be a factual account. Poe also convinced the New
York Sun to publish a hoax story about a balloon crossing the Atlantic in the space of a week; the
fiction was accepted as fact by the public for several days, and though it was eventually revealed
as untrue, it inspired Verne’s Cinq semaines en ballon. The “electroscope” hoax in the same
newspaper in 1877 offered a seemingly factual description by an “electrician” of a new
invention that resembles Robida’s telephonoscope, while Robida’s novel Le Vingtième Siècle was
republished in La Science Illustrée, alongside comptes rendus of meetings of scientific
academies. Though this last likely was not mistaken for a factual account, such “hoaxes”
abounded, but they are more than merely trivia in the annals of literary history. Such blurry
boundaries between scientific and literary texts reveal the way the virtual realities of fiction
become the virtual laboratories of science, inhabited by the same community of readers.
Such overlap between the virtual laboratory and the virtual reality of fiction was
possible, in part, because these works of fiction so expertly imitated scientific texts. “The Facts
in the Case of M. Valdemar,” for example, emphasizes fact in its title, an emphasis reiterated
early in the text as the narrator claims “It is now rendered necessary that I give the facts — as
far as I comprehend them myself. They are, succinctly, these.” In the London reprint of the
story, an advertisement added at the beginning states that “the narrative, though only a plain
recital of facts, is of so extraordinary a nature as almost to surpass belief.” In Baudelaire’s
translation of the story, the title refers to “La verité sur le cas de M. Valdemar.” In fact, even the
presence of narrative did not reveal the hoax: Poe’s story, for example, is a narrative that
purports to recount the facts. Similarly, Orrin Lindsay’s “Plan of Aerial Navigation, with a
narrative of his explorations in the higher regions of the atmosphere, and his wonderful voyage
round the moon!” purports to be a lecture given at the People’s Lyceum and consequently
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published. It also includes the narrative of a voyage around the moon, interspersed with
extensive footnotes that explain and work out mathematically the laws of physics and
gravitation, much like Verne’s De la terre a la lune.
The Voyages Extraordinaires position themselves in this context. They do not borrow
from but imitate scientific texts, positioning themselves alongside the numerous ‘lectures’ and
‘records,’ such as Poe’s and Lindsay’s, that purport to be factual accounts. Through form(at),
style, naturalistic and rhetorical techniques, illustrations, and the circumstances of publication,
they mimic the scientific article. Arthur Evans notes that “one of the most fundamental features
of Verne’s work is their profound heterogeneity,” (38) and, indeed, Verne’s novels are jampacked full of various forms of scientific discourses. Evans points, for example, to the
classifications and taxonomies that pervade the novels, making the Voyages Extraordinaires,
“themselves a sort of encyclopedia,” (Ibid, 40) while Willis emphasizes that the Vernian
narrative methodology is “clearly also the narrative method of natural history writing…In the
work of [] amateur naturalists, enumerations, statistical information, naming, and classification
form the basis for narratives that attempt to maintain both readerly interest and a high
standard of scientific integrity.” (141)
These scientific discourses and registers have generally been read as literary. That is,
critics tend to read Verne’s assemblage of scientific sources as a kind of heteroglossia, a literary
bricolage that combines multiple voices for a more powerful literary effect. Daniel Compère, in a
study of Verne’s extensive references and sources, argues that “Verne introduit dans son œuvre
des éléments qui, a priori, ne sont pas littéraires. Comme nous l’avons vu, la documentation
n’est jamais recopiée telle quelle, mais arrangée, récrite, pour ‘s’insérer dans le fil du discours
vernien sans rupture. La science est naturalisée vernienne.” (142) He emphasizes, that is, the
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transformation of non-literary elements into literary ones at Verne’s hands. Simone Vierne, too,
argues that “la comparaison avec les textes scientifiques modèles montre en outre un réel effort
de Jules Verne pour faire voir et pas seulement instruite, et, sans qu’il en soit conscient, pour
faire rêver.” (38) Contrasting Conseil with Arronax, she suggests that the former is a caricature
of scientific methodology, capable of nothing but mechanical classification, while Arronax’s
narration is full of a « jeu poétique très moderne sur les termes techniques.” (34) She calls the
result a “poésie moderniste,” (40) emphasizing Verne’s transformation of scientific terminology
into poetic effect. Similarly, Unwin insists that throughout the novels, “the literal denotation of
objective reality itself assumes, through the accumulation of its own words, a poetic and
incantatory force.” (2000b, 50) The poetic power of scientific language is pre-eminent.
I believe a recalibration of the relationship between the scientific and the literary in the
Voyages Extraordinaires is in order. Present readings of Verne, in claiming that he made
scientific writing poetic, assume the absence of literary and poetic elements from the scientific
texts, yet as Devin Griffiths points out, scientific writing in the nineteenth century saw the
“importance of literary modes to the scientific imagination,” (8) making use of what he terms
“literary technologies” in scientific texts. Consequently, when Verne’s objective description
“shades off into poetic invocation,” (Unwin 2000b, 50) it can be understood not necessarily as
transforming scientific writing, but as mimicking it. Michel Serres makes a similar argument,
both in regards to Verne and in his philosophy of science more largely: he emphasizes the
presence of poetry and myth within the sciences. “La science est la totalité des légendes du
monde. Le monde est l’espace de leur inscription. Lire et voyager sont un seul et même acte,”
(14) he writes. Science is already poetic and, in certain ways, literary, a fact the Voyages
Extraordinaires use to their advantage.
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Additionally, new disciplines in the period blurred the distinction between scientific and
imaginative practice. Paleontology, for example, reconstituted prehistoric mammals by relying
on imaginative and creative approaches. Since the physical traces of the past, such as fossils,
discovered by these disciplines necessarily left gaps that could not be filled in by scientific
methodology, the discipline relied on the imagination and intuition to fill in those blanks.
Georges Cuvier’s reconstitutions of various animals on the basis of their bones, for example,
“matérialise[nt] un ensemble d’hypothèses” (Cohen, 118) similar to the way that Axel’s vision of
the prehistoric past in Voyage au centre de la terre occurs when his “imagination [l]’emporte
dans les merveilleuses hypothèses de la paléontologie.” (214) His description of the way that the
“monde fossile renaît” is accompanied by an illustration (Image 8) that resembles Cuvier’s own
illustrations of his texts. (Image 9) These moments demonstrate the way the scientific
methodology of reconstructing the past and the artistic approach of depicting it were
inseparable; as such, it becomes tricky to say whether the prehistoric descriptions and
illustrations of Voyage au centre de la terre exist within an artistic or scientific register. They
suggest that this is an impossible delineation, further opening up space to read the literary texts
as scientific ones.
The Voyages Extraordinaires position themselves this context: as scientific texts with
literary, poetic, and imaginative content that would not have been antithetical to scientific
writing. This is, more largely, what can be said to define science fiction: while realist fiction,
though often heavily reliant on science in its content, is nonetheless primarily literary, science
fiction is scientific writing injected with the literary qualities. As scientific texts, Verne’s novels
do two things: firstly, they create an extensive virtual reality – the abstract space of the virtual
laboratory – inhabitable through virtual witnessing, borrowing the literary technologies of
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scientific texts in order to create and record a virtual experiment. Secondly, they elicit from the
reader a mode of reading scientifically, with a different frame of mind and process than that
required by literature. They include extensive mathematical, scientific, and technical
information that must be constantly analyzed and correlated. This mimics the reality of living
within technological modernity, where the endless influx of different kinds of technoscientific
information must be constantly made coherent by the individual living with it. It also requires a
form of reading that privileges constant analysis and correlation, making necessary an ongoing
making coherent of the world by the reader, occasionally at the expense of narrative.
Virtual Witnessing
The scientific registers of the Voyages Extraordinaires position them as experimental
records, while their attention to description makes possible the virtual witnessing of those
experiments. Virtual witnessing relied on meticulous description of the experiments in question,
and the Voyages are full of a “précision technique” (Vierne) that aligns them with the highly
empiricist Realism of the period. Literary Realism and scientific empiricism self-consciously
existed on the same spectrum in the nineteenth century, with literary writing positioning itself
as possessing the same empirical rigor as scientific texts. Hetzel claims in the introduction to Les
Aventures du Capitaine Hatteras, for example, that “il faut bien se dire que l’art pour l’art ne
suffit plus à notre époque, et que l’heure est venue ou la science a sa place faite dans le
domaine de la littérature.” The ideal of accurately, objectively describing reality was a driving
force behind both scientific and literary writing, and it is, in part, what makes possible the
meticulous description of virtual witnessing. In fact, Théophile Gauthier wrote in Le Moniteur
Universel that the Voyages Extraordinaires are “l’application à un fait d’invention de tous les
détails vrais, réels et précis qui peuvent s’y rattacher de manière à produire l’illusion la plus
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complète,” and the emphasis on exactitude and precision evokes virtual witnessing’s ideal of
exact description. Gauthier noted that the descriptions, “exacts et minutieux comme un livre de
bord, f[ont] naitre l’absolue sensation de la réalité. ” (quoted in Vierne, 21) Gauthier almost
suggests that, through their descriptions, they create an experience of virtual reality.
The imagery throughout Verne’s novels contributes to this virtual witnessing while
evoking another aspect of the scientific journal: the engravings, illustrations, and diagrams that
accompany scientific texts and that make it possible to reproduce (either in a physical or mental
laboratory) the details of an experiment or an experience (the two being encompassed, of
course, by the single word expérience in French). As Shapin and Schaffer write, “[the scientific
text] itself constitutes a visual source.” (61) And indeed, Boyle went to great lengths to include
pictures alongside his prose: he “consulted with the engravers and devoted great attention to
the manufacture of these images” (Ibid) even though doing so was expensive in the midseventeenth century, and therefore images were used sparingly. These images served a crucial
function: because they were highly mimetic, they aided in the multiplication of witnesses and
allowed for the replication of the laboratory and its experiment. Boyle’s famous image of his air
pump (Image 10), for example, “is not a schematized line drawing but an attempt at detailed
naturalistic representation complete with the conventions of shadowing and cut-away sections
of the parts. This is not a picture of the “idea” of an air-pump, but of a particular existing airpump.” (Ibid) This was a heavy departure from the previous depiction of scientists and
laboratories, such as those of the alchemist’s laboratory, which were highly symbolic rather than
representational in nature. Boyle even sometimes included engravings that depicted specific
moments in the experimental procedure, as for example, “a mouse lying dead in the receiver.”
(Ibid) Through this “density of circumstantial detail” and naturalism, Boyle’s images “imitated
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reality and gave the viewer a vivid impression of the experimental scene,” (62) making it
possible and more accessible to inhabit the virtual laboratory and witness an experiment at
which one is not physically present.
The illustrations in Verne’s novel perform a similar function, allowing for the inhabiting
of the virtual space of the text. Verne collaborated closely with the illustrators during the
process of producing the novels, much as Boyle collaborated closely with his engravers. More
importantly, Evans notes that “which passages are chosen for such pictorial representation
often seems decided less by their importance to the overall plot than by their pedagogical value
and/or their potential for enhancing the text’s local color, verisimilitude, or metaphoric
content.” (1988, 118) Evans’ evocation of verisimilitude is particularly significant: the
illustrations of “various cities, topography, monuments, flora and fauna, and unusual sights and
peoples” (Ibid) that make verisimilitude possible recall the “circumstantial detail” provided by
Boyle’s engravings. The depictions of Nemo’s undersea diving bells, the Kingdom of Coral, or the
ancient ruins of Atlantis are but a handful of examples, all of which accompany Arronax’s “field
notes.” If the narrative is a record of the expert Arronax’s fieldwork, then the illustrations are
analogous to those of new specimens or other discoveries that cannot be merely verbally
described.
In fact, the illustrations of the novels very much ask the reader to accept them as
scientific records rather than what they are: artistic renditions of the narrative by illustrators. At
a moment in Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, for example, Arronax expresses regrets that he is
“réduit a n’en conserver que le souvenir” of a descent four leagues below the surface, while
Nemo brings a camera that allows them to obtain “un négative d’une extrême pureté.” (444)
This negative is provided alongside the text (Image 11), and Arronax writes “c’est l’épreuve
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positive que j’en donne ici. On y voit ces roches primordiales…ces granits inferieurs…” (Ibid) That
“épreuve positive” is, of course, the “photograph” itself, which is labelled with that very same
phrase. And yet the illustration provided is not a photograph; it is an engraving by Neuville in the
exact same style as numerous others, but by providing a “légende” that labels that engraving as
the “épreuve positive,” Verne effectively asks the reader to accept that he is engaging in the
practice of what Daston and Galision term “mechanical objectivity” (43) – the use of
apparatuses to create naturalistic rather than idealized images of reality, towards which
scientific representation moved in the second half of the nineteenth century. In providing this
kind of photographic, “objective” proof of Arronax’s field excursion, Verne is using the tools,
both literary and visual, at his disposal to mimic the literary and visual technologies of scientific
writing. In doing so, he is asking the reader to invest in the fiction that the text is a scientific one,
and to approach it as such.
Disrupting the Narrative
At the same time as recording a virtual experiment, the novels require the record of that
experiment to be read as a scientific text – a form of reading that requires continuous, active
analysis, cross-referencing, and correlation, sometimes at the expense of narrative. Here it is
helpful again to draw on Bender and Marrinan’s concept of the diagram, which they define as “a
proliferation of manifestly selective packets of dissimilar data correlated in an explicitly processoriented array that has some of the attributes of a representation but is situated in the world
like an object.” (7) Their example is the plate of a pastry-maker’s shop in Diderot’s Encyclopedia,
which includes a view of a workroom full of objects and ingredients and, at the bottom, a
number of the implements used in the workroom, floating in a virtual space of whiteness. At the
bottom, that is, the components of the pastry shop are each realistically depicted but “isolated
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spatially and functionally from one another; they offer themselves to multiple regards and
users, and they generate an emptiness that invites movement.” (21) This movement and
multiple angles allow for active analysis and correlation; a diagram generates “understanding by
eliciting a study of [individual parts] in new and unpredictable re-formations shaped to a large
extent by the user’s orientation and expertise.” (52) Incidentally, Boyle’s engraving of an airpump (Image 10) is also a diagram: in addition to the pump itself, it includes all of its ancillary
components in a virtual space of whiteness, each one labelled, such that the reader must
actively correlate these components and the text that describes their functions to understand
the device’s workings.
The Voyages Extraordinaires similarly ask the reader to correlate different kinds of data,
both textual and visual, in such a way while challenging their ability to read for narrative or
suspense. The novels are full of footnotes, calculations, diagrams, ciphers, lists, monetary
amounts, and maps – that is, different sets of dissimilar data. In particular, footnotes and
calculations are especially prominent in De la terre à la lune; recalling Lindsay’s text on aerial
navigation, these footnotes tend to specify quantities, elucidate scientific laws, or define terms.
They also consistently ask the reader to pause the process of reading in order to follow or even
perform the mathematical calculations, reconcile the physical laws elucidated with the action of
the narrative, attempt to decipher the ciphers, or examine the maps and diagrams. This aspect
of Verne’s novels makes them deeply exciting, like puzzles, but also precludes them from being
read merely for suspense. Their various sets of data allow, and even ask, the reader – both
young and old – to practice the act of scientifically perusing, correlating, and making sense of
data to create a meaningful world-picture.
The Voyages Extraordinaires also ask the reader to correlate visual information, much
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like the pastry plate and the illustration of the air pump. This is particularly evident in the
numerous illustrations of flora and fauna throughout Verne’s novels, most obviously in Vingt
mille lieues sous les mers (Image 12). Like the components of the air pump, these undersea
organisms are each portrayed realistically, yet crammed artificially into a space where they exist
alongside each other as they never would in the real world. Such images exist alongside the
textual narrative, with its verbal enumerations and descriptions of the same flora and fauna, and
must be actively correlated by the reader. Another example lies in the depiction of Captain
Nemo’s diving bells (Image 13) These are based directly on ones Verne saw at the 1867
Exposition Universelle, and the illustration mimics directly the diagram provided for this
Exposition (Image 14), which shows a man wearing the diving bells from various sides, allowing
the viewer to correlate them into a 360-degree rendition of what it would look like. Similarly,
Verne’s characters are positioned in different stances – one is not wearing a diving bell at all – to
allow a similar correlation. This correlation also works alongside the text, which describes the
functioning of the diving bells, and further illustrations that show the characters walking under
the sea while wearing them (Image 15).
Verne also asks the reader to correlate between map and text. An obvious example is
staple of 20,000 Leagues under the Sea, where Arronax continually provides the latitude,
longitude, date, and time of day for the Nautilus’ travels, as in the following passage:
La direction du Nautilus se maintint au sud-est. Il coupa l’Equateur, le 1er décembre, par
142* de longitude, et le 4 du même mois, après une rapide traversée que ne signala
aucun incident, nous eûmes connaissance du groupe des Marquises. J’aperçus a trois
milles, par 8*57’ de latitude sud et 138*32’ de longitude ouest, la pointe Martin de
Nouka Hiva.. (208)
This passage, Willis notes, is reminiscent of the many published oceanological accounts of the
period, such as the following:
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I have the honor to acquaint you…that at 5 o’clock p.m., on the 6th of August last, in
latitude 24*44’ S and longitude 9*22’E, the weather dark and cloudy, wind fresh from
the N.W., with a long ocean swell from the S.W., the ship on the port tack, heading N.E.
by N., something very unusual was seen by Mr. Sartoris…( quoted in Willis, 145)
Willis argues that Verne’s “deployment of ship sightings, positions, movements, and the dates
and times of logbooks” positions his novel as an oceonological text. This is again the kind of
scientific language that, like Poe’s and Lindsay’s works, led readers to mistake literary texts for
scientific ones. Yet though the form of the above passage directly mimics an oceanological
record, the information contained within it only becomes meaningful through correlation with
another piece of information provided by the text: a map (Image 16) of the Nautilus’ entire
journey. It is through correlating the Nautilus’ trajectory with a reference to nearby land masses
(Nouka Hiva, the Marquises) that the reader can place the submarine on a map. The narrative of
Vingt mille lieues sous les mers constantly forces the reader to perform this cross-referencing of
the map, precluding passive immersion in the narrative.
In fact, diagrams undermine the very possibility of reading for suspense. By requiring
the active correlation of dissimilar data, they resist being “choreographed into a coherent
narrative thread,” (Bender and Marrinan, 25) provoking a form of reading that pauses time and
jars the reader out of the narrative. Verne’s novels often disrupt the flow of narrative in such a
way. For example, at a particular moment, Arronax “attendi[t] avec une certaine impatience que
le point fut reporté sur la carte” (406) so that he can divine the submarine’s direction. This
suspense is not shared by the reader, as the map in Image 15 of the submarine’s trajectory is
provided on the preceding page. In fact, Harpold notes that this map is a “a snapshot” of the
submarine’s itinerary whose significance is that the itinerary is shown “all at once, not as it
unfolds.”(22) The scientific register of the map precludes the literary possibility of narrative and
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suspense.
The description of a dinner Arronax enjoys aboard the Nautilus is another example:
Je fis honneur au repas. Il se composait de divers poissons et de tranches d’holothuries,
excellents zoophytes, relevés d’algues très apéritives, telles que la Porphyria laciniata et
la Laurentia primafetida. La boisson se composait d’eau limpide à laquelle, à l’exemple
du capitaine, j’ajoutai quelques gouttes d’une liqueur fermentée, extraite, suivant la
mode kamtchatkienne, de l’algue connue sous le nom de Rhodoménie palmée. (178)
It appears at first that Verne is taking to a comic extreme the tendency of the Realist novel to
describe, classify, and typify. Sarah Capitanio notes that the extensive documentation,
classification, taxonomies, and enumeration of the Voyages Extraordinaires “take to an extreme
the nineteenth-century Realist tendency to represent a world that is a priori circumscribable,
causal and explicable in a way that frequently blurs the boundaries between the novel and
scientific or technical manual.” (63) In this moment in particular, Verne certainly surpasses Zola,
who, for all his claims to empiricism, never resorted to Latin nomenclature.
In fact, for all the painstaking Realism of the period’s fiction, this moment, with its Latin
nomenclature, is jarring. However, if we read Verne’s text as a scientific document, a field
report or article for publication in a scientific journal, the attention to classes and species of the
edible organisms takes on a new angle. The Latin nomenclature draws attention to itself as a
way of describing the world, and in doing so, pauses the flow of narrative. It forces the reader to
transition from the mode of reading a literary text (which possesses plot and narrative and
suspense, all reliant on the flow of time) into the mode of reading a scientific text, which
requires a different kind of attention and a different sense of time. Additionally, this “jeu sur
l’étrangeté des noms inconnus,” (Vierne, 37) provokes a defamiliarization that evokes Bertolt
Brecht’s estrangement effect which, too, jars the reader out of a complacent, passive regard at
the narrative into a more active, analytical response to it. For Brecht as for Suvin, estrangement
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is a scientific way of viewing the world, an analytical response rather than a passive one. When
Verne evokes Latin nomenclature, therefore, he not only positions his texts as scientific ones,
but uses the language of science to create the estrangement effect that forms the foundation of
science fiction. That is, he unites the scientific form of reading – based on constant analysis and
correlation, rather than passive immersion – with a fundamental component of the experience
of reading science fiction.
It might be tempting to write off these moments of rupture, or the zealously painstaking
description, as the inadequacies of an inexperienced author with more interest in science than
style. The self-awareness of Verne’s texts, however, reveals a deeper attention to affect and
scientific ways of recording the world. The Voyages Extraordinaires are self-aware of themselves
as scientific texts that draw attention to their ability to describe the world while forcing the
reader into an analytical stance vis-à-vis empirical reality. Timothy Unwin, in particular, suggests
that Verne “forces us to question the purpose and the meaning of the conventions he departs
from and to think self-consciously about the traditions within which he is writing.” (2005, 14)
Invocations such as Arronax’s “quel spectacle! Comment le rendre!” (410) abound in the novels,
drawing attention to the difficulties of empirical description of the world. The aforementioned
illustration of the “épreuve positive” ask the reader to accept fictions in the place of such
description. At various moments, knowledge “of all kinds gets relayed, apparently for its own
sake, quite independently of the narrative, sometimes indeed in defiance of all known fictional
conventions.” (Unwin 11, 2005) Staging these ruptures and correlations, as well as these
moments of self-awareness, Verne asks us to think about the nature of scientific (and literary)
texts, and invites us to read in a different way: through analysis, estrangement, and rupture
rather than immersion and affect.
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Concern with Collective Science

Not only does Verne position the literary text as a scientific text, but he makes the role of
technoscience in the social sphere the central concern of that text. As always in his oeuvre,
there is a doubling: the creation of a virtual scientific community through the form of his novels
mimics the novels’ concern with the communal nature and social implications of technoscientific
endeavor. The paradox at the heart of the Voyages Extraordinaires is that though they take
place outside of society or “civilization,” they display a significant concern with the way
technology shapes human life on a social scale. Verne’s novels continually reach towards the
frontier, desperately seeking the uncharted and unknown; each of his heroes fears “the loss of
their individual freedom in a world increasingly dominated by collective human presence”
(Williams 2013, 107) and its technology. Verne’s scientists are often loners, attempting valiantly
to escape civilization and its double quest for knowledge and conquest through technology,
encapsulated in the idea of Progress – ironically relying on the very technologies whose power
they seek to escape. This has led scholars to emphasize the inaccessibility of technoscience to
the public.
Arthur Evans points out that in Verne’s novels, “in each instance where the electrical
power source of the Vernian machine is explained, the text always stops short of a complete
elucidation, leaving the ultimate key to the mystery unresolved.” (1988, 70) This is not untrue,
though it hardly renders Verne dissimilar from any other author of science fiction.16 But Verne is
not interested in solving the problem of how a submarine might be powered by electricity, or
exactly how a heavier-than-air machine might fly. Instead, he posits that such a solution exists,
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In a 1904, Verne differentiated his novels from those of his contemporary, H.G. Wells, by arguing that
they have a greater basis in scientific reality. See Jones, “Jules Verne at Home.”

70

and then proceeds to explore instead the wide-ranging social consequences that would ensue
from it. Thus, though Evans limits the role of science in Verne’s novels to two categories –
creating “special effects,” (1989, 98) or serving as a plot device or “verisimilitude-builder,” (ibid,
1) such a positioning elides the more prominent role technoscience plays on the social level in
these narratives.
In fact, Verne’s miraculous machines cannot but have an effect on the social whole, just
as their creators can never entirely escape from civilization – though their attempts to do so are
deeply revelatory. Through their otherness and their alienation from civilization, they help
reveal what is at stake within in - and Verne is deeply ambivalent about the answer. As Williams
writes, Verne’s heroes, doomed to death as their marvelous machines are to destruction at the
end of each novel, “highlight by contrast the basic health and sanity ‘of the true proprietors of
the world, whose only concern is to adapt themselves as perfectly as possible to situations of
which the complexity, not at all metaphysical nor even moral, involves very simply some piquant
caprice of geography.’” (2013, 130) In seeking to escape modernity, Progress, civilization,
conquest, and technology, they are destroyed as those forces push ever further. And for all their
efforts to keep their technological innovations for themselves, technoscience refuses to be
locked away in the utopian spaces of Verne’s machines, and its effects are inevitably far-ranging.
This is evident in the openings of Verne’s most prominent novels, which follow a similar
pattern in which both the expert (“savant”) and “amateur” communities come together to
engage in the same, highly public, debate over a matter simultaneously technoscientific and
social. In the first chapter of Vingt milles lieues sous les mers, for example, Nemo’s submarine is
a “phénomène inexpliqué et inexplicable”(31) whose nature and explanation provokes a debate
in which experts and amateurs debate both among themselves and with each other. While “les
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sociétés savantes et les journaux scientifiques” (34) discuss the question, which leads to an
“interminable polémique des crédules et des incrédules dans les sociétés savants,” (34) this
debate soon extends beyond a merely scientific collective and to the entirety of society. «Les
journalistes qui font profession de science » (34) engage in the matter; “Les négociants,
armateurs, capitaines de navires…de l’Europe et de l’Amérique, officiers de marines militaires de
tous pays, et, après eux, les gouvernements des divers Etats des deux continents se préoccupent
de ce fait au plus haut point” (32) – that is, merchants and military officers. And, finally, the
general public becomes engaged, as whispers about the monster “surexcitaient l’esprit public à
l’interieur des continents,” (31) while particular accounts “émurent profondément l’opinion
public.” (34) For all that Nemo himself has escaped from civilization, his marvelous machine
cannot help but have an effect on the social whole. Even at the depth of the sea, his
unprecedented technology cannot be invisible.
In fact, by the time Arronax arrives in New York, “la question brulait,” (40) a thirdperson phrasing that suggests that those interested in the question are not circumscribed in any
way, and Arronax himself is asked to provide his expert opinion on the matter in the New York
Herald. This newspaper will reappear repeatedly throughout Verne’s oeuvre; in Robur-leconquérant, for example, a subscriber writes in to it to suggest that the mysterious machine is a
missile from Les millions de la Bégum, another of Verne’s novels (published, as majority of the
Voyages Extraordinaires, in Hetzel’s the Magasin d’Education et de Recréation). This is but one
example of what Compère calls Verne’s “autoréférences,” which proliferate in his novels. Such
dizzying intertextuality highlights the way that a community of both experts and amateurs, and
the circulation of knowledge within it, is made possible due to the possibilities of print and
communication technologies. The opening of Robur-le-conquérant follows a similar pattern to
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Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, as the entire world debates a “phénomène inexplicable.” (4) In
addition to “les observatoires du monde entier” (5) that engage in scientific debate on the
question, “des milliers des feuilles publique s’emparèrent de la question, la traitèrent sous
toutes ses formes, l’éclaircirent ou l’obscurcirent, rapportèrent des faits vrais ou
faux…passionnèrent enfin les masses quelque peu affolées.” (5) Again, both experts and
laypersons, in scientific observatories or the popular press, have a stake in the answer. Both
novels presciently suggest Marshall McLuhan’s concept of the “global village,” made possible
through communication technologies and echoing the form and medium of the Voyages
Extraordinaires and the virtual laboratory they create.
These marvelous machines raise scientific questions that inevitably become social ones.
In the case of Nemo’s submarine, the nature of the creature that turns out to be the Nautilus
gains significance “comme il s’agissait là d’un intérêt public, puisque les communications
transocéaniennes en souffraient.” (41) Meanwhile, the noises made by Robur’s Albatros make
the discovery of its nature an equally pressing concern; moreover, Verne makes it explicit that
one day, Robur will return to “livrer le secret d’une invention qui peut modifier les conditions
sociales et politiques du monde.” (247) Just as science fiction deals with questions
simultaneously social and technoscientific, the societies within the novels must confront the
inescapable social implications of technoscientific innovations. In fact, these machines become
so socially significant within their fictional worlds that imaginaries form around them; through a
kind of doubling, Verne depicts the very sociotechnical imaginaries in which his novels
participate, showing himself to be aware of the way technoscience exists in public space and the
collective imagination. The Nautilus, for example, becomes so popular that “on le chanta dans
les cafés, on le bafoua dans les journaux, on le joua sur les théâtres….On le vit réapparaitre dans
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les journaux – à court de copie – tous les êtres imaginaires et gigantesques, depuis la baleine
blanche, le terrible ‘moby dick’ des régions hyperboréennes, jusqu’au Kraken démesuré.” (34)
Print culture and the public spheres of cafés and theatres are the vectors for the spread of these
imaginaries.17
But perhaps the most important thing the novels do to render technoscience a matter
of collective concern is to challenge the distinctions between amateur and professional science.
At a moment when science was becoming increasingly professionalized (the word “scientist”
was coined in the 1840s), the Voyages Extraordinaires blur the distinctions between specialized
scientific communities and the public whom that science affects. In his perceptive reading of
Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, for example, Martin Willis argues that the space of the Nautilus
inverts traditional hierarchies, as Professor Arronax becomes the amateur and Nemo the expert.
He points out that the Nautilus “reveals itself as the space of the dedicated amateur naturalist
but also as a professional site of oceanological knowledge,” (161) while Nemo’s collection
“performs a dual role as a private collection of the supreme amateur and as a hidden site of
professional oceanological expertise.” (Ibid) With amateurs taking on the roles of experts, Verne
offers a vision of technoscience that is accessible and relevant beyond the sphere of
professional science.
Robur
Verne’s most trenchant interrogation of technoscience’s role in the world, and of the
enterprise of science, is his 1886 novel Robur-le-conquérant. This text emphatically positions
science not as the subject of specialists, but as an endeavor that exists within social and political
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Verne’s novels, too, were frequently adapted by the theatre, with some adaptations having an
enormous financial success, but they are beyond the scope of this chapter.
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space, implicating quite literally the entirety of the world. It is perhaps the best example of the
Voyages Extraordinaires functioning as sociotechnical imaginaries for the concrete visions it
gives of technoscience within society. More than any other novel, perhaps, it abounds with
references, not only to scientific treatises and technical manuals (as do all Verne’s novels), but
also to the Universal Expositions (24), which position technoscience in a social and political
space, to Nadar’s highly publicized launch of the balloon Le Géant (Ibid), and to his manifesto in
favor of heavier-than-air flight, (65) from which Verne quotes.
The novel opens as the Albatros, the protagonist Robur’s heavier-than-air flying
machine, begins to appear all around the world, planting flags and playing melodies, and
becomes a concern “en tous pays de la terre, royaumes ou républiques.” (4) As the narrator
notes, “il fallait donc découvrir ce qui se passait” and where these noises are coming from,
because they are inescapable within “le globe terrestre.”(5) The entire world thus becomes a
laboratory, in which a new variable that is introduced – the novum that is Robur’s marvelous
machine – transforms existence. Opting out of this experiment is impossible, as it implicates the
entire world, and consequently, the scientific debate regarding heavier-than-air flight
transforms into a social question regarding the effects of such flight on a world community.
Technoscience is no longer the sphere of specialists given its far-reaching effects, and as the
scientific question becomes a social one, the circulation of knowledge between an expert and a
lay community becomes of paramount importance.
Yet despite the social significance of the phenomenon that turns out to be the Albatros,
the assent that is the ideal of Boyle’s virtual witnessing is utterly missing from the scientific
community within the novel, and more particularly from the Weldon Institute. Due to Robur’s
constant circumnavigation, the entire world has been transformed into a laboratory and allowed
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each scientist to physically witness the experiment that is the addition of this new variable – the
Albatros; due to the technologies of print and telegraph, that scientific community becomes a
virtual one. This is well emblematized by the illustration at the beginning of the first chapter of
Robur-le-conquérant (Image 17), which neatly encapsulates this virtual scientific community
created through print and communication technologies. Within the first chapter, observatories
and interested parties all over the world engage in the question of the inexplicable flying
machine, and the illustration depicts a kind of “flattening,” such that all the telescopes,
observatories, and scientists from around the world are shown together in the same image. One
can see multiple telescopes, being used to regard the sky by individuals of several discernible
nationalities and ethnicities. The “flattening” of the image thus evokes the equivalence Shapin
and Shaffer make between the physical and abstract spaces of the laboratory; Robur has
transformed the entire planet in to a physical laboratory, which, through the communication
technologies of print and the telegraph, becomes a virtual laboratory, allowing each scientist to
participate communally in the same experiment.
And yet, despite both physical and virtual witnessing, the experts cannot find consensus
and no assent is ever reached: in the first chapter, two gentlemen engage in a duel over the
tune the Albatros plays; a Chinese scientist proposes that the Albatros is “une machine volante”
(8) to universal laughter, while an anonymous op-ed suggests it is the projectile of Herr Schultze
from another of Verne’s novels. The disagreement of the scientific community is comically, but
aptly, symbolized by a few lines from the meeting of the Weldon Institute, a scientific
community of lighter-than-air aficionados:
“Jamais nous ne serons du même avis!”
“Jamais…Jamais !”
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“Alors à quoi bon disputer ?”
“Ce n’est pas la dispute ! C’est la discussion!”
The Weldon Institute, which positions itself as a group of experts on the subject of
airflight, can be read as a microcosm of the larger scientific community that has failed in its role
following a universally significant socio-scientific event. They reveal themselves to be a scientific
community separate from, and perhaps even irrelevant to, the social sphere, as well as
incapable of reaching agreement among themselves. After the votes for the Institute’s president
are split evenly down the middle (another failure of agreement), they choose the president
based on the exactness with which the candidates can find the middle of a line, with the loser
being less exact by “trois quinze-centièmes de millimètres.” (18) It is a scale at which a
microscope is required to judge the results, but the comedy of the moment reveals something
more important about the Institute: its irrelevance. By contrast to Robur, an amateur who
agitates the entire “globe terrestre,” the Weldon Institute is a self-proclaimed community of
experts whose values and concerns are comically distant from actual concerns within the world.
These opening chapters of the novel dramatically display the drawbacks of an insular,
specialized scientific community detached from the world that science affects.
The plot of the novel continues as a narrative of seeking assent to an experiment from
those supposed to be qualified to give it, and failing to find it. The scientific question at the
heart of Robur-le-conquérant is the relative merits of heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air flight
– a question that was understood to have social, economic, and military implications at the time
- and Robur is a scientist and engineer who seeks to prove to a community of scientific experts
the superiority of heavier-than-air flight. “Et, s’il était venu à Philadelphie, s’il s’était présenté
dans la salle des séances du Weldon-Institute, n’était-ce pas pour faire part de sa prodigieuse
découverte, pour convaincre ipso facto les plus incrédules ?” (80) Verne asks. But though Robur
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presents to the Institute the same arguments for heavier-than-air flight that were current in the
period, the experts of the Weldon Institute refuse to believe him. They are consequently
kidnapped, and Verne asks “A quelle série d’expériences avaient-ils été invites inviti… ?” (85)
The choice of word is telling: “expérience” is a term that will return repeatedly to describe
Robur’s staging of an experiment meant to produce proof, and consequently assent, of the
validity of heavier-than-air flight.
But even presented with direct visual evidence of a heavier-than-air flying machine
when put on one, Uncle Prudent and Phil Evans are reluctant to acknowledge it. On the Albatros
itself, “il eut été difficile de ne pas se rendre à l’évidence. Cependant Uncle Prudent et Phil Evans
ne repondirent pas.” (74) Presented with direct visual evidence that they have flown from
Philadelphia to Montreal, Phil Evans exclaims “C’est a n’y pas croire!” to which Uncle Prudent
responds with the supremely unscientific “N’y croyons pas!” (76) They refuse, in short, to give
their assent as scientists to the very evidence before their eyes, and to the conclusions that
proceed from it. This assent only comes much later in the novel, and reluctantly: “Uncle Prudent
et Phil Evans durent reconnaitre de quelle puissance disposait un tel appareil, et quels services il
pouvait rendre à l’humanité.” (160) This conviction about the efficacy of heavier-than-air flight is
inseparable from their recognition of the social uses of the Albatros. Yet despite the proof
before their eyes, Phil Evans and Uncle Prudent keep Robur’s machine a secret once they have
escaped from it. Robur’s flying machine is the definitive response regarding the debate of
heavier-than-air travel, “un appareil volant, avec application pratique de la théorie du ‘plus
lourd de l’air,’” (223) but confronted with this incontrovertible, physical proof, they refuse to
give their assent, not revealing their story to the world and proceeding instead in the
construction of a lighter-than-air aerostat. Having built the Go ahead, the entirety of the
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Weldon Institute comes to its launch to “affirmer par leur presence que rien ne pourrait jamais
séparer les partisans du ‘plus léger que l’air’!’”(236) Having refused to give their assent to
Robur’s machine, Phil Evans, Uncle Prudent, and the rest of the Weldon Institute instead give
their assent, through their presence, to lighter-than-air flight.
Given the failings of the scientific community in the novel, Robur moves his experiment
into public space, and seeks assent from persons beyond the scientific community. Verne writes
of Robur’s intentions : “franchir l’Himalaya pour montrer de quel admirable engin de locomotion
il disposait, convaincre même ceux qui ne voulaient pas être convaincus, il ne voulait sans doute
pas autre chose.” (116) Moving the debate from the enclosed spaces of the Weldon Institute
into public space, he elicits the assent not merely that of the scientific community, but of the
entire world. The final scene of the novel is a dramatic aerial battle between the Weldon
Institute’s Go ahead and the Albatros, which begins and ends as an experiment requiring public
witnessing and assent. The Go Ahead is first launched as an “épreuve” (239) – a test – of a
lighter-than-air machine in front of a crowd of “patrons, employés, ouvriers, hommes, femmes,
vieillards, enfants, membres du Congrès, représentants de l’armée, magistrats, reporters,
indigènes blanc et noirs” (236) – in short, every individual towards which scientific
popularization might have been targeted at the period. Then the Albatros appears to engage in
an aerial battle with the balloon, a “vengeance publique qui prouverait en même temps la
supériorité de l’aéronef sur tous les aérostats et autres appareils de ce genre.” (243) Robur later
calls this battle his “expérience” (246) – again the language of experiment, witnessing, and proof
returns as Robur demonstrates the efficacy of his machine. This battle literally realizes the
debate between heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air flight and moves it into public space,
seeking the assent of witnesses. That assent is quickly forthcoming as the Albatros’ victory is
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followed by “une tempête de hurrahs, qui, cette fois, étaient admiratifs.” (247) Where scientists
have failed to give their assent to the results of an experiment they witnessed, laypeople have
not.
The novel ends with Robur departing, having understood that the world is not yet ready
for his machine. But Verne makes it explicit that one day, he will return to “livrer le secret d’une
invention qui peut modifier les conditions sociales et politiques du monde.” (247) Robur’s
publicly staged experiment reveals the way a technoscientific innovation becomes the subject of
collective social interest, which is precisely what science fiction addresses.
What Is the Data Produced?
The aim of experimentation is, naturally, to produce new knowledge. Through Boyle’s
ideal of virtual witnessing, this knowledge could be accepted as matter of fact, consequently
shaping our understanding of reality and our actions. Similarly, the aims of the experimental
novels of Emile Zola were “se rendre maître de la vie pour la diriger.” (23) Like a scientist, the
experimental novelist observes and reveals the laws of “human machinery,” a knowledge that
makes it possible to improve social conditions, “régler la vie, régler la société, résoudre à la
longue tous les problèmes du socialisme.” (24)It was intended, in short, to provide an
understanding of the laws of the human, social world in order to more effectively shape it for
the better. In the case of Verne’s novels, the experimentation involved in the production of
knowledge is similar to that of Zola, with the exception that it involves a “novum” that does not
play the same extensive role in Zola’s novels: science and technology. At a moment when
technoscience possessed a novelty it does not today, Verne’s works were the virtual
laboratories in which this novelty could be transformed into a novum whose consequences
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could be carefully considered, and from which knowledge could be derived.
But how does the “result” of this experiment become matter of fact, and what kind of
action does it make possible? Obviously, there is no encyclopedia of the consequences of
technoscience in society, as there is of the laws of physics, which is why it is useful to think in
terms of sociotechnical imaginaries. Imaginaries are tangible visions of the future, such that the
scenarios they present open up space for concrete considerations and new behaviors rather
than ‘merely’ personal experience. By helping to construct and inform sociotechnical
imaginaries, the visions of science fiction enter into the collective imagination, and gain the
assent of “witnesses” as they become an indelible part of the way we understand living in a
modern, technological world. One only has to look at the influence of fictions such as The
Terminator or Frankenstein on our fears of an AI uprising or scientific hubris for an obvious
example: these fictions are so popular that the visions of technoscience they provide have
become explanatory frameworks or cautionary tales, evoked any time AI, automation, or
research ethics are discussed. They become a vocabulary to articulate hopes and concerns
about the future. In short, science fiction provides the knowledge of future possibility, and when
that knowledge enters into collective consciousness, it variously shapes our fears, hopes, and
consequently, behaviors and actions.

For Sheila Jasanoff, sociotechnical imaginaries are

“associated with active exercises of state power,” which is likely why she gives lip service to the
genre as a repository of sociotechnical imaginaries without fully investigating it. But the concept
of ‘action’ is a more nebulous one, for (sociotechnical) imaginaries must also account for
collective behaviors. Science fiction, in contributing to those imaginaries, helps define both
individual and collective action at various levels - not necessarily merely that of the state. Such
action is obviously not always as obvious as the construction of infrastructure or the institution
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of policy, but, as I will demonstrate in the following chapter, the knowledge produced
nonetheless plays a significant role in ensuring the successful functioning of an advanced,
technological society by doing work such as making sense of modernity and contributing to the
creation of a collective identity.
Jules Verne’s Voyages Extraordinaires - accessible, intended for a broad public, and
hugely popular - played a significant role in constructing and maintaining such sociotechnical
imaginaries. They did not merely pass on scientific knowledge, but actively intervened in it. As
Evans notes, Verne’s works “functioned not merely as a passive reflection of their historical
milieu but rather as part of a dynamic mediation with it.” (1988, 33) That is, they inscribed
themselves into and intervened in national technosocial concerns and debates – simultaneously
shaping the debates around technoscience and influenced by them. They served as manifestos
or warnings, provided vocabulary and a set of references for contemporary rhetoric to martial,
and shaped the way people thought about technoscience and its role in society. Verne provided
the cognitive frameworks for understanding technological novelty, work that is crucial but
underappreciated. In the next chapter, we’ll examine more specifically how they were able to
perform this kind of work.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE VOYAGES EXTRAORDINAIRES AND THE WORK OF SOCIOTECHNICAL
IMAGINARIES
In the previous chapter, I touched upon the way that sociotechnical imaginaries became
necessary to articulate new concerns about the role of technoscience in society. In fact, they can
even be likened to mythology: like myths, imaginaries have great explanatory power, helping us
understand how we exist and relate to each other within a technologized society. In this
chapter, I specifically examine the way the Voyages extraordinaires entered into culture more
broadly and provided a framework to make coherent technological modernity.
Arthur Evans has noted that Verne created a “mythology of the Machine,” (1988, 33)
but perhaps equally as significantly, he created an imaginary of the machine18. Verne’s novels,
according to Simone Vierne, are marked by the simultaneous presence “de la modernité
technique et du mythe,” (11) making them
une véritable création mythologique moderne, c’est-à-dire a la fois une fidélité au
mythe comme schème dynamique inconscient, et une interprétation, au sens musical
du terme, du mythe pour les temps modernes, en cette aube de notre civilisation
technicienne, industrielle, et scientifique, qui triomphe dans ce dernier tiers du XIXe
siècle, moment de la production de l’œuvre… (10)
Her evocation of the term “interpretation” is significant, for it is suggestive of an adaptation, a
re-writing, of classical myth for a modern, technological, and industrial moment – and, by
extension, an adaptation of the explanatory power of myth for a technological era. Verne’s
18

During the process of writing this chapter, I visited multiple science museums in both France and the
United States, and almost every single one included some kind of reference to Verne: the Academy of
Natural Sciences in Philadelphia referenced the Nautilus to talk about Nautilus shells, the Musée des Arts
et Métiers explains a nineteenth-century diving bell with a reference to Nemo – not to mention the
endless restaurants, amusement parks, and cafés named after him and his characters, particularly in his
birthplace of Nantes.
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novels are such texts: powerful, fabulous visions of the Machine that retain the explanatory
power of myth.
Making Sense of Modernity
Among the myriad reasons (touched upon in the previous chapter) why sociotechnical
imaginaries became necessary, two stand out: the unprecedented transformations of society
through technoscience and the collective future becoming a realistic concern. The end of the
century, in particular, was a time when two paradigms for understanding technological
innovation, and its role in shaping the future, warred with each other. The first was the notion
of “Progress,” an optimistic vision of the future through technoscience, and the second the
sense of loss, nostalgia, and the end of the world, encapsulated by the ominous term “fin-desiècle.” In particular, the discovery of the Second Law of Thermodynamics became “a common
expression of collective anxieties about the decline of the high-energy civilization of the West,”
(Williams 2013, 124) while new discoveries about the past destabilized the former teleological
narrative about humanity. In this atmosphere, there was a need to balance the opposing views
of Progress and pessimism, and to create new narratives of humanity’s past, present, and
future.
Sociotechnical imaginaries – and consequently science fiction - helped do so. One of the
main differences between imaginaries and the similar concept of ideology is precisely that they
are productive. Althusser’s conception of ideology refers our imaginary relationship to the real
conditions of existence, a relationship that carries negative connotations due to the possibility
of false consciousness. Sociotechnical imaginaries, on the contrary, open up space for
constructive imaginings of the future and productive action; they include the normative
frameworks through which we understand our social existence and are able to participate in it.
84

At a moment when technoscience naturally inflected these norms and expectations, both
science fiction and sociotechnical imaginaries coalesced and intertwined with each other,
responding to a collective need to make sense of modernity, to provide frameworks through
which new technoscientific concepts and discoveries that reshaped humanity’s visions of itself
could be understood, and, occasionally, to provide and maintain positive visions of the future.
Verne’s Voyages Extraordinaires contributed to these imaginaries, providing the narratives,
anticipatory visions, vocabulary, and discursive context to understand and normalize new
technologies, consequently making possible existence and behavior within technological
modernity.
One of the momentous changes that humanity needed to make sense of was its place in
time. Both the past and the future had become new areas of concern: paleontological and
geological discoveries revealed a prehistoric past within which humanity played no role, while
Darwin’s theory of evolution destabilized former teleological narratives which placed human
history within a predictable and recognizable pattern. As Stephen Kern writes, “As larger vistas
of the past have been opened up and have shattered conventional ideas about its duration and
effect on the present, so a new knowledge of the future is becoming possible.” (quoted in
Grubbs, 22) The future also ceased to be the domain of prophets to become that of secular
writers in the second half of the nineteenth century, a moment when Progress seemed to be
bringing that future closer, faster than before. Sylvia Miller writes of the mindset of this
moment: “the future was at one time predictable and recognizable because all of history was
seen as a cycle in which mankind would journey forth only to return to its origins…Darwin and
science in general seem to have broken this time circle and transformed it into an open-ended
line.” (quoted in Grubbs, 23) The future is, by definition, blank - it has no content and no form,
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made up only of predictions and anticipations. At a moment when such anticipations became a
serious possibility, cyclical narratives, as Miller notes, could no longer fill in that blank.
Consequently, humanity needed to place itself within time, to transform Progress from an
overpowering force shaping existence into a trajectory that could be mapped and referenced.
When I visited Verne’s hometown of Nantes in the summer of 2017, I took the tram to
the museum that was his childhood home. At the time, the city of Nantes had transformed the
tram line into a kind of paleontological museum: each station represented a different period of
prehistory – the Jurassic, the Cretaceous, etc – and descriptive panels informed the rider that
each meter the tram travelled represented thousands of years of history. This conceit
transformed this simple means of transportation into a time machine, making tangible the span
of prehistoric time by using physical space. That is, it mapped prehistory onto physical space. I
could not help but remark the similarity to Verne’s Voyage au centre de la terre, whose heroes
travel backwards into time as they descend further into the center of the Earth, and each
moment of prehistory, with its geology, its flora, and its fauna, are painstakingly described along
a predictable – and circular- trajectory.
This, I want to suggest, is what Verne was doing for his contemporaries: mapping both
the past and the future, such that a contemporary could orient themselves within space and
time at a moment when both had been reframed. Rosalind Williams (2013) emphasizes that the
Voyages Extraordinaires are not just scientific romances, but also geographical romances: they
are always about movement through space that must be painstakingly mapped. In novels such
as Voyage au centre de la terre, Verne provides concrete visions of a prehistoric past that he
maps onto physical space. As the protagonists descend towards the center of the Earth, each
ensuing layer becomes another moment from a history that had been revealed to be lengthier
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than previously believed. This mapping, combined with the painstaking, attentive descriptions
that are a staple of the Vernian narrative, provided a way for the reader to place humanity
within historic time. Additionally, like all of Verne’s novels, Voyage au centre de la terre follows
a circular trajectory, a cyclicity striking given Miller’s suggestion that the period’s scientific
discoveries have “broken this time circle and transformed it into an open-ended line.” (quoted
in Grubbs, 23) Through his mapping of time onto space, Verne returns some of the missing
cyclicity to time.
Equally importantly, Verne fills in the blank that is a future, such that “Progress” and the
“fin-de-siècle” could be understood not as an undiscovered country of the future, blank and
uncharted and consequently to be feared, but as a knowable trajectory that humanity was
following. The breakneck race of Progress did not have to be a race into the unknown. Williams
argues that by the end of the nineteenth century, the frontier had disappeared as the last blank
spaces on the map were filled in (2013), leaving the future as the final uncharted territory, one
that opened up even as the frontier was closing. Verne, as she notes, was always seeking the
unknown, evidenced from the subtitle of the Voyages Extraordinaires, ‘dans les mondes connus
et inconnus.” Just as Verne had filled in the unknown geographical spaces of Africa or the
bottom of the sea, he charted yet another frontier: the future. “Le progrès est une des lois de ce
monde,” (243) he wrote in Robur-le-conquérant, and when that progress inevitably manifested
itself, Verne’s novels served as the maps and guidebooks to the technoscientific future through
which progress realized itself.
Verne’s most powerful and most concrete vision of that future, and its technoscientific
transformations, is in Robur-le-conquérant. Set “une dizaine d’années d’ici,” (letter to Hetzel,
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may 1885) it offers, through the mouthpiece of Robur, a very concrete vision of the conquest of
air that is to come:
Mais est-ce à dire que l’homme doive renoncer à la conquête de l’air, à transformer les
mœurs civiles et politiques du vieux monde, en utilisant cet admirable milieu de
locomotion? Non pas ! Et, de même qu’il est devenu maitre des mers, avec le bâtiment,
par l’aviron, par la voile, par la roue ou par l’hélice, de même il deviendra maitre de
l’espace atmosphérique, par les appareils plus lourds que l’air, car il faut être plus lourd
que lui pour être plus fort que lui. (31)
At a moment when heavier-than-air flight still warred with lighter-than-air flight, Robur offers a
vision of a moment when that debate has been resolved in favor of airplanes and helicopters. At
the triumphant climax, Robur repeats a similar proclamation: “L’avenir est aux machines
volantes. L’air est un point d’appui solide,” (Ibid) a statement Verne echoes in his own final
words to the novel : “Quant à l’avenir de la locomotion aérienne, il appartient à l’aéronef, non à
l’aérostat.” (247) Notably, both the future and the air will be conquered by heavier-than-air
flying machines; time and space are both mapped through this statement. With this explicit
invocation, Verne fills in the blank that is the future, just as the Albatros opens up the possibility
for filling in the blank spaces of the geographical map.
In fact, while it is a critical commonplace today that Verne invented nothing, in his own
time, he was cast as a prophet of modernity. It is notable that at a moment when the future
became a serious collective concern, of interest to secular writers, Verne was presented as able
to foresee the marvelous solutions to technological problems, with assertions of his prophetic
power ranging from matter-of-fact to celebratory and awestruck. Albert Montel wrote of Verne
in Le XIXème Siècle, for example:
Avec Robur-le-Conquérant et Cinq Semaines en ballon, il a prédit la conquête de l'air. Il a
décrit la route du Pôle dans les Aventures du Capitaine Hatteras, dans le Pays de
fourrures, dans Vingt mille lieues sous les mers ; enfin la Maison à vapeur avait devancé
l’automobilisme.
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In another article in the same publication, poetically titled “Sic Itur Ad Astra,” Raoul Lucet
evokes Verne’s “prescience divinatoire”:
Quand Jules Verne se met à attacher le grelot d'une utopie, celle-ci ne tarde guère à
devenir une réalité. Cette opinion que - n'en déplaise aux pointus, — je professe
imperturbablement, je l'ai déjà appuyée ici-même, à plusieurs reprises, par le rappel des
nombreuses prophéties aventurées par l'inimitable amuseur qui se sont réalisées ou
promettent de se réaliser sous peu.
While Serres claims that Verne is “well behind the times,” (82) his own contemporaries asserted
the opposite. Charles Clément raved in the Journal des débats, for example, that “Il ne rêve pas
des perfectionnements plus ou moins prochains, il n'attend pas les inventeurs; d'un bond, de
son caprice toujours éclairé par son savoir, il dépasse les conquérants académiciens et va les
attendre au-delà de leurs futures conquêtes. These excerpts are notable for their specificity: the
authors reference specific technologies and discoveries Verne has predicted (air flight,
automobiles, the discovery of the Poles) as a way to support their claim that Verne’s novels can
be used as a guide to the future – just as a reader might use the maps in Vingt mille lieues sous
les mers as a guide to the narrative.
In fact, Verne’s predictive powers seem to have been accepted as a matter of course so
much so that, in 1893 – a moment that brings near the feared “fin-de-siècle” as well as the tail
end of Verne’s illustrious career – a journalist wrote in Le Gaulois: “Tous, depuis de longues
années, nous avons pris l'habitude de voir en lui une sorte de précurseur scientifique et
géographique.” Again, there is a conflation of time and space: Verne is a précurseur in space
(“géographique”) and time (“scientifique,” referring to technological progress through time).
Raoul Lucet, in a review of Robur-le-conquérant in Le XIXème Siècle, hyperbolically praises
Verne, “dont les prophéties réalisées ne se comptent plus. » Verne, it seemed, could represent
that which is by definition unknownable – the future. And, as a sociotechnical imaginaries are, in
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Jasanoff’s definition, “visions of desirable futures,” Verne’s perceived and actual prophetic
power positions him as the source of positive visions of the future. These evocations of the
prophetic power of science fiction, so common as to be cliché in our day, are all the more
striking in that they reflect a moment in time that was struggling to come to terms with the very
concept of the future, with the notion that what comes after could be understood, predicted,
and represented. Verne made coherent visions of the future, creating the possibility for a
meaningful existence in the present.
In fact, Verne made modernity as an ongoing process coherent, traceable throughout his
novels as an increasing sense of the acceleration of time and the condensation of space. As
Grubbs remarks, nineteenth century transportation and communication technologies “changed
the individuals’ perception and experience of time and space,” (31) for they made it possible to
both travel and communicate with greater speed. Consequently, it seemed as if time was
moving faster and space was becoming condensed. This process is made manifest throughout
the Voyages Extraordinaires: when Verne began writing in the 1860s, he could write of words
both “connus and inconnus,” for the world “had seemed inexhaustibly large when Verne started
writing the extraordinary journeys.” (Williams 2013, 3) In the 1873 novel Autour du monde dans
80 jours, Verne’s protagonist Phileas Fogg struggles to use a plethora of transportation
technologies, including trains, ships, and carriages to circumnavigate the word in 80 days. By
1886, when Verne published Robur-le-conquérant, (a novel set a dozen years in the future)
Robur’s Albatros could fly around the world in 8 days. When Hetzel suggested that Robur could
bring news from the other side of the world in his marvelous machine as a dramatic twist, Verne
categorically shot it down: the telegraph, he argued, made communication practically
instantaneous. By the early 1890s, the world was “rapidly shrinking,” (Williams 2013, 3) as those
90

unknown spaces were rapidly filled in, Phileas Fogg’s record had been beaten, and explorers
were approaching the poles.
This process of acceleration was articulated in the press via the Voyages Extraordinaires.
La Presse wrote in 1878 “Il ne s'agit plus de monter haut, il s'agit de marcher vite….Le vieux
monde est fini avec les vielles mœurs. Go ahead! Place à Phileas Fogg et a son siècle!” (David,
December 30, 1878) The orientation towards the future is unmistakably optimistic, articulated
through Phileas Fogg’s race against time. Predating Robur-le-conquérant by 8 years, the article
also references the phrase “Go ahead,” which will be the name of the Weldon Institute’s lighterthan-air machine in Robur-le-conquérant. By the 1890s, the world had become smaller, and a
sense of “fin du globe” – “the end of the world not in time but in space,” (Williams, 2013 9) –
pervaded. And, just as a decade earlier the Voyages Extraordinaires had been used to make
coherent the speed at which progress was happening, in this fin-de-siècle moment his works
were rather used to express the sense that there is no more space, and perhaps no more
progress. La Science Illustrée wrote of Nellie Bly’s circumnavigation in 1890 :
Dans quelques années, pour peu que les Américains — et surtout les Américaines —
continuent de s'en mêler, le tour du monde, tel que l'a conçu Jules Verne, n'aura
plus qu'un intérêt archéologique. Philéas Fogg sera à ses petits-neveux ce que la
diligence est au chemin de fer, la caravelle au paquebot transatlantique, la vapeur à
l'électricité. (Legrand)
The similarity to the 1881 piece “En Ballon!” is striking: here the diligence is compared to the
railroad, just as above the diligence is evoked in relation to more modern travel methods19. The
quick changes in means of transportation is part and parcel of a greater notion of Progress –

19

The “intérêt archéologique” that the author claims circumnavigation will offer in the future is also
evocative of Robida’s Le Vingtième Siècle, wherein the inventions of the nineteenth century have been
relegated to the Musée de Cluny, a museum of medieval history in Paris.
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progress that seems to be occurring with such speed that even Verne, a prophet of “science
divinatoire,” cannot seem to keep up.
Manifesto as Sociotechnical Imaginary
Manifestos can often function as sociotechnical imaginaries. They are, by definition,
political interventions: they offer concrete visions of what the future should be like and how it
can be brought into being. Robur-le-conquérant is one such manifesto: Verne positioned the
novel within the significant contemporary debate of lighter-than-air versus heavier-than-air
flight, and the national, social, and political outcomes inevitably attached to it. A strong
supporter of heavier-than-air flight, he saw the novel as a manifesto for the cause, continuing
the work begun by his contemporary and friend Nadar, of whose Society for the Promotion of
Heavier-Than-Air Travel Verne had been a member. Founded in 1863, on the heels of the
publication of Cinq Semaines en ballon, the Society published a manifesto, held public debates
at which proponents of lighter-than-air flight were permitted to speak, and launched the balloon
Le Géant to raise publicity and funds for research into heavier-than-air flight. Robur adopts
arguments in favor of heavier-than-air flight taken directly from Nadar’s manifesto and the
helicopter designs of Ponton d’Amercourt, another member of Nadar’s society, who is
responsible for coining the world helicopter.
But though Nadar galvanized the public and excited the press, his zeal and talent for
publicity resulted in nothing more than bankruptcy, and produced no workable results. Verne
arguably succeeded where Nadar did not: the novel inspired Igor Sikorsky, who read Verne’s
stories as a child, to invent the first helicopter. But of equal importance to inspiring this
invention is the novel’s intervention in a scientific debate with national, political, and social
implications. Verne continued the work Nadar began, agitating for progress in heavier-than-air
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travel, and in so doing, contributed to France’s socio-technical imaginaries by offering visions of
its future made possible through the conquest of the air.
Engaging in the doubling typical of Verne’s oeuvre, Robur performs what it portrays: it
moves a significant scientific and social debate from private into public space. The novel
portrays the implications of the future of aviation on a worldwide scale and literally stages the
conflict between heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air flight in a public arena; similarly, Verne
presents the social and scientific debate in question to the virtual scientific community of the
Voyages Extraordinaires, asking for both their participation and assent. More than summarizing
contemporary knowledge, the novel intervenes in a contemporary scientific and social issue;
much like a scientist asking for assent regarding a theory, it positions itself as a scientific text,
engaging in a socio-scientific matter and asking for assent. This is what makes it the stuff of the
sociotechnical imaginary: this engagement of a collective that is scientific and social in a
question that is similarly both.
Yet its identity as a novel is what allows it to be such a successful manifesto. As a novel,
Robur can adopt the scientific arguments of heavier-than-air flight proponents while offering
concrete visions of success that are enmeshed in an engaging narrative and extensive
worldbuilding. Verne writes of Robur that “l’ingénieur ne se mêlait jamais des affaires des
autres, quand ce n’était pas pour lui question d’honneur ou d’humanité,” (120) yet examples of
both Robur’s interventions and the possibilities of his machine abound. On the social front, the
Albatros makes it possible to rescue shipwrecked sailors, and to free prisoners destined for
sacrifice. In the world of science, Robur’s machine makes it possible to map the unmapped areas
of the globe: “si quelque géographe avait eu à sa disposition un semblable appareil, avec quelle
facilite il aurait pu faire le levé topographique de ce pays….Alors, plus de ces grands vides sur les
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cartes de l’Afrique centrale, plus de blancs a teintes pales, a lignes de pointille, plus de ces
désignations vagues, qui font le désespoir des cartographes!” (152) This reference to the
mapping of Africa cannot but evoke Verne’s first novel, that of a balloon journey over the
uncharted portions of the African continent, eliciting in the reader awe and excitement at the
new possibilities for extraordinary voyages a heavier-than-air machine can open up.
In that sense, Verne’s ploy was successful: the novel was taken up by other proponents
of heavier-than-air flight, who used it as a “point d’appui” in their own mapping of a future in
which the as-yet-unconquered space of the air has been mastered. It succeeds further as a
manifesto in that its visions of the future become the sociotechnical imaginaries that inform
hopes, debates, and articulations in the public space of print. For example, in a stunning piece
from Le Beaumarchais, titled “En Ballon!”, Leon Millot envisions the future almost exactly as
Verne does:
Quand [l’hélicoptère] aura trouvé sa forme définitive, on ira de Paris à Versailles en cinq
minutes, et le Tour du monde en 80 jours de Jules Verne fera l'effet de ces excursions en
diligence que les partisans du progrès opposent dédaigneusement aux contemporains
de Louis XVIII.
Through the use of the future perfect tense and the assertive “quand,” the hypothetical future
becomes almost written in stone. The possibility of travelling quickly from Paris to Versailles is
an extrapolation of the ways in which the transportation technologies of the period condensed
space (something we will also see caricatured in Robida’s novels), but dealt with at the concrete
level of “when” rather than “if.”
Notably, Robur brings a social and political dimension to his vision of the future. The
conquest of air will, in his words, “transformer les mœurs civiles et politiques du vieux monde,”
echoing Camille Flammarion’s question – quoted in the novel – “A quelle époque l’homme
94

cessera-t-il de ramper dans les bas-fonds pour vivre dans l’azur et la paix du ciel ?” Responding
as much to Flammarion’s question as to Verne’s novel, Millot imagines a future of flying
machines linking Paris with its surroundings that has a distinctly Robida-esque ring to it:
Vous imaginez vous ce que pourrait être un dimanche dans l'azur? Avez-vous pensé à
ces innombrables réseaux d'hélicoptères qui rayent de la Villette au Panthéon, de Villejuif
aux Ternes, de Billancourt à Ménilmontant? O profanation! Avez-vous réfléchi aux millions
de pelures d'orange, à ces fragments de romaines, à ces tronçons de laitues, à ces aérolithes
faits de pâtés de foie gras et de cervelas 'à l'ail qui déshonoreraient l’espace ? Dites, avezvous songe à céla, ô Nadar ?
Millot’s description of the bourgeoisification of celestial space is based on then-extant
technologies or vocabulary extrapolated into a future, but it also evokes a whole nexus of
references, names, titles (Autour du monde dans 80 jours, Nadar) that situates the extrapolation
within a set of cultural narratives about the future in which Verne participated.
A more serious imaginary that Robur engages in is the question of military aviation,
which had significant implications for the French nation at this moment. Kate Turner traces the
way balloons had become a symbol of French national pride and revolutionary values from 1789
on: “Representative …of the glorious Revolution, and the values of Liberté, Egalité and
Fraternité, the balloon was, from this early stage, associated with politics and polemics, and
incorporated into a certain type of politically ‘engaged’ literature.” (141) The 1867 Exposition
used three different balloons, including Nadar’s Géant, and illustrations of them to help
authorize “a certain fiction of Paris” (Ibid) and “the fiction of a glittering Empire.” (149) After the
fall of the Second Empire to Prussian troops, the balloon became a fiction of heroic French
resistance against Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian war. During the Siege of Paris, balloons
facilitated communication with the provinces through a regular postal service, and even aided in
the escape of a prime minister despite the Prussian blockade. Consequently, they become a
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symbol of Parisian – and French – defiance, “inseparable from official representations of the
city.” (140) Two decades later, in an article on the potential military uses of balloons aviation,
Raoul Lucet referred to « l'industrie si éminemment française dans sa genèse, ses origines et
son évolution » of ballooning, making a case of the captive balloon (which have been a novelty
at the 1867 Exposition) as the future of France’s military use of balloons for the possibilities it
offered for gathering intelligence. Lighter-than-air flight, in the form of balloons, thus had an
intimate relationship to French identity through its military applications.
It is this national identity, and national imaginary, that Verne is intervening in: Robur-leconquérant ends with a ‘combat aerien” between the Albatros and the Go Ahead. In addition to
literalizing the conflict between heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air flight, this battle, Verne
suggests, presages the future of military aviation: “Un combat aérien se préparait, combat ou ne
s’offraient même pas les chances de salut d’un combat naval, - le premier de ce genre, mais qui
ne sera pas le dernier, sans doute, puisque le progrès est une des lois de ce monde.” (241) In the
context of the “eminently French” industry of ballooning and fictions of French resistance based
around it, Verne offered another possibility: that of the aéronef, rather than the aérostat, as the
victor in aerial military engagements.
Through mapping space and time, domesticating technologies, and penning manifestos,
therefore, Verne offered numerous ways to contribute to visions of both France’s future and its
present, as made possible by science and technology. At the same time, the Voyages performed
the same work as, and in tandem with, another significant space in nineteenth-century France:
the Expositions Universelles.
The Expositions Universelles
In the previous chapter, I considered the imagined community of the nation, which I
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equated with the public spheres of the imagination. Both were spaces made possible through
print, wherein a nation could imagine its future – that is, they were repositories for national
sociotechnical imaginaries. The Voyages Extraordinaires contributed significantly to these
imaginaries, allowing the nation to envision its past and future. The Expositions Universelles
were a similar space: a collective, nationally-inflected sphere of the imagination. A staple of
nineteenth-century culture, those hosted in the “Exposition City” of Paris - in 1867, 1878, 1881,
1889, and 1900 – left a particularly significant mark on both the city itself and wider cultural and
technoscientific history. Intended to showcase France’s technoscientific innovations, they were
spaces where its sociotechnical imaginaries could be made manifest. They allowed the imagined
community of the nation to participate in tangible, visceral, and immersive visions of its own
future - a different definition of virtual that evokes the immersiveness of virtual reality rather
than its lack of physical presence.
These Expositions bring my theoretical approach full circle, as they were spaces where
the imagined community that had been constituted through print could then be physically
reconstituted in the same space in order to participate in the imaginaries that defined its
existence. That is, if print virtually constitutes the nation and its future, the Expositions are this
virtual space made manifest. They also bring virtual witnessing full circle, such that the virtual
laboratory once again becomes a collective physical space: at the Expositions, the public could
collectively participate in the same futuristic visions they inhabited through fiction. In a way,
then, the Expositions and the spaces of print are the same space, inhabited and witnessed both
virtually and physically, harkening back to the dual physical laboratory and “laboratory of the
mind’s eye” outlined by Shapin and Shaffer. And, to add yet more dizzying circularity and
doubling, the Expositions were extensively discussed, summarized, and reviewed in the press,
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such that these physical spaces once again became virtual, inviting the entire community of the
nation to participate – even those who could not be physically present in Paris. That is, physical
witnessing could then be reproduced again virtually through the myriad forms of memorabilia,
ephemera, reviews, illustrations, guidebooks, and other publications produced for the
Expositions.
The sociotechnical imaginaries made manifest at the Expositions also overlap
significantly with the science fiction narratives of the Voyages Extraordinaires; both offer similar
attitudes towards, and experiences of, science, technology, and the future – as well as similar
narratives of statehood. Just as Verne’s novels were public, collectively inhabited virtual
experimental spaces, the Expositions were these same laboratories in physical form, frequently
offering the same visions. Verne visited the 1867 Exposition, for example, which directly inspired
many of the technologies in his novels, including Captain Nemo’s diving bells and the submarine
of 20,000 Lieues sous les mers, as well as the use of electricity to power his marvelous machines.
The Expositions are often mentioned throughout the Voyages Extraordinaires; Robur-leconquérant, in particular, evokes the “paratonerre de la Tour en fer de l’Exposition de 1889”
(12) and « le ballon de Giffard de l’Exposition de 1878. » (24) These merely cursory references
reveal a more intimate connection, however: the suggest that the Expositions and the Voyages
were both repositories of the same imaginaries, litmus tests for what was “in the air.”
Additionally, just as sociotechnical imaginaries are visions of the future, and just as the
Expositions were understood by contemporaries to represent the shape of things to come,
contemporaries thought of the Voyages Extraordinaires as prophetic visions “ombreuses prophéties … qui se sont réalisées ou promettent de se réaliser sous peu.” (Lucet,
XIXème Siècle).
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The press caught on to these parallels, likening many of the Expositions’ attractions to
the novels. For example, Michel Corday titled his review of the 1900 Exposition “Visions
Lointaines,” a title evocative of Verne’s Voyages Extraordinaires, and suggests that to visit the
Exposition was to “réaliser ces voyages extraordinaires de Jules Verne, traverser successivement
le monde céleste, le monde sous-marin, le monde souterrain, pour explorer enfin le surface du
globe.” The comparison is apt, for all the locales Corday mentions – space, the depths of the sea,
the underground, and the surface of the planet – had been the subjects of Verne’s novels. He
reiterates this comparison, writing that the Exposition offers “soit de placer le visiteur devant
des sites du globe, soit de le transporter dans les profondeurs du ciel, du sol ou de la mer, en un
mot de découvrir à ses yeux des vues sur l’univers.”He might as well be providing a summary of
the Voyages Extraordinaires, which aim to “refaire l’univers” just as the Expositions, in Corday’s
words, strive to “découvrir…des vues sur l’univers.” In both cases, this is done through voyages:
the Expositions and the novels both transport the reader, in various ways, to different locales.
These similarities reveal once more the way science fiction in general, and Verne’s works in
particular, shapes and serves as repositories for national sociotechnical imaginaries.
Performing Statehood
Performance is a crucial component of the creation and maintenance of sociotechnical
imaginaries: the imagined community of the nation participates in and internalizes its
imaginaries in part through their staging in public space. In fact, as Jasanoff notes, theatricality
has been “part of the machinery of statecraft and rulership from the earliest times,” (12) though
performances of modern statehood “are increasingly tied to demonstrations and to public
proofs employing scientific and technological instruments.” (14) She notes that “science and
technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective
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good,” helping to produce “power, social order, and a communal sense of justice.” (15) These
performances are what help to create and maintain sociotechnical imaginaries.
Naturally, such performances must occur in public space, which returns us to the space
of experimentation. Experimental science emerged in seventeenth century England, a moment
when the debates about its value dealt with the larger question of “how to establish truth and
how to achieve authority in a time of immense epistemic as well as political upheaval.”
(Jasanoff, 16) What was being adjudicated was the role of collective assent and the public
sphere in the production of knowledge, and what was at stake was “the emergence of a
democratic public sphere in which authority would depend on experimentally verifiable truths,
observable in principle by everyone, rather than on declarations from an inaccessible central
authority such as the monarch.” (Ibid) Though, as we have seen above, this experimental space
was still highly delimited, it nonetheless laid the framework for assent to the production of
knowledge to be given collectively, in a public space. At the same time, the seventeenth-century
laboratory was a performance space, and experiments were “performative occasions,” (16) with
royalty and nobility often in attendance. Just as sociotechnical imaginaries must be performed in
public space as spectacles for the assent of those present, experiments that dealt with authority
and knowledge were performed in quasi-public experimental spaces.
The Expositions Universelles are just such laboratories, staging performances of
statehood in public spaces for the assent of witnesses – and also perhaps necessitated by a
similar moment of transformation and upheaval. Nineteenth-century France experienced a
variety of ruptures with the past, and consequently with previous forms of constructing national
identity: the French Revolution had upended the former status quo and its neat delineations of
status; urbanization, particularly Hausmann’s transformations, destroyed physical traces of the
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past; and the perceived acceleration of time left the past behind faster. In the first half of the
nineteenth century, historical fiction had served as a source of national identity after these
moments of rupture, but by the latter half of the century, it had become outdated as a genre.
Furthermore, industrialization in France happened slower and later than in England, in some
ways post-dating the heyday of the Romantic historical novel earlier in the century. This
moment of industrialization needed new fictions of national identity. Additionally, the FrancoPrussian War of 1870 and France’s gruesome defeat provided an impetus for fictions and
performances of statehood.
The Expositions offered both spectacles of national identity and technological mastery
in this tumultuous time. They were the manifestation par excellence of sociotechnical
imaginaries. Significantly, these performances were just that: spectacles. In fact, to state that
the Expositions were spectacular occasions would be to repeat decades of scholarship on them,
and they became even more spectacular as the century went on, with the 1900 Exposition being
the apotheosis of that spectacle (O’Neil-Henry, Williams). Additionally, despite their
international and ostensibly “universal” nature, they staged and performed visions of national
futures. Their precursors date back to the “Fêtes Nationales” of the French Revolution, intended
for a “présentation publique des ‘arts utiles’ produits par la Nation,” (Andia, 10) while their
nineteenth-century incarnations were, at their most basic, intended to show off the
technoscientific accomplishments of the nation. The 1867 Exposition, for example, was
“expressly designed to showcase Second Empire France, and in particular the spectacular
metamorphosis of Paris at the hands of Hausmann and Napoleon III.” (Turner, 146) And of
course, a through-current of colonialism ran through many of the Expositions. Williams notes
that “in 1900, when imperial adventurism was at its height, the number of colonial exhibits
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expanded accordingly.” (1991, 61) The 1889 Exposition included the highly popular “Rue du
Caire,” while the 1900 Exposition contained a “Tour du Monde” that offered the visitor a voyage
through Europe and Asia, brought to life by panoramas.
These performances of nationhood offered a way to bridge modernity with the past, to
provide France with a coherent national identity while showcasing its progress into the future.
By displaying France’s technological marvels, the Expositions provided the France nation with a
vision of itself as an advanced society capable of progress and innovation, collectively witnessed
by the imagined community of the nation, and linking its past and future. Anne O’Neil Henry
notes, for example, the visual trope of a female allegory of France in advertisements for the
Expositions, which link national identity to technological mastery. The 1889 Exposition explicitly
commemorated the centennial of the French Revolution; that of 1900 was the “apotheosis” of
electricity while nevertheless offering the extensive, immersive attraction of “Le Vieux Paris.”
The past, and more specifically the national past, was always present at these events – but so
was the national future. A sociotechnical imaginary is, by definition, a vision of (national) futures
made possible through science and technology, and Rosalind Williams notes that
contemporaries experienced a “sense of the [1900] Exposition’s prophetic value” and were
“convinced that the fair revealed the shape of things to come.” (1991, 61) At the same time, the
continuity of past and future creates a narrative of national identity, and narratives are also a
significant component of national imaginaries. Taylor notes, for example, that the social
imaginary can include an understanding of “where we stand in history, in the narrative of our
becoming.” (27) With their nationalistic character, the Expositions could contribute to this
narrative, telling a story of the past that continues into the future and creating a sense of the
present moment’s relation to (national) history, consequently contributing to the collective
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practices of social life.
The Voyages Extraordinaires performed much of the same work. They were the virtual
experimental space, as the Expositions were the physical experimental space, where statehood
was performed and assent was given. Just as the Expositions created visions of France within
modernity, Verne helped construct national identity in a modern world. Although, with the
exception of the posthumous Paris au Vingtième Siècle, none of Verne’s novels take place in
France, (Williams 2013, 75) the Voyages, like the Expositions, offer continuity between past and
future, and forms of national identity that could bridge the two. In Verne’s novels, the past is
always present – not only in the descent into the past of Voyage au centre de la terre, but in the
form of its physical remnants encountered by the heroes, such as the ruins of Atlantis in the
Vingt mille lieues sous les mers. Even as they offer visions of existing within technological
modernity, the novels adamantly show that that modernity exists alongside traces of the past.
The Voyages were also referred to by contemporaries as natural descendants of the
historical romances that had helped provide a French identity earlier in the century. La Presse
claimed, for example, that Verne’s “Philéas Fogg et son capitaine Hatteras sont les d'Artagnan
et les Monte-Christo d'une époque pratique,” (David, December 30, 1878) while the Journal des
débats waxed lyrical that “il est l'Alexandre Dumas de la conjecture scientifique,
le d'Artagnan de la vapeur, de l'électricité, de l'astronomie,” (Clément, December 27, 1877) and
Hetzel himself cast Verne as a natural descendant of Dumas in the preface to Les aventures du
Capitaine Hatteras. Alexandre Dumas, one of the most prominent and prolific of the Romantic
writers, had contributed significantly to bringing the historical novel to France; he penned
dramatic tales of lesser known periods of French history, such as the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Inspired by Walter Scott, these historical novels helped create a national identity for
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the French people as Scott had done for his. He celebrated the national past and staged it as the
source of French History and greatness, as for example in La Reine Margot, which cast the
illustrious royal line of the Bourbons as destined to rule France. And, in fact, the same article the
Journal des débats says of Hector Servadac “Dans quelques uns de ses livres, M. Jules Verne est
un Cooper français ; dans celui-ci, il serait plutôt notre Walter Scott.”
Like Verne, Dumas created his novels from extensive primary sources (though Dumas
arguably took many more liberties with the original materials), digging into chronicles and
historiography to create powerful, dramatic tales of French heroes, with D’Artagnan perhaps the
most famous among them. Verne had met Alexandre Dumas in Paris in the 1840s, by which time
Dumas had penned his most famous historical novels. With this in mind, we can see Verne’s
characters as the modern-day versions of Dumas’ heroes. That is, what Dumas did for the
turbulent post-Revolutionary period, Verne did for the equally turbulent and changing world of
the Second Empire and Third Republic. It does not seem to matter that very few of Verne’s
protagonists are actually French: he is a French author that has created heroes for a practical,
scientific, positivistic – and consequently, quickly changing age – that France had a way of
making its own. It is notable that Verne becomes our Walter Scott, by implication doing for
France in his futuristic novels what Scott had done for Scotland in his historical novels. Verne
created a national mythology compatible with modernity, which showed how a contemporary
French nation can exist in harmony with new technologies, in a changing, globalizing,
cosmopolitan world while maintaining its national identity. This was the same work being done
by the Expositions. Together, they staged and participated in the same sociotechnical
imaginaries, contributing to and reflecting similar visions of France’s future and social existence
as shaped by science and technology.
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Equally interesting and revealing are the similar spectacles and immersive experiences
that the Voyages and Expositions offer – that is, they offer the experiences of similar
sociotechnical imaginaries by offering similar fantasies of exploration, (technological) mastery,
conquest, and possibility within a national context.
Electricity
Electricity was one of the strongest sources of the imaginaries of this period, marking it
with an electromania evident throughout both fiction and non-fiction. Throughout Verne’s
novels, electricity is always the motive power; as Evans points out, Verne’s machines “are
animated by what the Exposition International de Paris of 1900 was to call fée électricité.”
(1988, 71) One of the most famous phrases to have come out of Verne’s oeuvre it the title of a
chapter of Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, “tout par l’électricité,” which summarizes both
Verne’s corpus as well as the ideology and the imaginaries of the nineteenth century.
But electricity was more than a source of motive power; it was also a source of affect,
helping to put science on display and transforming it into spectacle in Expositions and Voyages
alike. It may be true that only a select few Vernian heroes get to explore the geographical limits
of the world, but this spectacle of science accessible to a select few in the laboratories is
transformed into a virtual spectacle through the illustrations and descriptions of the novels.
Consider, for example, the following passage from Vingt mille lieues sous les mers:
Les glaces prenaient des attitudes superbes. Ici, leur ensemble formait une ville
orientale, avec ses minarets et ses mosquées innombrables. Là, une cité écroulée et
comme jetée à terre par une convulsion du sol. Aspects incessamment variés par les
obliques rayons du soleil, ou perdus dans les brumes grises au milieu des ouragans de
neige. Puis, de toutes parts des détonations, des éboulements, de grandes culbutes
d’icebergs, qui changeaient le décor comme le paysage d’un diorama. (465, emphasis
mine)
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Firstly, there is the evocation of a “ville orientale” or a “cité écroulée,” reminiscent of the exotic
or historic locales that an Exposition allowed its attendees to visit. More significant, however, is
the reference to a diorama: dioramas and panoramas were a staple of the Expositions, and their
innovative use of imagery, optics, and illumination gave a technological realism to many of the
attractions such as the maréorama and cinéorama. Additionally, Arronax refers to the changing
of “décors,” as if referencing the scenery of the theatre rather than the reality of the world. The
world becomes a spectacle for the inhabitants of the Nautilus, and for all those who read of that
excursion.
Such theatrical visions, illuminated by electricity, abound throughout Vingt mille lieues
sous les mers, evoking the fairytale-like spectacles of the Expositions. Electricity was responsible
for much of the spectacle and theatricality of the Expositions, creating a “fairyland
environment” (Williams 1991, 84) that masked a more prosaic reality. Thanks to the Nautilus’
external lighting, Nemo is able to transform the bottom of the see into a similarly spectacular
fairyland environment, offering them an awe-inspiring, immersive experience that evokes the
attractions of the Expositions.20 The Mediterranean, for example, is full of wrecked ships, and
“lorsque le Nautilus passait entre eux et les enveloppait de ses nappes électriques, il semblait
que ces navires allaient le saluer de leur pavillon et lui envoyer leur numéro d’ordre. Mais non,
rien que le silence et la mort sur ce champ de catastrophes !” (387) Continually illuminated by
the Nautilus’ electric lamps, the undersea world becomes an endless spectacle.
Experiences of Technoscience
Furthermore, Verne’s novels stage, in the literal sense of the word, many of the
experiences of technoscience that the attractions of the Expositions Universelles made
20

Electricity also began to be used for theatrical illumination in the 1870s.
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accessible. For example, the Nautilus functions as an aquarium, another staple of the
Expositions – Image 18 shows a genteel public enjoying underwater fauna in a grotto-like
chamber that provides a quasi-immersive experience. While not identical, the image evokes
Riou’s illustration of the protagonists’ undersea promenade in Image 15. Even more striking is
the similarity between Image 18 and Image 19, an illustration accompanying a moment when
the lights inside the submarine dim, providing Arronax with “une fenêtre ouverte sur ces abimes
inexplorés.” (164) Arronax can look out onto the depths of the sea “comme si ce pur cristal eut
été le vitre d’un immense aquarium.” (Ibid) For Philippe Hamon, such a vision of the underwater
world “anticipates the aquariums, marinoramas, and dioramas of the Paris Universal Exposition
of 1900,” (74) but even the Exposition of 1867 (which Verne attended, a year prior to beginning
work on the novel), as well as that of 1878, featured aquariums, while the aquarium of the Paris
Jardin d’Acclimatation opened in 1863. Thus, though 20,000 Lieues sous les mers depicts an
exotic undersea voyage, it also depicts its characters as participating in a quasi-scientific
experience that was similarly accessible to a Parisian without leaving the city.
Another scientific imaginary that Verne has long been associated with is the journey to
the moon. His 1865 De la terre a la lune was a landmark text, representing realistically such a
journey, which had previously been the stuff of comedy and satire. Its cultural influence was
significant, even inspiring Georges Méliès in the creation of the 1902 film Voyage dans la lune.
And at the 1900 Exposition, one of the (literally) grandest attractions was a gigantic telescope
that projected a magnified image of the moon onto a screen. In Corday’s words, “la voir dix mille
fois agrandie, c’est s’en trouver eloigné de quatre-vingt kilomètres environ,” - not much farther,
that is, then Michel Ardan and his companions. Additionally, the same Exposition offered a
variety of dioramas: “d’abord prudent, il reproduit avec exactitude les paysages lunaires; pus,
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fantaisiste, il peint un voyage imaginaire dans un astre; enfin, franchissant les siècles aussi
aisément que l’espace, il raconte en vingt tableaux la genèse de la terre.” (Corday) The lunar
landscapes and interstellar voyages Corday describes could just as well have referred to the
Voyages Extraordinaires, which offer the same visions; the last diorama, of the genesis of the
Earth, naturally evokes Verne’s Voyage au centre de la terre. In all of these examples, the
experiences that technological innovation made possible for those attending the Exposition
resemble those of reading the Voyages Extraordinaires, as well as those of the novels’
characters.
Mapping Space and Society
The Expositions and the Voyages also represent a similar attitude towards the mapping
of space and society. Charles Taylor claims that the social imaginary is “much broader and
deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality
in a disengaged mode.” (23) It involves “an implicit grasp of social space” (26) outside of any
explicit categories and a “sense of moral order.” (28) In other words, it suggests a certain
structure of society and of the world that makes it comprehensible, allowing individuals to make
sense of existing within it.
Mapping, classifying, and ordering were typical of nineteenth-century science, including
social science, which aimed to create a legible and navigable world in the turbulent century of
social mobility that followed the French Revolution. But, as Taylor notes, the ordering and
mapping of a social imaginary must be implicit, and indeed it was in both the Voyages and the
Expositions. For example, the 1867 one attended by Verne “presented itself as a summary or
table of the various achievements of the era; structurally, it was laid out like an ideal two-way
chart provided with two means of ‘entry.” (Williams 1991, 102) Certainly this involved explicit
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mapping, but it also provided attendees with an intuitive layout through which to traverse the
Expositions, implicitly experiencing social order through physical space. Similarly, the Voyages
Extraordinaires map their protagonists’ trajectories ahead of time: Verne’s novels are always
closed systems with inevitably circular trajectories, such that both the starting and end points
are always a given. That is, outside of the maps that explicitly map the journeys within the
novels, the circularity provides an intuitive, almost mythical, and consequently subconscious,
ordering and making sense of space and the world.
The Expositions also reflected, in physical space, the encyclopedic tendencies of the
period’s “dioramic literature,” as Walter Benjamin refers to it. Philippe Hamon notes that “these
books shared more than their common subject matter with the Expositions; they also shared a
structure.” (96) As a prime example, he uses the numerous lists within literature of the period,
from Balzac’s types to the lists of fish species in Vint Mille lieues sous les mers – suggesting that
this “textual practice of exposition…takes sets of items and puts them into order.” (104) This
encyclopedic practice also defines the Voyages Extraordinaires, whose ostensible goal to
summarize all knowledge has been well-documented by critics. Notably, however, much of the
classifying in Verne’s novels is implicit: for example, though the various novels purport to each
be an entry in a sort of encyclopedia of scientific topics, such as astronomy (De la terre a la
lune), oceanology (Vingt mille lieues sous les mers), or aviation (Robur-le-conquérant), there is
no guide, no table of contents, that allows the reader to correlate the scientific topic with the
novel in question. Just like the implicit “sense of moral order” and “grasp of social space” that is
the domain of imaginaries, the Voyages and the Expositions offer such implicit and intuitive
ordering and classifying.
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The Imaginary and the Practical, or, Assent

Though the Expositions were spaces of the imagination and the imaginary, allowing its
attendees to visit dream worlds and participate in performances of statehood, they led to
concrete ends, or, in other words, realizations and reifications of sociotechnical imaginaries.
That is, the visions of the nation’s future made manifest at these Expositions both intertwined
with, and made possible, the direct action that Jasanoff demands from sociotechnical
imaginaries. If an experiment produces knowledge and results, then perhaps the most concrete
results were the transformations of the urban space of Paris. Numerous infrastructures were
created for the Expositions; most famous are the landmarks that still stand today: the Eiffel
Tower (1889), the Gare d’Orsay (1900) – now the Musée d’Orsay, the Grand Palais (1900), and
the Pont Alexandre III (1900). But other forms of infrastructure that are less spectacular, but no
less remarkable, were also integrated into the city: the famous Paris metro was laid down for
the 1900 Exposition, for example.
These transformations were made possible by, and even required, the assent of the
public, which, as we have seen, was equally crucial to the experimentation of the Royal Society
and the thought experiment of science fiction. The Expositions, as the virtual laboratory of
science fiction made physical, similarly required collective assent for the realization of
sociotechnical imaginaries and their transformation into concrete, tangible results. In fact,
Corday’s review of the 1900 Exposition describes it in the following terms:
La science s’y montre aimable, mais encore bien parisienne. Jamais l’alliance des
moyens de théâtre et d’industrie ne fut plus étroite. C’est le pacte de la coulisse et du
laboratoire. Et cette union en fait la force d’amusement. (emphasis mine)

110

This citation brings together the laboratory – the public space within which witnessing occurs
and assent is given – with the evocation of statehood and spectacle.
The spectacle of statehood was also closely linked to the project of witnessing and
education in the experimental spaces of the seventeenth century. As Shapin and Shaffer write,
“an experimental display adequate to [the visit of the King] ought to be both edifying and
spectacular.” (31, emphasis mine). They quote Christopher Wren, and the emphasis on
spectacle and display is evident:
And if you have any notable experiment, that may appear to open new light into the
principles of philosophy, nothing would better beseem the pretensions of the society;
though possibly such would be too jejune for this purpose, in which there out to be
something of pomp. On the other side, to produce knacks only, and things to raise
wonder, such as Kircher, Schottus, and even jugglers abound with, will scarce become
the gravity of the occasion. It must be something between both, luciferous in
philosophy, and yet whose use and advantage is obvious without a lecture; and besides,
that may surprise with some unexpected effect, and be commendable for the ingenuity
of the contrivance. (emphasis mine)
Wren sought an experiment that would evoke wonder, but also be “luciferous in philosophy” that is, edifying. Similarly, the Exposition Universelles abounded with effects and illusions, but
also educated public. And just as notables would have been invited to the assembly chambers
of the Royal Society, where the experiments of the laboratory would edify and entertain, that
laboratory has been transported to the “School of the Trocadéro” in Paris, where science
similarly entertains in its effects21.
However, it is important to consider what education and edification mean in the context
of the Expositions, and what their value is. As Williams has noted, “over the decades, the

21

The theatricality of the Abbé Nollet’s aforementioned devices for teaching science to an aristocratic
public here come to mind, for their artistry would add to the flair of the spectacle. This spectacularity of
the devices themselves transforms into the spectacle of effects at the Expositions.
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dominant tone of these expositions altered. The emphasis gradually changed from instructing
the visitor in the wonders of modern science and technology to entertaining him. In 1889, for all
their serious didactic intent, the Eiffel Tower and Gallery of Machines were popular above all
because they provided such thrilling vistas.” (1991, 59) Anne O’Neil-Henry agrees, arguing that
the 1900 Exposition demonstrated “a shift in the way electricity and, indeed, energy were
exhibited; from innovation to spectacle; utility to extravagance.” The Expositions, while eliding
the mechanical workings of technologies, increasingly exhibited their uses and their effects.
This, however, is also one of the values of the laboratory of science fiction: though the
genre can teach more abstract scientific principles, its primary merit lies in its ability to consider
the uses, effects, and consequences of technologies on a more concrete level. While the
Expositions may not have been educating the public regarding such principles, as the Voyages
Extraordinaires did, they familiarized the public with the workings and uses of technologies, and
it was this kind of knowledge that was crucial for the assent of the public in this laboratory. In
fact, the demonstration the workings of new technologies before the public was a common
practice in the nineteenth century: Edison’s phonograph, for example, was first demonstrated to
the Academy of Sciences in Paris, then to the Parisian public, a witnessing reproduced virtually
through extensive newspaper reports of the occurrence.
The vocabulary of witnessing and assent was precisely the rhetoric used regarding such
demonstrations of new technologies, particularly at Expositions. For example, the French
senator Foucher de Cariel spoke about the 1881 Universal Exposition in the following words:
La lumière nous vient, dit-on, de l’extrême Ouest et l’exportation scientifique devient,
avec celle des blés, une des branches les plus actives du commerce américain. Nous
voulons le croire, mais, pour que la démonstration soit complète, il faut cette
consécration supérieure que seul nous donne le témoignage universel. (quoted in
Beltran & Carré 67, emphasis mine)
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Significantly, de Cariel demands “universal witnessing” of the uses of electricity, a term strikingly
similar to Boyle’s demand for witnesses to his experimental demonstrations. He also makes use
of the word “demonstration,” emphasizing the way that the public’s assent to the possibilities of
new technology must be given publicly, in the collective space of the Exposition, following their
witnessing of it. Ivy Roberts also points out that, in 1878, the “British papers reflected a growing
distrust of Edison’s rhetoric, calling for a public demonstration to authenticate the promise [of
electric lighting].” (13) Again the language suggests the necessity of public witnessing of the
viability of a new technology prior to its integration into society, and the 1881 Exposition
provided an opportunity for precisely this kind of witnessing: “C’est bien en 1881 que
l’électricité quitte le monde confidentiel des laboratoires de recherche et des ateliers
d’inventeurs pour prendre de façon démonstrative le statut d’industrie et présenter ses
multiples applications à la société.” (Kuntz, 84) Electricity transforms the Exposition, and the
world, into a laboratory within which it is judged on its effectiveness.
Having witnessed the uses and viability of such technologies, the public was then able to
give their assent. At the Royal Society, such assent occurred in the form of witnesses to an
experiment signing a ledger to confirm their presence and corroborate its results. At the
Expositions, this assent came in the form of public acceptance of new technologies, a willingness
to purchase and use new them, and through the press, in positive reviews of them. The press, as
we have seen, was a space where technological futures were frequently discussed, and so
assent in the virtual space of print went a long way in validating and encouraging the use of new
technologies. Thus, for example, the 1881 Exposition first demonstrated Edison’s incandescent
lightbulb, and this laboratory space was “le véritable point de départ de l’essor de la lampe à
incandescence et plus généralement de l’éclairage électrique.” (Beltran & Carré) Edison himself
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stated “l’exposition ouverte à Paris lui a donné une grande impulsion commerciale,” and was “a
l’origine de la diffusion de l’éclairage électrique public et privé.” (Ibid, 70) This Exposition was
the first to showcase the use of electricity in a private, domestic space (prior to this, electric
illumination had only been available via arc-lamps, too dangerous to use indoors), which led to
the spread of both its public and private use. The importance of displaying and popularizing new
technologies for their commercial success therefore cannot be overemphasized. It is not enough
for a technology to be invented: it must be marketed, and receive public assent; in fact, Thomas
Edison’s success lies in the combination of his scientific and marketing abilities.
Such assent had obvious economic benefits for the French nation, again transforming
sociotechnical imaginaries into concrete effects. Consequently, Beltran notes that the 1881
exposition “repose ainsi sur deux piliers. L’Etat en assure la maitrise administrative et la
subventionne ; associée à l’opération, la Ville de Paris, accorde 25 000 francs.” (64) A year prior
to the Exposition, the Ministre des Postes and Telegraphes, Adolphe Cochery, urged the
president of the French Republic to accord this funding with the following report:
aujourd’hui aucune science ne semble devoir, plus que la science électrique, réaliser de
rapides progrès, résoudre des problèmes intéressant la vie économique des nations, et
rendre enfin a toutes nos relations d’inappréciables services.” (quoted in Beltran &
Carré, 62)
Explicitly articulated as a technology and a science that could be economically and socially
beneficial to the nation, electricity was put on display at the 1881 Exposition and funded by the
state.
There were, of course, also other benefits to the popularization of science, which was
justified throughout the nineteenth century by myriad reasons that bridged intellectual
concerns with social, political, and national ones. Bensaude-Vincent writes that “l’instruction du
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people, la formation du citoyen deviennent de véritables slogans publicitaires et de puissants
motifs pour chercher à élargir le marché.” (51) An education in science and familiarity with one’s
technological milieu was a crucial part of the education of a citizen – a kind of assertion of civic
responsibility that relies on a scientifically and technologically literate populace. And, France’s
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, where the “eminently French industry” of ballooning had
become a symbol of French resistance against Prussian troops, no doubt contributed an impetus
towards scientific literacy.
The Voyages Extraordinaires engaged in this same project of familiarizing the public with
science and technology. Founded upon the same imaginary of the French nation as modern and
technologically adapt, the Expositions and the Voyages Extraordinaires helped transform that
imaginary into a reality, doing the work of making France a scientifically literate and
technologically adept society. Evans writes of the Voyages Extraordinaires: “Tailored as they
were to this society’s rapidly changing view of itself and to its vision of a better future, these
publications took root and soon sold by the millions.” (1988, 14) In fact, one of the greatest
motivations for writing the Voyages Extraordinaires was a national project of educating the
French public in science and technology, something that was absent from the school curriculum
at the time. Influenced by a concern over the “serious problems...developing in the French
educational system” (Evans 1991, 13) in the 1860s, Hetzel responded to this need with his
Magasin d’éducation et de Recréation, a wholesome publication intended to be read by the
entire family. The novels he commissioned from Verne aimed “to be a kind of literary home
remedy, a recreational antidote to this serious lacuna in the educational exposure of French
youth, that is, to teach science through family readings.” (Ibid, 14) Such a popularization of
science therefore can to be seen as a national project that helps prepare citizens for
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participation in the civic arena, and has positive results for the nation itself.
Just like the Expositions, the Voyages also engaged in the project of de-alienating – of
familiarizing – new technologies, and particularly the private uses of technology. Caroline
Grubbs notes of the novels of Albert Robida, another French author of science fiction, and a
contemporary of Verne’s:
The novel functions as an intermediate stage between the present and the future. It
prepares its readers for the changes that will reshape their environment, or, more
precisely for the fact of change itself. Futuristic literature participates in the
reconfiguration of modern life that characterizes the latter half of the nineteenth
century by acclimatizing readers to the acceleration of technological culture. (105)
These words could apply equally to Verne’s Voyages Extraordinaires, which do the important
work of familiarizing new technologies; Evans argues that Verne’s texts “acted as a kind of
representational model for enlightened social adaptation to the complex technology and/or
alien environments that it described.” (1988, 34) This contributes to the social practices that
make possible our collective existence in a technological society, a crucial aspect of social
imaginaries. As Simone Vierne notes, part of Verne’s motivation was to “remplir le programme
consciemment et consciencieusement trace par son ami et éditeur: introduire les jeunes
lecteurs dans notre monde moderne.” (15) That is, the novels had the double function of
preparing both children and adults for the task of living in a mechanized, technologized world.
It has become a familiar refrain that Verne did not invent any new technologies:
Williams argues that Verne is “just a few steps ahead of contemporary reality,” (2013, 77) Unwin
claims that “much of the technology in his novels was already in existence,” (2005a, 21) and
Serres goes so far as to suggest that Verne is “well behind the times.” (82) In a refutation of the
now-commonplace refutation of Verne as a prophet, I would like to suggest that he is, in fact,
slightly ahead of the curve. But what is important is not whether he invented technologies or
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merely improved upon already existing prototypes, as the canon of science fiction contains
works that do both. What is important is the way he envisions these technologies being used.
Rosalind Williams suggests that, just as realistic novels “helped readers navigate bourgeois
society,” so romances like Verne’s “helped them navigate the quasi-magical world that
bourgeois society was creating.” (33) Indeed, just like Robida, Verne prepares his readers for the
changes that will reshape their environment by familiarizing technologies in private spaces
where they had not been used before, even if they had been invented. Perhaps ironically, given
his heroes’ attempts to escape bourgeois civilization, Verne shows them using technology for
personal ends within domestic spaces. Almost every one of his novels contains a vehicle that is
an enclosed world onto itself, a contained microcosm that resembles the bourgeois domestic
spaces of the Second Empire while at the same time being more technologized than such spaces
had yet become. In these private spaces, as in the Expositions, it is “tout par l’électricité.” Just as
the 1881 electrical Exposition domesticated electricity, showing it used for indoor lighting and
doorbells, electricity is always dominated, tamed, and put to private and domestic uses in
Verne’s novels.
For example, the Nautilus in 20,000 Lieues sous les mers (written 1868-69) contains a
dining room, library, and salon and museum furnished with the finest comforts, seemingly
indistinguishable from the Parisian drawing rooms of Verne’s time. Yet each room is also
illuminated by “un plafond lumineux,” (122) significant for though electricity had been put to
multiple uses by this time, it had not yet penetrated into the domestic spaces. It made possible
the telegraph, but this was used at this time for “public” uses such as journalism and finance
exponentially more than private communication. Outdoor and theatrical lighting using arc lamps
was used in the 1870s, but indoor lighting was impossible, as the arc lamp was too bright to be
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used indoors and required too high a voltage. The incandescent lightbulb, which could burn for
hours, was not invented by Edison until 1879, and not displayed until 1881 Exposition. Verne’s
vision of Nemo’s illumination of his strikingly bourgeois domestic space was highly prescient,
and normalizing a technology that would not be invented for another ten years. Just like Albert
Robida’s novels, electricity in Verne’s microcosms is capable of providing every convenience
within a private residence, in ways that were impossible at that time22.
Conclusion

Fictional visions of technology’s uses and the futures they make possible both prepare
the reader to exist within their technoscientific present and enable the construction of the
future. The back-and-forth between technoscientific work and culture therefore forms crucial
part of technological and social development: new technologies influence cultural production,
which in turn shapes technoscientific progress. Through this back-and-forth, sociotechnical
imaginaries are realized as concrete, tangible futures, and the laboratory of science fiction both
investigates the consequence of such a realization and enables it.

22

This domestication of technology within private spaces parallels the modern-day use of science fiction
films as a form of “diegetic prototypes” intended to find and convince investors. In Lab Coats in
Hollywood, Kirby details numerous cases in which the intra-diegetic use of a technology, seamlessly
integrated into a fictional world, led to investment in research that led to the development of that specific
technology.

118

CHAPTER THREE
COGNITIVE ESTRANGEMENT AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE: ALBERT ROBIDA’S LE
VINGTIEME SIECLE, STRANGENESS, AND NOVELTY
The nineteenth century was a period marked by an onslaught of technoscientific
novelty: from railroads and the telegraph in the earlier half of the century to photography, the
telephone, electric lighting, motion pictures, and X-rays by the end of it. But when faced with
such inventions, an important question emerges: what is novelty? By its definition, the novel is
that of which we have no experience, which has not even previously existed. With the
emergence of science fiction, however, a genre came into being that was based on realistically
depicting the future and whose representations of novelty predate, predict, and frequently even
cause the realization of the very technologies they portray. Science fiction depicts possibilities
that do not (yet) exist, evoking an inevitable effect of estrangement. At the same time, its
marvelous technologies enter into our cultural imaginaries, such that science fiction serves as a
collective lexicon through which to understand these innovations once they become science
fact.
Science fiction therefore exists as a literary form anchored in paradox. On the one hand,
it is the genre of cognitive estrangement, founded on making strange the familiar and staging
novelty; on the other, it familiarizes technological novelties to create the cognitive frameworks
and cultural lexicon through which we make them coherent as they increasingly shape our lives.
How can a literary form both make strange and make familiar? I approach this question by
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investigating the nature of estrangement, anchoring it in an examination of the experiences of,
and discourses around, technoscientific novelty in the nineteenth century: I argue that science
fiction transforms these experiences and discourses into literary form. I then draw on cognitive
science and the psychology of literature to show that, through language and form, science
fiction elicits cognitive and affective responses of both strangeness and familiarity
simultaneously and thus calibrates our relationship to technological novelty. Since technology
overwhelmingly shapes our lives, behaviors, and identities, this calibration is in turn an avenue
through which science fiction shapes our responses to and behaviors around novelty.
This forms part and parcel of a larger way in which literature shapes our understanding
of the world and our interaction with it. We access reality overwhelmingly through the lens of
language and story, and in the previous chapter, I approached this phenomenon at the
sociological level, arguing that science fiction contributed to the sociotechnical imaginaries that
enable the collective practices of social life. In this chapter, I complement this broader
sociological approach with one focused more directly on the individual experience of the literary
work by drawing on cognitive science. Additionally, anchoring and contextualizing
estrangement, a fundamental component of science fiction, in technoscientific history allows
me to address once again the underlying question of why science fiction emerged in the
nineteenth century.
I focus primarily on Albert Robida’s 1882 science fiction novel, Le Vingtième Siècle, as
well as contemporary popular science texts, newspaper articles, caricatures, and other textual
and visual discourses around novelty. Robida’s novel is a particularly apt choice for this chapter’s
investigation because it uses both text and image to create a vast and extensive encyclopedia of
its moment’s discourses around technology. Robida himself was a caricaturist who contributed
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extensively to Le Journal Amusant and edited La Caricature, and had his finger on the pulse not
only of technological novelty, but of the ways it was being satirized. Le Vingtième Siècle
therefore ties together with a loose, picaresque narrative a lengthy series of vignettes depicting
a futuristic Paris. It is very much an immersive, “slice of life” text, with a “heavy emphasis on the
anecdotal” (Willems 2004, xxxviii) that forms “a kind of historical chronicle of everyday life in
the future.” (Ibid, xxxviii). As Phillippe Willems emphasizes, Robida’s work is that of chronicler;
his novel, with the narrative as pretext, it serves as an almost encyclopedic collection of the
rhetorics, ideas, tropes, and anxieties around technoscientific novelty that were “in the air” at
the moment, and offers an invaluable resource through which to understand societal feeling
towards, and discourses around, innovation. Le Vingtième Siècle therefore serves as an apt
illustration of how this collective cultural lexicon around technoscientific novelty becomes
transposed into literary form in order to prepare us to confront and understand that novelty.
Cognitive Estrangement: The Rationalization of Magic
In the introduction, I suggested temporalizing Darko Suvin’s delineation of the various
literary forms that make use of estrangement in order to map how cognitive estrangement
(science fiction) emerged out of earlier, “non-cognitive” estrangement (in the form of the
fairytale, the myth, and the fantasy). All these literary forms create an effect of estrangement by
depicting a world whose norms and possibilities are distinctly different from our own; only
science fiction, however, explains these seemingly marvelous possibilities through a
performance of scientific rigor. I used this differentiation to argue that science fiction emerged
out of these earlier forms in the nineteenth century, when a new rationalistic and technological
paradigm made possible the depiction of phenomena impossible in our present reality as made
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possible by technoscience rather than magic. At the midpoint of this literary genealogy lay the
fantastic, which marks an oscillation between the supernatural and the scientific as explanations
for these seemingly impossible phenomena.
This emergence of cognitive estrangement is therefore the emergence of a new literary
mode, reflective of a new technoscientific paradigm. As it developed out of earlier literary
forms, science fiction embodied at the formal level the new experiences of, and rhetorics
around, technology in the nineteenth century to reflect this new paradigm. As Rosalind Williams
notes, in this period, “the visible world was being reshaped by often invisible but amazingly
powerful forces. In a world of railroads, telegraphs, electric lights, ether, and x-rays, the
marvelous mingled with everyday life. These new experiences recalibrated the literary triad of
myth, romance, and realism. Ordinary life no longer seemed ‘realistic’ when human beings
assumed powers that appeared quasi supernatural.” (33) Technology itself seemed fantastic:
nineteenth century science had moved beyond the study of Newtonian mechanics to what it
called “imponderables” – light, heat, electricity, and magnetism, all of which were invisible,
powerful, and, from the perspective of an earlier era, supernatural. These imponderables could
transform reality without being seen, thus seeming very much like intangible supernatural
forces, but nonetheless had the capacity to be harnessed by human ingenuity and to transform
quotidian life.
Electric power offers the most illustrative example of this technological yet fantastic
experience. At the 1881 International Exposition of Electricity in Paris, one of the most striking
exhibits featured a set of elegantly furnished rooms equipped with the latest electric
technologies, including indoor lighting, doorbells, and alarms. The visitors to the smashingly
popular exposition were thus able to experience the crucial effect of estrangement as the
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unfamiliar (in this particular case, electricity) entered into a familiar, domestic space. There is
perhaps no better word to describe this experience than “uncanny,” deriving from the German
unheimlich, meaning “unhomely.” That is, the uncanny is quite literally that which is opposed to
the ‘heimlich,” the homely, familiar, and domestic, and its emotional effect lies in being “that
class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar.” (Freud, 220)
Without delving too deeply into psychoanalytic thought, therefore, it suffices to state that the
essence of the uncanny lies not in strangeness or the unfamiliar per se, but in its relation to, or
juxtaposition with, the familiar. This was precisely the experience that the advent of electric
power provoked: it allowed this strange, imponderable force to enter into the familiar spaces of
civilization. Following the 1881 Exposition, electric illumination entered into real domestic
spaces with the invention of Edison’s incandescent lightbulb and transformed the way people
lived in them. Due to the brightness of the light and the way it fell, it revealed dust and
produced shadow in new ways, changing both fashion and home furnishing. Thus, a seemingly
supernatural force quite literally reordered the way people existed in the sphere of the home,
and yet was subject to rational explanation and human control. The technologies powered by
electricity were therefore the very embodiment of cognitive estrangement, making possible that
which had previously only been possible through magic (people absent or dead speaking,
blindingly bright interior illumination) through rational and technological means. These fantastic
forces transformed the home into the space of estrangement, but were subject to a cognitive
glance, as they were not an unchangeable force that simply is, but rather a concrete technology
that could be created, controlled, or removed from the domestic space.
Le Vingtième Siècle recreates the uncanny effect experienced by the Expositions’ visitors
as it recreates the same experience of fantastic technology within domestic space. Published in
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1882 – that is, a mere year after the aforementioned exposition – Robida’s novel is set in the
Paris of 1952 and depicts a future in which the cutting-edge technologies of the nineteenth
century have become developed, ameliorated, and disseminated throughout society. They have
penetrated into the domestic sphere and reshaped daily life on every level, and the story
focuses on the Ponto family– M. and Mme. Ponto, their two daughters Barbe and Barnabette,
and their adoptive daughter Helene Colobry– as they live in this strange new world. In
particular, the narrative follows the protagonist Helene as she attempts to find herself suitable
employment in this technologically-advanced future, trying out a variety of professions and
consequently allowing Robida to provide the reader with a tour-de-force of his elaboratelydesigned world. Dreamy and romantic by contrast to her eminently practical stepsisters, and
having spent the past several years at a boarding school in the provincial Plougadec-lesCormorans, Helene finds herself ill-suited for the various professions of technological modernity,
and her alienation from the advancements of the future allow her to serve as an avatar for the
reader, to whom this new world is equally strange.
The novel therefore features mainly technologies that had already been invented at the
time of writing, but which had not yet become widespread. It therefore estranges the familiar,
in the form of both bourgeois domestic space and Paris itself, by depicting these fantastic
technologies as having penetrated into these spaces that they had not yet entirely touched. The
Pontos and Helene all regularly make use of the telephone, patented in 1876, electric trains,
which brought the public to the Universal Exposition of Electricity in Paris in 1881, and electric
illumination, used to light Parisian streets in the 1870s but not yet a staple of domestic life in
1882. At this same Exposition, visitors could listen to a 2-minute live broadcast from the Opera
and the Comédie-Francaise via telephone. Though the visual component was absent, such a live,
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long-distance broadcast is reminiscent of the telephonoscope in the Ponto home. Depicting such
a variety of strange novelties within the familiarity of the bourgeois home, Le Vingtième Siècle
therefore replicates the estrangement effect of the 1881 Exposition’s electrically-outfitted
rooms as well as, more broadly, the uncanny experience of new technologies entering the
home. Verne accomplished a similar effect in his novels: each of his machines is “d’abord une
maison—électrique our à vapeur certes—mais possédant tous les caractères et tout le confort
de la maison bourgeoise à la fin du XIXeme siècle. » (Noiray, 119) What creates estrangement in
Verne’s novels is therefore not so much the technologies themselves - as Unwin notes, “much of
the technology in his novels was already in existence” (2000, 21) – but rather, their presence in
comfortable middle-class interiors. Nemo’s submarine, for example, possesses all the comforts
of a bourgeois home in the form of a dining room, library, salon, and smoking room – but also
electric illumination. Technology penetrates into familiar domestic space, creating an effect of
(cognitive) estrangement.
Let me, in this chapter, trace the translation of the topoi of the “non-cognitive” and
fantastic literary forms into the mode of cognitive estrangement in Robida’s Le Vingtième Siècle,
as well as popular science books and periodicals, pamphlets, advertisements for and records of
technoscientific demonstrations and lectures, caricatures of scientific innovations, and the
ephemera of the Expositions Universelles. Such materials both recorded and shaped the
nineteenth century’s experiences of technology, providing insight into how novelty was lived
and received. Mapping how science fiction translated the topoi of the fairytale, the myth, and
the fantastic into the mode of cognitive estrangement in ways that mirror popular rhetoric
around technological novelty therefore reveals how the emergence of cognitive estrangement
embodies in literary form a new experience of technology and a new technoscientific paradigm.
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This in turn allows for an understanding of science fiction as a literary form directly anchored in,
and as the embodiment of, concrete technoscientific history. I also give particular attention to
the material and technological contexts of production of texts in this new mode of cognitive
estrangement, which mirror the rationalization at the heart of the texts themselves.
It is at the level of language that science fiction first reveals its predominant mode as
that of cognitive estrangement. Science fiction is what Darko Suvin terms a “factual reporting of
fictions,” and in Chapter One, I argued that it positions itself as scientific rather than literary
writing. This allows science fiction to perform the scientific rigor that translates the mythical,
magical, and fantastical into the language of fact and create cognitive estrangement. As Arthur
Evans writes, “Robida’s fanciful extrapolations cannot be simply categorized as fantasy, in the
true sense of that word. For, in terms of verisimilitude and mimesis, his novels are solidly
anchored (from a nineteenth-century perspective) in a realistic representation of daily and
family life in France – much like, earlier in the century, Balzac’s Scenes de la vie privée or Scenes
de la vie parisienne.”() Balzac’s Comedie humaine positioned itself as a scientific text, a kind of
natural history of human types, and Robida’s description of the future similarly exists in the
mode of empiricism rather than the fanciful possibilities of fantasy.
This linguistic empiricism is a product of the context in which science fiction first
appeared: the novels of Robida and Verne were, on the whole, serialized in periodicals,
alongside scientific and political news. As Florence Carneiro and Brigitte Rozet point out, “les
revues qui publient nombre de romans en feuilleton adoptent pour ces derniers une
présentation matérielle identique à celle des articles [de vulgarisation de la science]. Comme
dans un texte destiné à un public de non-spécialistes, l’auteur de fiction pratique la note
technique en bas de page ou l’intègre au cours du récit. Sur un même feuillet, vérité et fiction se
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côtoient. » (126) Le Vingtième Siècle, in particular, was republished in 1896 in La Science
Illustrée, one of the dominant periodicals for scientific popularization. As we saw in Chapter
One, this « côtoiement » contributed to a homogeneity of style between science fiction’s factual
reporting of fictions and the actual factual reporting on technoscientific innovation of popular
science text, allowing for a performance of scientific rigor that positioned works of science
fiction as scientific texts.23 This performance of scientific rigor is also how science fiction
translated the topoi and the possibilities of fantastical fiction into the mode of cognitive
estrangement.
This transformation is most striking in science fiction’s reworking of myth into its own
modality. 24 As we have seen, myth provides powerful explanations for why the world is the way
it is, but these explanations are static and eternal. They describe the way of the world now and
for all time, which is why the estrangement of myth is ahistorical and non-cognitive. Science
fiction, by contrast, is deeply aware of the place in time of what it depicts; Robida, for example,
“situates his novels within a continuum portraying that future’s past and its own potential
future.” (Willems 2004, xxv) As such, it draws, linguistically, on the lyricism, the grandeur, and
the explanatory power of myth while moving it into the realm of the scientific. Consider, for
example, the following paragraph from the opening of La vie electrique, the last novel in the
trilogy that begins with Le Vingtième Siècle:

23

As Michael Saler points out in As If: Modern Enchantment and the Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality,
such similarities may have encouraged less sophisticated readers to approach the stories as nonfictional
rather than fictional.” (115) Though he is referring to the realist style of Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories,
similarly published alongside actual criminal reporting, the same argument could be made of science
fiction given its publication venue.
24
Critics and science fiction creators have also frequently referred to science fiction as a kind of
mythology for modernity; William Shatner, who played Captain Kirk on Star Trek, suggested that science
fiction offers to modernity the same explanatory power that myth used to, thus in itself becoming a kind
of modern myth. [source]

127

Les rôles sont renversés, c'est à la Nature domptée aujourd'hui de se plier sous la
volonté réfléchie de l'homme, qui sait modifier à sa guise, suivant les nécessités,
l'éternel roulement des saisons et, selon les besoins divers des contrées, donner à
chaque région ce qu'elle demande, la portion de chaleur qu'il lui faut, la part de
fraîcheur après laquelle elle soupire ou les ondées rafraîchissantes réclamées par un sol
trop desséché! L'homme ne veut plus grelotter sans nécessité ou cuire dans son jus
inutilement. (3)
Previously, that is, man had been subject to the change of the seasons, and it was myth that
explained its “eternal roulement”: the myth of Persephone and Hades that explains fall and
winter and Apollo’s chariot that explains the coming of day and night are the most salient
examples. However, the ever-repeating cycle ceases to be quite so eternal and becomes subject
to change with the advent of technology, as Robida makes explicit:
C'est la conquête définitive de l'Électricité, du moteur mystérieux des mondes qui a
permis à l'homme de changer ce qui paraissait immuable, de toucher à l'antique ordre
des choses, de reprendre en sous-œuvre la Création, de modifier ce que l'on croyait
devoir rester éternellement en dehors et au-dessus de la Main humaine! (3)
The mythical language here is evident : the “moteur mysterieux des mondes,” “toucher à
l’antique ordre des choses,” “la Création,” “au-dessus de la main humaine” all evoke the lyricism
of myth. But it is interspersed with science and technology, in the form of a “moteur,”
electricity, and the human ability to harness, control, and change the eternal way of the world.
Similarly, numerous critics have emphasized the extensive mythical and epic archetypes in Jules
Verne’s novels (Evans, Unwin, Serres, Vierne): for example, the Nautilus in Vingt mille lieues
sous les mers is assumed by the commander of the ship charged to hunt it down to be a
mythical beast, and “il y croyait comme certaines bonnes femmes croient au Leviathan – par foi,
non par raison. Le monstre existait, il en délivrerait les mers, il l’avait juré. C’était une sorte de
chevalier de Rhodes, un Dieudonné de Gozon, marchant à la rencontre du serpent qui désolait
son ile.” (54) The mode of myth and romance is unequivocally evoked, yet repeatedly laid to rest
through statements such as Arronax’s exclamation that “Les temps ne sont plus ou les Jonas se
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réfugient dans le ventre des baleines!” (89) Again myth becomes rationalized and subject to
human control through the tools of technoscience.
This was also the modality of popular science texts, advertisements, and the ephemera
of the Expositions Universelles, all of which reveal attitudes towards technoscience within mass
culture. An illustration in the 1911-1913 3-volume set Le Monde et la Science, for example,
depicts what appear to be Olympian gods gazing down from the clouds onto a sky filled with
airplanes (Image 20). This is an obvious transposition of the mythical into the space of the
technological, in which the gods seem frightened by the fact that they have been superseded by
human technological might – just as, in the above quotation from Robida, humanity has
changed the “antiques lois du monde.” This kind of mythical iconography similarly proliferated
in the numerous images produced for the Expositions Universelles, which celebrated “the novel
in the guise of the eternal,” (Gunning) translating human-made technological novelty into the
mode of myth. The 1900 Exposition, for example, transformed electricity into “a glimmering
allegorical statue that represented electricity with radiating spokes in the shape of a star,”
(O’Neil-Henry) which topped the Palais de l’Electricité. That is, the technological was indelibly
intertwined with the realm of the mythical, but those myths necessarily coexisted with the
technical explanations that could draw back the veil from the mystery of these spectacles.
The same kind of transition of modes occurred with the fairy tale. For example, in Le
Vingtième Siècle, M. Ponto throws a party in honor of Helene, which Robida describes using
magical language:
Un beau soir, l’hôtel Ponto tout entier resplendit sous une féerique illumination; de la
base au faite, des girandoles de lumière électrique dessinèrent des arabesques
flamboyantes et lancèrent jusque sous les derniers arbres du jardin, de longues gerbes
d’étincelles semblables a des queues de comète. Les fanaux de gala s’allumèrent sur les
toits, pour indiquer de loin le débarcadère aux aérocabs des invités. (110)
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This particular passage of Robida’s novel proceeds according to the same logic as the Gothic
expliqué: it beings with an invocation of a “féerique illumination” that makes the
hotel “resplendi[r],” while the next phrase provides the naturalization of this image through the
“lumière électrique.” Then pattern then repeats: “arabesques flamboyantes” and “gerbes
d’étincelles” that look likes “des queues de comète” are explicitly mentioned to create a
fantastic atmosphere, while the next sentence is eminently practical and even empirical,
describing the way that the “fanaux de gala” indicate the “débarcadère aux aérocabs.” The
realities of modern urban life – vehicular travel, traffic, navigation – are not so much juxtaposed
with as follow logically from the moments of fantasy. Consider, also, Nemo’s invitation (that
cannot be refused) to Arronax and his companions: “Vous allez voyager dans le pays des
merveilles. L’étonnement, la stupéfaction seront probablement l’état habituel de votre esprit.”
(120) This is an invitation into a Wonderland, a wiser guide preparing the protagonist for a
journey into a world of marvels. But this guide is no wizard, but rather, a scientific prodigy and
technological expert, and the marvelous spectacle will be accessed through the technology of
the submarine.
These descriptions recall the portrayal of electricity in the popular texts of the
nineteenth century, and particularly in the imagery of the Expositions Universelles. Electricity
was dubbed “La Fée electricité,” while Thomas Edison received the moniker “The Wizard of
Menlo Park” for his invention of the incandescent lightbulb and the phonograph. Edison figures
as the protagonist of Villiers de l’Isle Adam’s 1886 fantastic/science fiction novel L’Eve future –
but, as the author points out, « en Amérique et en Europe une légendé s’est donc éveillée, dans
l’imagination de la foule, autour de ce grand citoyen des Etats-Unis. » (37) Edison has become a
myth of modernity, and “le héros de ce livre est, avant tout, le ‘sorcier de Menlo Park’, etc – et
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non M. l’ingénieur Edison, notre contemporain.” (Ibid) Villiers gestures in his preface to the way
wizardly and technological acumen became indelibly intertwined in popular portrayals of
Edison, such as an engraving (Image 21) published in The Daily Graphic in 1878, depicting Edison
as a stereotypical wizard in a robe and pointy hat. His robe is covered in images of his
inventions, while the wand he holds blazes the light of knowledge. The technologies of the
magician have become the tools of the scientist, harnessing imponderable forces.
Edison was well known in France, and had in fact become quite a sensation once the
phonograph and the incandescent lightbulb in Paris, while the 1881 Universal Exposition of
Electricity and the 1900 Exposition Universelle both foregrounded electricity. Edison’s sorcery
therefore translated easily into the depiction of electricity as a fairytale-esque force, paving the
way for “a shift in the conception of electricity from the utilitarian to the spectacular,” (O’NeilHenry) particularly in the uses and portrayals of it in the Expositions Universelles. Consider, for
example, the various ephemera depicting the Palais de l’Electricité produced for the 1900
Exposition, such as Image 22. Such souvenirs abounded, and while guidebooks and catalogues
“took pains to describe in detail the mechanical aspects of the Palais de l’electricité, the visual
depictions of the event…captured the spectacular nature of the attraction itself.” (O’Neil-Henry).
In addition to “spectacular,” we might add, also, fairytale-esque, though it is difficult to claim,
through the distance of more than a century, that what we consider today a fairytale-esque
image is how it would have been perceived at the time. Its depiction of electricity, however, is
certainly otherworldly, but would have come with the knowledge that his otherworldly spectacle
was made possible through technoscientific means, accessible and comprehensible through the
guidebooks and catalogues that O’Neil-Henry mentions.25 Similarly, as Rosalind Williams notes,

25

Some of the souvenir postcards from the Expositions can be held up to the light, at which point the
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“the advent of electrical power invested everyday life with fabulous qualities.” (84) The
spectacular, the marvelous, the fabulous – all evoke both the strangeness and the magic of the
fairytale; like this literary form, electricity allowed access to alternate, dream worlds, yet
remained in the realm of the demonstrably rational.
This conception of “la fée electricité” hints towards another form of scientific
popularization taking place in Britain: scientific fairy tales used to teach science to women and
children. In texts such as The Fairyland of Science, fairies represented invisible forces such as
electricity, magnetism, and gravity, and explained the workings of nature. In explaining the
phenomenon, Talairach-Vielmas writes, “the world of fancy is repressed through the presence
of rational explanations for mysterious processes or appearances…as in the explanation of the
Aurora borealis, Ignes Fatui (Will o’-the-Wisps), the ‘spectre of the Brocken’ and Fata Morgana
(or Fairy Illusion).” (20) This is precisely the modality of science fiction: taking the seemingly
fantastical and naturalizing it. Just as science fiction naturalized electric light, speaking over
large distances, and flying machines, these didactic scientific texts naturalized fairy tale motifs
such as fairies, spectres, and hauntings.
Finally, and most interestingly, science fiction adopts the tropes of the fantastic and the
Gothic, thus transitioning from a hesitation between the supernatural and the rational to the
scientific worldview that is the hallmark of science fiction. Here, I trace the translation of these
topoi from Alexandre Dumas’ 1849 Les Mille et Un Fantômes to Le Vingtième Siècle. Emerging
out of the Romantic milieu inhabited by Charles Nodier and Gerard de Nerval and influenced by
the tales of Hoffmann, the former gathers together multiple stories that address the possibility
Palais de l’Electricité, Eiffel Tower, and other attractions will “light up,” replicating in some small way the
dazzling experience of the Expositions themselves. In another way, then, the magic of electricity and the
experience of novelty can enter into domestic space, as souvenirs do, even as the physical postcards were
likely mass-produced, thus again combining the fairytale-esque with the realities of the industrial world.
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of the dead feeling and speaking after the moment of death in the guise of a dinner party that
serves as its frame narrative. It is therefore highly representative of the fantastic mode that
dominated the earlier half of the century and offers a neat starting point to trace the
rationalization of this mode’s topoi. It opens with the narrator (a fictionalized version of Dumas
himself) returning from a hunt when he witnesses a man who has assassinated his wife turn
himself in to the mayor because the decapitated head of his wife had spoken to him to insist
that she was innocent. As Dumas gathers with the mayor and other citizens at a salon that
evening, the conversation naturally tends towards a discussion of whether life or sensation
might remain within a head once it has been cut from the body. This was a topic of significant
scientific debate in the period due to anxieties around the potential suffering caused by the
supposedly painless guillotine, a stark representation of the violence of the French Revolution
that remained in the cultural imagination over the ensuing decades. In addressing it, Dumas
deftly mixes scientific discourse with atmospheric suspense to create the hesitation of the
fantastic that Todorov explains. The mayor offers a thoroughly scientific explanation, logically
deriving the assertion “Si donc le siège de la faculté de sentir est dans le cerveau, aussi
longtemps que le cerveau conserve sa force vitale, le supplicié a le sentiment de son existence.”
Yet the proof of this assertion is the series of stories that follow and make up the anthology, in
which the characters recount an experience in which the dead spoke to them. And in each story,
scientific rhetoric is replaced by heightened suspense and exaggerated shock – that is,
rationality cedes to emotional affect.
Consider, for example, the following scene of the character Albert discovering the
guillotined head of his lover:
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Tout à coup, il me sembla qu'une voix douce et lamentable à la fois, qu'une voix qui
partait de l'enceinte même de la petite chapelle prononçait le nom d'Albert.
Oh ! pour le coup, je tressaillis. Albert !... Une seule personne au monde me nommait
ainsi.
Mes yeux égarés firent lentement le tour de la petite chapelle, dont, si étroite qu'elle
fût, ma lumière ne suffisait pas pour éclairer les parois, et s'arrêtèrent sur le sac dressé à
l'angle de l'autel, et dont la toile sanglante et bosselée indiquait le funèbre contenu.
Au moment où mes yeux s'arrêtaient sur le sac, la même voix, mais plus faible, mais plus
lamentable encore, répéta le même nom :
- Albert !
….
Je criai trois fois.
- Solange ! Solange ! Solange !
A la troisième fois, les yeux se rouvrirent, me regardèrent, laissèrent tomber deux
larmes, et, jetant une flamme humide comme si l'âme s'en échappait, se refermèrent
pour ne plus se rouvrir. (95)
With the benefit of our scientific hindsight, such anecdotes might acquire a rational explanation.
In the eighteenth century, Luigi Galvani discovered that an electric current could make the legs
of a dead frog move, seemingly imitating life; today, scientific experiment has suggested that
the brain experiences sensation for several seconds after decapitation. Within the story, such an
explanation is not definitively offered; instead, the scientific rhetoric offers a possible
explanation, but it is equally plausible, within the realm of the fiction, that the supernatural
simply is.
Albert Robida’s novel also presents a moment of the dead speaking, but in a strikingly
different mode. Dumas’ stories are gruesome and macabre : upon being kissed by the dead lips
of Solange, Albert narrates how “un frisson de glace passa par tout mon corps ; je jetai un
gémissement, et je m'évanouis.” (96) And in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher,”
an entombed and supposedly dead Madeline of Usher returns from the grave with “blood upon
her white robes,” until the narrator flees, “aghast.” (65) No such terror is present when the dead
speak in Le Vingtième Siècle, which they do through the means of a phonograph recording,
which had been invented by Edison only a few years prior to the novel being written, in 1877.
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M. Ponto claims that he enjoys “le théâtre retrospectif,” and when Helene expresses confusion,
he explains: “Lors de l’invention du phonographe, à la fin du siècle dernier, on eut l’idée,
excellente au point de vue de l’art et des traditions de demander des clichés phonographiques
aux artistes de l’époque.” (75) He then goes on to describe the experience :
On presse le bouton du phonographe et Mounet-Sully rugit une scene de Hernani ; on
presse un autre bouton et une tragedienne…Sarah bernhardt…lui donne la replique. On
presse encore un bouton et l’on entend la voix de Baubray, un fin et jouyeux comedien
du Palais-Royal, alternant avec celle de Celine Chaumont dans une piece de Victorien
Sardou. (76)
All these names, it should be noted, were recognizable as those of the leading actors of plays in
the mid-nineteenth century, who would certainly be dead by 1952. The dead therefore speak
once again, but they do so directly before the reader’s eyes, in broad daylight (or lamplight),
while the technological means through which they are able to do so are explained matter-offactly to Helene. By contrast, Les Mille et Un Fantômes is made up of a series of first-person
anecdotes gathered together in a nested narrative typical of the fantastic form, placing into
question the very possibility that the dead spoke in the first place. Robida’s modality, that is, is a
“factual reporting of fictions,” (117) while in Dumas’ stories, this factual aspect remains doubt.
As the fantastic trope of the dead speaking acquires a definitively rational explanation, it is
translated from the dark, macabre atmosphere of the fantastic into the a new, rationalistic
modality.
This mirrors the rhetoric used around the phonograph in the press of the period, which
was similarly marked by the mode of the fantastic rationalized. With its invention, the
phonograph – like the photograph and the telephone – elicited an uncanny reaction because of
they were “recording technologies that seem to alter ontological status,” (Gunning, 48)
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challenging the traditional distinctions between life and death by allowing the dead to speak.26
Contributing to this uncanny effect was the fact that it was powered by “la fée electricité” and
invented by the Wizard of Menlo Park; André Lange notes “l’attribution à Edison de pouvoirs
surnaturels dans ses capacités d’inventeur” (99) by the press of the period in both America and
the Continent, which inflected the rhetoric around the phonograph. Thus, for example, after a
demonstration of its uses, the New York Sun published an article titled “Echoes of Dead Voices.”
This title evokes the motif of the voice from the beyond that we saw in Dumas’ fantastic stories,
and the article opens in the same exaggerated, affective mode:
Nothing could be more incredible than the likelihood of once more hearing the voice of
the dead, yet the invention of the new instrument is said to render this possible
hereafter…. whoever may speak into the mouthpiece of the phonograph…has the
assurance that his speech may be reproduced audibly in his own tones long after he
himself has turned to dust.
Remove the word “phonograph” and these phrases might very well be from Dumas’ fantastic
story. The hyperbole of “nothing could be more incredible than,” evoking the marvels and
impossibility of the fairy tale and the fantastic conceit of the dead speaking, echoes Gaston
Tissandier’s description of the apparatus in La nature, following its demonstration in Paris: “On
ne saurait se faire une idée de l’impression d’étonnement et d’admiration que l’on éprouve
quand on entend parler cet instrument.” Such “étonnement” and “admiration” regarding “une
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In the Sherlock Holmes story “The Adventure of the Mazarin Stone,” Holmes uses the phonograph to
catch a criminal by making use of precisely its ability to uncannily replicate human presence where none
exist. Convincing Count Sylvius that he is in his rooms, playing music, rather than eavesdropping on his
conversation, he catches this criminal in the act, and notes that “These modern gramophones are a
remarkable invention” (573) in response to the Count claiming that Holmes is “the devil himself.” (572)
Holmes, as we have seen, represented enchantment made possible through the means of modernity, and
Doyle’s stories frequently featured him using technologies (fingerprinting in criminal investigation being
the most prominent example) before they were used in real life – much in the same way that science
fiction frequently does. In this story, the phonograph casts Holmes in the marvelous role of “the devil
himself” by making his presence seemingly possible in two places simultaneously, only to rationalize this
possibility through a technology of modernity.
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des plus grandes merveilles de la physique moderne” is a moment where rationality seems to
flee in favor of emotional affect.
Yet what promptly follows the Sun’s emphatic evocation of immortality and the
speaking dead is a detailed explanation of the way in which the apparatus functions, including a
lengthy citation from Scientific American. This article therefore stages the Gothic expliqué, as the
supernatural possibility of the dead speaking is evoked to then be immediately rationalized. It
represents the transition from the fantastic to the rational that marks the emergence of science
fiction and the modality of Robida’s novel. In particular, Scientific American’s speculation about
the possibilities of Edison’s new invention recalls M. Ponto’s description of how the phonograph
functions: “Imagine an opera or an oratorio, sung by the greatest living artists, thus recorded,
and capable of being [illegible].” Not only does Robida’s novel depict the possibilities described
in this article – including using the phonograph to record performers– it also uses the same
modality of making the fantastic rational. Just as in Le Vingtième Siècle, a sense of wonder and
estrangement persists in the exaggerated rhetoric, but the possibility that the speaking voices
are supernatural rather than technologically explainable is immediately and definitively put to
rest. Both, that is, allow for wonder while eliding any possibility that the speaking voices are
supernatural rather than technologically explainable.
Another frequent motif of the fantastic and Gothic forms is the haunted dwelling, in
which the hero or heroine is plagued by strange voices, visions, and inexplicable occurrences.
Lying awake through the night, the narrator of “The Fall of the House of Usher” recounts how
“[I] harkened…to certain low and indefinite sounds which came, through the pauses of the
storm, at long intervals, I knew not whence. Overpowered by an intense sentiment of horror,
unaccountable yet unendurable, I…endeavored to arouse myself from the pitiable condition into
137

which I had fallen…” (61) These sounds turn out to be coming from a tomb, where Madeline of
Usher has been supposedly entombed alive, and from which she equally inexplicably rises – to a
predictable response of horror. Robida reworks this familiar trope, as well: in the third chapter
of Le Vingtième Siècle, Helene goes to sleep only to be awakened by a mysterious whistling
sounds, each one followed by matter-of-fact reports of revolutions, catastrophes, and bloody
atrocities around the world. Naturally, at the sound, Helene “bondit terrifiée.” (24) Unlike in the
House of Usher, however, this voice is immediately revealed to be not that of a ghost or
revenant, but of a technology: “’un téléphone!’ fit Helene avec un soupir de soulagement.”
(Ibid) Later, she says “J’ai eu bien peur ! Mais je comprends maintenant; les journaux envoient
les comptes rendus de théâtre à leurs abonnés par téléphone…C’est beau la science,” (27)
admitting her emotional reaction, which is promptly followed by a rational explanation. Thus,
the possibility of the supernatural is not even remotely entertained, yet Helene is no less
haunted, plagued as she is by a technology that she does not know how to control, and which
fills her with terror.
Cognitive Estrangement and Cognitive Science: A Theoretical Foundation

Throughout the above examples, and much of early science fiction, wonder still exists
even though the possibility of the supernatural has been definitively put to rest. Estrangement is
produced through means compatible with modernity, yet able to evoke the same sense of
wonder that magic and the fairytale had previously been able to do. Helene, having spent most
of her life sequestered in a boarding school, finds most of the technologies she encounters just
as novel as the reader would, and she is constantly frightened, astonished, stunned, and
astounded. Frustrated with the unceasing voice of the telephone cited above, for example,
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Helene presses a button – “sans choisir…le premier timbre venu.” (32) An alarm naturally
sounds, a fire-extinguishing gas is released, Helene calls for help, and justifies herself by
admitting “J’avais peur.” (33) moments later, the electrical alarm system alerts her that thieves
have broken in, and “dun seul coup elle retrouva ses terreurs.” (35) Helene’s mingled response
of astonishment and terror is not unlike that of a heroine of the Gothic to the supernatural, yet
its causes are thoroughly technological, and the possibility is never even entertained that they
might be supernatural. Similarly, throughout Verne’s novels, astonishment is “l’etat habituel de
[l]’esprit” of his protagonists, as Nemo tells Arronax it will be. “C’est merveilleux,” (141) Arronax
exclaims in seeing the electrically-powered Nautilus, but while it is indeed marvelous, it is hardly
miraculous. There is no otherworldly component to the phenomena he sees, and indeed,
Arronax admits, regarding the functioning of the submarine:
Il y avait là un mystère, mais je n’insistais pas pour le connaitre. Comment l’électricité
pouvait- elle agir avec une telle puissance ? Ou cette force presque illimitée prenait-elle
son origine ? Etait-ce dans sa tension excessive obtenue par des bobines d’une nouvelle
sorte ? … (145)
A mystery exists (and the French word « mystère » has its own set of supernatural
connotations), but in attempting to penetrate it, Arronax delves straight into technical
explanations: tension, coils, a system of levers. His stupefaction is compatible with rationality,
and in fact, the technical explanation does nothing to remove the sense of wonder itself, but
merely to confirm once and for all the non-supernatural quality of its source. Wonder and
comprehension, emotional affect and intellectual reasoning, exist alongside each other. This, in
a word, is cognitive estrangement: a sense of wonder made possible through technological
means, but which recalls that same wonder evoked through magical means.
It would seem obvious, perhaps, that our experience of novelty would be a linear
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transition from wonder to habituation and familiarity; John Onians, for example, outlines the
four cognitive stages that an individual passes through in response to new technologies:
amazement, a consequent physical paralysis, a mental reaction which results in something being
learned, followed by a new action. (Gunning, 41) But the reality is hardly so clear-cut. As Tom
Gunning points out, “as historical phenomena, human experiences have always already been
caught in the net of social discourse. And …. the ‘newness’ of new technology, its capacity to
dazzle us, is always in some sense the product of discourses surrounding it.” He fittingly goes on
to discuss estrangement, with its capacity to render familiar objects strange and remove them
from the “automatism of perception.” Coining the broader term of “discourses of wonder,” he
defines them as those discourses that “draw our attention to new technology, not simply as a
tool, but precisely as a spectacle, less as something that performs a useful task than as
something which astounds us by performing in a way that seemed unlikely or magical before.”
These discourses are what allow us to see the “newness” of technology and consequently to
experience wonder and amazement vis-à-vis novelty.
However, science fiction further complicates matters because it performs a dual
function: making strange and making familiar. I have shown, in the previous chapter, how
science fiction contributes to the sociotechnical imaginaries that make coherent technological
modernity. As such, it familiarizes new technologies, mitigating the reaction of strangeness they
provoke in order to permit their dissemination and integration into human life. But science
fiction also consistently makes strange: its capacity to create estrangement makes it a form of
the discourses of wonder that Gunning considers. This duality of making strange and making
familiar asks us to reconceive of the very ways we understand strangeness and habituation, as
well as the relationship between the two.
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Cognitive science offers a way to understand this duality. Drawing on scholarship in this
field, Jonathan Gottschall summarizes how fiction acts as the “the flight simulators of human
social life. Just as flight simulators allow pilots to train safely, stories safely train us for the big
challenges of the social world. Like a flight simulator, fiction projects us into intense simulations
of problems that run parallel to those we face in reality. And like a flight simulator, the main
virtue of fiction is that we have a rich experience and don’t die at the end.” (58) Importantly,
this does not necessarily happen on a conscious level: these ‘flight simulators’ contribute to the
knowledge that makes up our implicit memory and unconscious mind, thus allowing fiction to
invisibly structure our behaviors. Importantly, the knowledge gained from these virtual realities
is not “factual knowledge (‘knowledge that’) or procedural knowledge (knowledge ‘how’), but
emotional knowledge: ‘knowing what’ it is like to…” (Maestripieri, 3) have a certain kind of
subjective experience, which then inflects our participation in the practices of social life.
Through the lens of cognitive science, all fiction is thus a kind of virtual reality. As we
saw in Chapter One, however, popular fiction – which includes genre such as science fiction,
detective fiction, fantasy, and adventure stories – takes this fact to its full potential, developing
and fleshing out fictional worlds that can be inhabited as virtual realities through the use of
paratexts. But science fiction, as a literary form predicated on technoscientific innovation before
it exists in reality, is the only type of fiction that can serve as a flight simulator for practicing our
emotional and intellectual responses to novelty. Thus, in much the same way that the virtual
environments of video games allow players to practice perception, perception-action
coordination, and decision-making (Pinker), science fiction allows readers to practice
confronting the strange and unfamiliar, processing new scientific and technological information,
and fitting it into their worldview. That is, it allows practice of both cognitive processes (making
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sense of novelty) and emotional responses (experiencing wonder and astonishment in response
to novelty). This maps conveniently onto science fiction’s dual capacity of making strange and
making familiar through the concept of cognitive dissonance: the human ability to
simultaneously hold opposing beliefs or knowledge. This dissonance is a fundamental aspect of
the human intellectual process, and it allows us to experience wonder and strangeness when
confronting novelty while still being able to fit that novelty into cognitive frameworks and
process it intellectually. And it is these cognitive practices that then invisibly structure our
behaviors in relation to real-world novelty.
This cognitive approach offers a complement to the work done in the previous chapter:
in considering Verne, I suggested that science fiction offers the frameworks for understanding
novelty. In doing so, I made use of the tools of sociology and drew on the idea of the
sociotechnical imaginary to sketch out, in broad strokes and using historical documents, the way
science fiction shapes collective and social behaviors that make up human life within
technological modernity. This chapter addresses the more individual cognitive and affective
processes through which individuals respond to technological novelty – individual responses
that, in turn, serve as the building blocks for the behaviors and identities of social life. It is also
important to note here the different meanings of the word cognitive: when I speak of cognitive
science, I refer to the scientific study of the mind and its processes, which is distinct from the
connotations of the same word in the phrase “cognitive estrangement.”
Through articulating this question in such explicitly neuroscientific ways would not have
been possible in the nineteenth century, the seeds of the approach taken here were already
present in the thought and criticism of the period. Most obvious is Freud’s idea of the
unconscious – that is, of mental processes of which an individual is unaware, and which may be
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in contrast with their conscious thoughts and actions. This notion forms the foundation of the
kind of subconscious and instinctive knowledge produced by the flight simulator of fiction.
Additionally, Michael Saler points to the concept of the ‘ironic imagination’ that emerged in the
second half of the nineteenth century, and which normalized the idea of immersion in works of
fiction by articulating the possibility of the human mind to simultaneously invest in a fiction and
know that it is a fiction, 27 recalling the more modern concept of cognitive dissonance. This
“double consciousness of the ironic imagination enabled one to shuttle back and forth between
actual and imaginary worlds, retaining critical detachment while gratifying a craving for
wonder.” (49) Such a shuttling back and forth between critical detachment (easily mapped onto
estrangement, which implies distance and an alien perspective) and wonder (which implies
immersion and affective response) also underlies science fiction.
Le Vingtième Siècle as a Flight Simulator

By transforming the rhetoric and discourses around novelty into literary form, science
fiction becomes such a flight simulator. As I will show throughout the next sections, Robida
incorporates the caricatures, satires, newspaper hoaxes, speculations, and imagery around
novelty that existed in the period’s press and popular science publications – including his ownand transforms them into literary form. Technological advancement was a frequent subject of
commentary, satire, celebration, and concern in the press of the period, and Robida was deeply
immersed in this culture. Hired by the Journal amusant in 1866, he contributed to this journal as
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Saler’s excellent history is reminiscent of Catherine Gallagher’s concept of fictionality, an idea she
argues emerged in the eighteenth century to create a space between truth and lying for fiction to exist in.
Today, cognitive dissonance similarly underpins forms such as the action film, which require the viewer’s
emotional investment that the hero might not succeed to coexist alongside the practical knowledge that
the action film hero will inevitably succeed.
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well as Le petit journal pour rire, paris-Caprice, Le Polichinelle, Paris-Comique and La Vie
perisienne throughout the 1860s and 1870s. In 1880, he launched his own satirical journal, La
Caricature, serving as its editor-in-chief until 1892. A prolific satirical cartoonist and illustrator,
he, like Verne, “did not systematically astonish their contemporaries with futuristic visions
pulled out of a hat. Rather, their rational conjecture took place within a network of popular
publications that, in a sense, predigested new scientific discoveries for the general public.”
(Willems 2000, xxii) Even more than that, this immersion in the print culture of the period, and
particularly in the satirical publications frequently commentating upon technological
advancement, primed Robida to transform their fleeting glimpses of the future into a sustained
fictional world.
Texts and images such as the caricature and the hoax usually offer a glimpse of a
singular moment in time or a description of a singular object; they are defined by their
instantaneity, made all the more fleeting because they published in periodicals, a textual form
that is by definition fleeting. By incorporating them into a fictional world, however, Robida
transforms the momentary experience of novelty they provide into a sustained, immersive one.
Le Vingtième Siècle itself, for example, emerged out of a series of cartoons on war in the
twentieth century in La Polichinelle, and its sequel, La Guerre au Vingtième Siècle began in a
special issue of La Caricature published on October 27, 1883. This version, however, was largely
non-narrative: it was written in the mode of a news report (much like the ones Helène listens to
in one of the first chapters of Le Vingtième Siècle), with illustrations that jump from depicting a
battle to zero-ing in on a soldier’s helmet. (Image 24) This third-person reporting and jumping
around lacks true narrative cohesion, making sustained immersion difficult. Once such
illustrations and speculations are gathered together into a fictional narrative, however, Robida’s
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“diverse glimpses into detailed aspects of this future world, while irrelevant to the storyline, are
highly important because each one – in pointilliste fashion – adds to the cumulative effect. Each
serves both to concretize and to contextualize the reality of this future society….In other words,
Robida achieves unparalleled verisimilitude through enhanced background definition.” (Willems
2004, xxiv) Through a cumulative process enabled by the (however flimsy) storyline of Helene
searching for a profession, these diverse glimpses build a virtual reality: a realistic “flight
simulator” that provides the experience of a sustained encounter with novelty and strangeness.
The success of Le Vingtième Siècle as a virtual world also lies in Robida’s talents as an
illustrator, which make his novel a heterogeneous, multimedia text that combines word and
image. As Willems notes, Robida’s artwork “amplifies particular points of the textual message,
presenting context-building material in the same fashion as a footnote might. The illustration
function as supplemental vehicles for fictional content: they supply peripheral data…” (2004,
xxx) The reference to footnotes is evocative, since paratextual apparatuses such footnotes,
charts, appendices, photographs, and glossaries contributed to constructing virtual realities out
of literary texts, as we saw in Chapter One, by enabling readers “to actively engage in the
pretense that the marvels described were real.” (Saler, 61) Similarly, Robida uses his talent for
illustration to create an immersive fictional world, all the better to simulate in all its complexity
the experience of technological novelty in a sustained way. At the same time, he incorporates
the vast technoscientific lexicon existing in the culture of the period – what I will call below the
“megatext” – to add depth and texture to this virtual world.
Drawing on this rich cultural imaginary, Le Vingtième Siècle acts as a flight simulator that
both makes strange and makes familiar, offering the opportunity to experience a confrontation
with novelty as well as the cognitive frameworks that help make sense of it. Incorporating the
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wide variety of visual and textual satires of progress prevalent in the period, Robida makes that
satire into the foundation of his fictional world to create a similar effect of estrangement vis-àvis technoscientific innovation. But he also familiarizes specific novelties and the idea of a world
full of them. This makes possible cognitive estrangement, which is the foundation of science
fiction: an experience of difference accompanied by a recognition that subjects that strangeness
to a cognitive glance.
Satire and Estrangement

Let’s start with making strange.
In the nineteenth century, progress itself was often caricatured, possibly because it itself
must have sometimes seemed like a caricature by comparison to earlier periods of human
history. Satire relies on hyperbole: it is through exaggeration that it arrives at its effect, and
progress itself was a natural target because it felt so hyperbolic, taking to an unnatural extreme
the way things had been previously. The advent of the railway, for example, created a sense of
the very “annihilation of space and time.” (Schivelbusch, 35). The train at the beginning of the
century travelled at thrice the speed of stagecoaches, consequently destroying “the space
between points [of departure/arrival]. That in-between, or travel space, which it was possible to
‘savor’ while using the slow, work-intensive eotechnical form of transport, disappeared on the
railroads.” (Ibid, 38) The trains traversed the world at such unthinkable speeds that reality
became a blur. Such innovations also led to a sense of accelerating time, and 1800 was a turning
point “in which the interval between experience (the past) and expectation (the future) became
increasingly shorter.” (Grubbs, 15) The passage of time itself therefore attained a kind of
extreme. Furthermore, the ideal of “progress” spurred discovery, exploration, and colonization
146

that went so far that, by the end of the nineteenth century, there was quite simply no more
frontier left. “Since the emergence of Homo sapiens, human history had taken place against the
ground of non-human nature. During their lifetimes, human activities came to dominate nearly
everything that happened on the planet,” (2013, 8) writes Rosalind Williams. This resulted in the
troubling prospect of “fin du globe, the end of the world not in time but in space.” (Ibid, 9) All
these were never-ending experiences of amplification: time accelerated, speed increased,
distance shortened drastically, communication became instantaneous, and technologies
accumulated. The caricature L’homme-oiseau (Image 25) from a 1900 edition of Le journal
amusant illustrates well illustrates the easy transition from this reality to satire. Claiming that “la
conquete de l’air est achevée,” it shows “les Chemins de l’air” replacing “les Chemins de fer »
and men acquiring wings. That is, it takes to an even further extreme many of the discoveries
reshaping nineteenth-century life: if there is no more frontier left on the earth, then humanity
has discovered another frontier by delving into the sky, previously the sphere of gods and poets;
the accelerating travel of the railway has conquered even this frontier; human technology has
subjugated even the laws of gravitation itself.
Satire therefore offered a fitting avenue to express an experience of technology defined
by hyperbole. But satire also estranges: Montesquieu’s satirical Lettres Persanes, for example,
makes strange the staples of eighteenth-century French life, such as paper money, by describing
them from the point of view of those alien to French civilization. Such estrangement, due to a
literally alien perspective, is also the modus operandi of science fiction. In the case of
nineteenth-century satires of progress, however, this estrangement was frequently achieved
precisely through further exaggerating an already hyperbolic experience. Robida frequently
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engaged in such satire throughout his lengthy career,28 for example, depicting a Paris
overwhelmed with buildings, transport vehicles, and power lines in the illustrations “un quartier
embrouillé” (Image 23) and “L’embellisement de Paris,” which shows an anthropomorphized
lady Paris practically drowning under railroad lines, steam, and windmills. The acceleration of
travel due to the railway caused a “shrinking of space,” (Schivelbusch, 33) and the economist
Constantin Pecquer argued in 1839 that due to this “veritable rapprochement de distances…Lille
se trouve tout à coup transporté à Louvres, Calais à Pontoise, le Havre à Poissy, Rouen à Sèvres
ou à Asnières….” (26) The extreme contraction of space therefore “conversely appeared as an
expansion,” (Schivelbusch, 35) and Robida effectively makes this notion the reality of his
fictional world by depicting, in Le Vingtième Siècle, a Paris possessing 37 arrondissements, which
has “annexed” Rouen and goes “jusqu’a Meaux” (40) to the east. Such satires ensured that the
experience of novelty remained strange, that the experience of it did not slip into automatism
and habituation.
Science fiction transforms such satire into the foundation of its fictional world, making
the hyperbolic exaggerations of the caricature into the realities of the future. It borrows satire’s
power to make strange in order to produce its own effect of cognitive estrangement, while at
the same time crystallizing it into literary (and narrative) form. That which is a comic
exaggeration within a satire becomes the foundation of the fictional world - and frequently
loses its comic component, intended to ridicule its subject, in order to simply focus on it as is.
These caricatures – which are, on their own, momentary and fleeting, intended to be a glimpse
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Robida’s first novel was also satirical, an 1879 parody of Jules Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires titled
Voyages très extraordinaires de Saturnin Farandoul dans les 5 ou 6 parties du monde et dans tous les pays
connus et même inconnus de Monsieur Jules Verne. Again hyperbole makes an appearance, in the « très
extraordinaires » voyages to countries « connus et même inconnus, » amplifying to a comic extent the
sense of discovery and exploration underlying Verne’s novels.
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of a moment in time –accumulate to build a fictional world, and therefore a sustained,
immersive experience of estrangement. And for Robida, who engaged throughout his career in
these satires of progress, it was an easy transition from the numerous comic vignettes he
penned into a fictional world that, just like his satires, makes use of hyperbole to estrange.
Robida’s vision of the Musée de Cluny (Image 26) in Le Vingtième Siècle, for example,
elegantly weaves into the fabric of a futuristic Paris the subject of the 1878 Punch caricature
“The Museum of Modern Antiques.” (Image 27) The Punch illustration depicts a “museum”
containing recent nineteenth-century inventions such as the torpedo, the diving bell and,
significantly, a model of a locomotive, while the caption reads “in consequence of rapid
development of invention.” Like many of the examples above, this caricature takes to an
extreme - i.e. hyperbolic – extent the rapid technological development that marked the
nineteenth century. Seeing recent inventions, such as the diving bell (which had been
demonstrated at the 1867 Exposition Universelle) in a museum of antiques naturally strikes the
viewer as strange. The conceit of this caricature forms part of the fictional world of Le Vingtième
Siècle, in which the Musée de Cluny, Paris’ medieval museum, now houses a locomotive. The
last locomotive in the world of the novel ran in 1915, and has become an antique, just as in the
Punch caricature, displayed in the museum alongside “toutes les reliques du moyen age.”29 (13)
An effect of estrangement is thus produced through an exaggeration of technological
development and a compression of time that make the brand-new technologies of the reader’s
present not only outdated, but medieval. Importantly, by evoking the well-known and
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Referring to periods that are distinctly modern (by our present-day standards) as “medieval” has
become a common conceit in twentieth-century science fiction, such as the stories of Isaac Asimov and
the original run of Star Trek. It is difficult to say if Robida originated the practice, but if he did, then he
appears to have done so in a way that reflects contemporary methods of articulating anxieties regarding
the speed of innovation and development.
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recognizable Musée de Cluny, Robida anchors his satirical vision in a recognizable Parisian
landscape, neatly transforming satire’s estrangement effect into the immersive experience of
his fictional world.
The 1878 caricature “Awful Possibilities of the New Speaking Phonograph,” (Image 28)
published in the Daily Graphic, offers another poignant example. Following on the heels of
Edison’s demonstration of the phonograph, it pokes fun at the electromania sweeping through
Europe and America and that forms the undercurrent of Le Vingtième Siècle. It, too, is
hyperbolic (“awful possibilities”) and the contemporary obsession with Edison leads it to
imagine the worst possible outcomes, informed by contemporary social mores: thieves might
force a dying man to amend their will, while unscrupulous men might lure respectable women
out of their homes with recordings of opera. But most striking is its suggestion that a wife might
keep her husband awake all night with a repeating wail of “Police! Fire!” recorded on the device,
which evokes the third chapter of Robida’s novel, “Une Nuit Agitée.” This is the chapter I
considered above in comparing the hauntings of Gothic fiction to Helene’s restless night, when
she falls asleep only to be awoken by a “sifflement strident et prolongé.” (24) As the night
progresses, she hears reports of coups, revolutions, and accidents; finally, frightened, Helene
“appuya violemment sur des timbres. Immédiatement un effroyable vacarme de sonneries
retentit dans l’hôtel.” (32) She has unwittingly set off the fire alarm, waking the entire house
from their sleep and summoning the authorities. There is, of course, no fire. Though Helene acts
out of ignorance rather than malice, the parallel to the Daily Graphic is striking, wherein a new,
electrically-powered communication and recording technology similarly makes peaceful sleep
impossible due to unnecessary news and alarms.
A world guided by the notion of “progress” must have sometimes made it difficult to tell
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the difference between documentation of progress and satire of it; the boundary between
satirical and science -fictional texts was frequently blurry, emphasizing the way satire builds the
world and modality of science fiction. In fact, many caricatures and hoaxes from the fin-de-siècle
read like futurological texts, making it impossible to tell without context if they are satire or
speculation. Such is the so-called electroscope hoax, arising out of an article published in the
New York Sun in 1877. Reportedly penned by an “electrician,” it claims that “an eminent
scientist” has developed a device whereby “objects or persons standing or moving in any part of
the world may be instantaneously seen anywhere and by anybody.” The author outlines the
numerous uses to which the electroscope can be put: “merchants will be able to exhibit their
goods,” “fugitive criminals placed in the electroscope can be instantly identified by the police
authorities,” “mothers, husbands, and lovers will be enabled to glance at any time at the very
persons of their absent children, wives, or beloved ones,” “painters may retain their paintings
and exhibit them simultaneously in all the galleries of Europe and America,” scholars are
“enabled to consult in their rooms any rare and valuable work of manuscript,” and “to represent
at one time on a hundred stages in various parts of the world the opera or play sung or acted in
any given theatre.” Of course, no such device had been invented, but the hyperbole regarding
this “marvelous apparatus” is palpable. Plays and operas can be broadcast “on a hundred
stages,” “in any given theatre,” art can be exhibited “in all the galleries of Europe and America,”
fugitives can be “instantly identified,” and “any” rare of valuable manuscript can be consulted.
The accumulation of superlatives, “any,” “every,” and “all” creates a sense of continued
exaggeration that reveals the text to be satirical.
And yet, it can be read as anticipatory. An untrained reader, unfamiliar with the
pervasive satires of progress in the period, could easily mistake its hyperbole for speculation.
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Indeed, almost every example mentioned by the anonymous “electrician” finds is parallel in Le
Vingtième Siècle – and, equally uncannily, in today’s reality. Mothers and husbands can indeed
communicate face-to-face across long distances, as the telephonoscope facilitates “la
suppression de l’absence” (Image 29) - an illustration from Le Vingtième Siècle showing a man
stationed abroad to communicate in person with his wife and children; the same technology
allows opera and theatre to be broadcast the world over; painters can exhibit their paintings the
world over due to the advent of photo-painting ridiculed in the novel. Thus, the subject of the
satire seamlessly becomes a staple of the fictional world of the future, while its hyperbole is
transformed into worldbuilding and science fiction’s estrangement effect.
Importantly, this estrangement does more than just reflect the hyperbolic experience of
technological novelty in the nineteenth century: it renews it. Tom Gunning emphasizes that
“modernity must partly be understood as learning to be surprised by certain innovations, a
discourse that valorizes and directs our attention to such changes and the excitement they can
provoke.” So while, for example, Victorian suspense fiction helped people assimilate the
speeding up of everyday life, (Daly) then caricatures such as the Museum of Modern Antiques
and science fiction, including Robida’s depiction of the Musée de Cluny, help make that
speeding up visible again by making it strange. And, by transforming the exaggerations of satire
into a fictional world, science fiction novels such as Le Vingtième Siècle prolong that experience
of estrangement, consequently allowing fiction to serve as a flight simulator that can extensively
prepare the reader to experience novelty and confront it in the real world.
The Absent Paradigm and the Megatext

And yet, science fiction also familiarizes technological novelty. As Caroline Grubbs notes,
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Le Vingtième Siècle’s “repeated visual vocabulary” (124) habituates the reader to the strange
and frightening future and “creates a space for the reader to adjust to the image of advanced
technology transforming familiar Parisian places.” (105) Within cognitive science, this
phenomenon can be understood in terms of schema: frameworks that serve as “working models
of what we know about how the world works” that “develop continually, and are internally
coherent.” (Oatley, 61) When “events occur, or things are said, in a story or in a life, we
assimilate them to our own schemas….What we see and what we read are taken in insofar as
they achieve significance for us, by becoming parts of our schematic models, our implicit
theories of what we know about the world.” (Ibid) In other words, we make sense of reality by
discovering patterns and fitting new information into existing cognitive frameworks. Such a
schematic approach to the world becomes all the more necessary in the face of novelty,
because the novel is by definition that of which there is no prior knowledge or cognitive
framework. Consequently, new technologies become integrated into existing frameworks,
regardless of how well they fit these models or how much we know about the functioning of
these novelties. This likely accounts for the way technologies such as electricity, the telephone,
and the phonograph were framed in terms of mythical and folkloristic topoi: while such
supernatural phenomena were imperfect ways to make sense of the inventions of an age of
rationality, they had possessed explanatory power for millennia, and had the weight of cultural
tradition behind them. But by the mid-to-late nineteenth century, science fiction had sufficiently
coalesced as a literary form to begin constructing its own technoscientific lexicon. This lexicon,
deriving from and rationalizing myth, fairytale, and fantasy rather than replacing them, served
as a set of schemas through which novelty could be understood and which created the sense
that such novelty was not entirely novel.
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According to Marc Angenot, the process of reading and decoding science fiction makes
use of an “absent paradigm” to create meaning. Language, as Angenot points out, is
paradigmatic – that is, “meaning is always in relation to other elements” (130) of language. We
know the meaning of a word by understanding its relations to other words: day and night, light
and dark, child and adult. Science fiction, which is usually set in a reality different from our own,
uses fictive words and neologisms to create “the illusion of a paradigmatic structure” (132) and
consequently elicit belief in the reality it depicts. Such neologisms “give the reader the
impression that the word is a sociolinguistic clue, a symptom of the epoch described.” (Angenot,
132) That is, the reader is asked to participate in the fiction these neologisms have meaning by
believing that the other words that give them meaning exist. Damien Broderick expands on this
notion by suggesting the idea of the megatext. If a regular or ‘realistic’ story “evoke[s] shared
verities and commonplaces (however provisional and arbitrary these might be from the
standpoint of a deconstructive critic, cultural relativist, or epistemological anarchist, providing
behind every item in a syntagm a certified and secure paradigm of references,” Broderick asks,
“how could this procedure be mimicked in sf, where many of the lexical items have no “realworld” references?” (142) The answer is that science fiction has what he terms a megatext,
made up not of the “shared verities and commonplaces” of realistic fiction, but rather of a set of
“icons,” symbols, and conventions familiar to a trained science fiction reader. These icons
include the robot, the spaceship, and the monster – but also arguably narrative tropes such as
the temporal paradox or the alien invasion.
Such a megatext offers a valuable critical tool for understanding not only how science
fiction functions, but also its way of making familiar. However, though the idea of the megatext
is simple enough once science fiction has coalesced into a genre per se, possessing a readership
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trained in its conventions, it is more ambiguous at a moment when the genre was still emerging.
As yet unaware of itself as a discrete entity, it could have no trained readership with a shared
competency in its lexicon. Yet, in Robida’s day, a megatext of sorts did exist, furnished by a rich
culture of satires, caricatures, speculations, and hoaxes that made up the period’s popular
culture. As we have seen, science fiction translated satire into literary form, moving from the
momentary experience of estrangement into a world of sustained estrangement. This same
textual culture, which both celebrated and critiqued progress, furnished a rich set of ideas,
images, iconography, and neologisms, creating a kind of megatext that Le Vingtième Siècle
adopts and incorporates into its fictional world.
The best example of this is the telephonoscope, which, contrary to popular belief, was
not coined by Robida. Both the word and the concept had existed in the cultural imaginary for
several years before Robida published his novel. In 1878, Thomas Edison introduced what is
today known as the megaphone, but which he initially called the telephonoscope. By this time,
Edison had become “the Wizard of Menlo Park,” a key figure in American and European
sociotechnical imaginaries. Thus, in 1879, George du Maurier published in Punch an illustration
of “Edison’s Telephonoscope,” (Image 30) in which a well-off couple sits at home, watching a
group of people, including their daughter, on the screen while communicating with her through
a telephone. It resembles a nineteenth-century version of Skype, and the caption to the
illustration provides a brief dialogue between the couple and their daughter. Georges du
Maurier would later create a whole series of illustrated satires of Edison, but this particular
image looks, without context, like it could have come straight out of Robida’s novel. And in fact,
as André Lange notes, there are similarities between the two, including “le format panoramique
de l’écran, ainsi que la caractéristique interactive du medium.” (103) At the same time, scientific
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discussions about “la télescopie électrique” date to as early as 1878.30 It seems clear that Robida
invented neither the word nor the concept of the telephonoscope, but instead, integrated the
already-existing concept into an extensive fictional world into which it fits seamlessly. To make
sense of Robida’s telephonoscope, a reader does not need knowledge of a lexicon specific to the
genre of science fiction; (s)he needs access to a nineteenth-century technoscientific imaginary
and its attendant lexicon.
Flying vehicles is another pertinent example. As we saw in Chapter Two, the debate
between heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air flight took up much attention in the nineteenth
century, and visions of the future frequently included some form of flying vehicle. The word
“hélicoptère,” for example, was coined by Ponson d’Amércourt in 1861, and promptly attributed
by Harper’s Weekly to Nadar (Begley, 136). In 1864, the newspaper published a full-page
illustration of “systems of sailing in the air” (Image 31) that included the helicopter. Thus, when
in Robida’s 1882 novel, Barbe says “Tiens, j’ai oublié de téléphoner à papa d’envoyer un
hélicoptère au-devant de nous!” (6) the word would likely have been recognizable to a readeras would the telephone, invented in 1876. Robida’s twentieth century is also full of a variety of
lighter-than-air craft, the majority of them, seemingly inexplicably, fish-shaped. Willems (2000)
suggests that this is a playful reference to Bertall’s illustrated version of Souvestre’s Le Monde
tel qu’il sera, which also included a fish-shaped aircraft. But the link between fish and balloons
also existed in the cultural imaginary of the nineteenth century: Nadar, a proponent of heavierthan-air flight, dismissed dirigible balloons as “flying fish,” (Begley, 158) though his papers
include a “poisson aerien” presented to him by someone named Francois (Image 32).
Additionally, in 1859, a broadside depicting a “navire aerien, le poisson volant” by Camille Vert
30

For an exhaustive chronology of texts about “la télescopie électrique,” see André Lange’s site “Histoire
de la télévision.”
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was published by chez Bonaventure et Ducessois (Image 33). Fish-shaped flying machines
therefore copiously flitted about “in the air” of the nineteenth century.
Robida therefore incorporates ideas and “icons” that formed part of the collective
cultural lexicon into the world of his novel. As Phillippe Willems notes, Robida, “rather than
considering his model from above …draws the reader into exploring it from within,” (2004, xxiv)
inviting them into an immersive experience of a fictional world. This end is achieved through
combining the possibilities offered by the paradigmatic structure of language with his adoption
of the period’s megatext to create a kind of Barthesian “Reality Effect.” Considering the “’futile’
details” (141) of the realist narrative, Barthes argues that such details do not “denote the real
directly, all that they do – without saying so – is signify it.” (148) They give the impression, in
other words, of a developed world without carrying meaning in themselves – creating “the
referential illusion.” (148) Similarly, the “technobabble” of science fiction does not necessarily
mean anything in itself, but functions instead to create the impression of a coherent world.
When the lexicon being used is drawn from the popular imagination, however, it imbues the
fictional world with a whole new level of realism.
Like Verne, Robida invents few words for technologies. In regards to neologisms in
science fiction, Marc Angenot writes:
The coined word may sometimes appear to be a creation ex nihilo. Often it will seem to
have an ascertainable etymology – which both permits an attempt at definition and
gives the reader the impression that the word is a sociolinguistic clue….The reader
perceives the contextual meaning of the coined word but he also gets an idea of the
type of society he is dealing with through a words semantic formation and use. In the
nineteenth century, Greco-Latin derivations gave a text a scientific look. Nowadays,
other modes of formation give an impression of “futurism” to the contemporary
reader.” (132)
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In contemporary science fiction, such neologisms are often creations ex nihilo, requiring a
competency within the genre to parse their meaning. By contrast, Robida’s terms are not
creations ex nihilo, but instead have an ascertainable etymology – usually the Greco-Latin one
that Angenot notes gives a text a “scientific look,” and which reflect the nineteenth century
practice for naming technologies. In fact, in introducing the telephonoscope, Robida states,
“avec le téléphonoscope, le mot le dit, on voit et l’on entend.” (56) The assumption is that a
contemporary reader, familiar with terms such as telephone, megaphone, and phonograph, can
“decode” the meaning of the new technology from contemporary practice. The novel’s lexicon
therefore does not merely resemble the period’s Greco-Latin technological nomenclature, but is
drawn directly from it. Instead of creating neologisms, Robida works with familiar neologisms (if
such an oxymoron may be permitted), or recombines the building blocks of familiar neologisms.
Drawing from familiar naming practices and technoscientific icons, Le Vingtième Siècle is thus
able to achieve a remarkable Reality Effect in depicting a world that does not exist. Drawing the
reader in in such a way, it offers the opportunity to continue acclimating to these novelties
through sustained engagement with a fleshed-out fictional world.31
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Because of this, the effect on a contemporary reader experiencing Robida’s novel is a unique one. The
future Robida envisions is a moment in our past, and yet though Robida is eerily prescient in many ways,
he is wrong on a number of other counts, such as flying machines. His envisioning of a future that
integrates technologies novel at his moment in time, but quotidian to us, is almost a kind of double
defamiliarization: there are things in the novel alien to us, such as flying machines, and yet ones that are
familiar in a way they could not have been to Robida’s readers. Reading Le Vingtième Siècle ironically
requires familiarity with a megatext distinctly different from that required to read contemporary science
fiction, and creates an entirely different experience of estrangement for present-day readers. A reader
who has not spent much time researching nineteenth century technology is caught in a situation of not
knowing which parts of the novel are extrapolation, and which are mimesis. Similarly, Robida’s
nomenclature, familiar to a nineteenth-century reader, seems strange and alien to us, creating an
experience of estrangement utterly different from the one Robida envisioned. There is arguably a sense of
uncanniness in not knowing what a contemporary reader would have found unfamiliar.
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The Familiar and the Unfamiliar

I have shown how science fiction both creates estrangement (drawing from the
modality of satire) and makes familiar (by constructing a megatext). Significantly, that familiarity
and strangeness are often evoked in the same moment of the reading experience and in the
same textual object, illuminating the way strangeness and familiarity do not just coexist, but
exist simultaneously. As Darko Suvin notes, a science fiction’s novum is “totalizing” in that it
“entails a change of the whole universe of the tale, or at least of crucially important aspects
thereof.” (80) Though every aspect of a world is transformed, the novum is not totalizing in the
sense that there is always some reference to terms and ideas familiar to the reader, for if there
were not, all meaning would be lost. For example, Brecht emphasizes that the alienation effects
in theatre “wake up” the viewer rather than putting him in a stupor – but a text in which
everything is unfamiliar would similarly put the reader into a stupor. A text full of nothing but
the strange allows the reader’s mind no purchase on the fiction through which to make sense of
it, while a play between strangeness and familiarity allows a reader to find meaning while also
confronting them with two different cognitive and affective experiences.
Many critics have noted the oscillation between strange and familiar that exists within
science fiction. Darko Suvin, for example, remarks that the modality of science fiction provides
“a feedback oscillation that moves now from the author’s and implied reader’s norm of reality
to the narratively actualized novum in order to understand the plot-events, and now back from
those novelties to the author’s reality, in order to see it afresh from the new perspective
gained.” (88) Istvan Csicery-Ronay similarly argues that the alternative world created through
extrapolation from a novum is “a model that readers make sense of by constantly, though not
always consciously, comparing it with the familiar world….. The novum establishes a distance
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from which reality can be seen with fresh eyes, a distance that the regime enforcing the reader’s
consensus reality strives to suppress.” (50) It bears emphasizing here that this comparison does
not necessarily happen consciously, and it is also an oscillation happening so fast that it is much
like the vibration of an atom, making familiarity and strangeness practically simultaneous.
But there is another oscillation occurring with the same frequency: the one between the
reader’s present and the imagined future. Claire Barel-Moisan notes, for example, that the
nineteenth-century roman d’anticipation is defined by “un discours constamment en tension
entre projection vers le futur et satire du présent.” (175) Similarly, Caroline Grubbs argues that
fin-de-siècle fiction, including Robida’s, was defined by “the near-constant juxtaposition of
temporalities,” (36) and extensively demonstrates the porousness of the boundaries between
past, present, and future throughout Robida’s oeuvre. A constant oscillation therefore happens
throughout Le Vingtième Siècle between an unfamiliar future and a familiar present, subjecting
the text to a cognitive (in Suvin’s definition of the term) glance and creating cognitive
estrangement. As I summarized in the Introduction, science fiction differs from other literary
modes of estrangement in that its alternate possibilities exist not as some parallel, eternal,
“other” world but as a product of tangible, traceable change. When Robida flits back-and-forth
between present and future, familiar and unfamiliar, he posits the future as a product of the
present, and consequently, subjects this future’s strangeness to a cognitive glance as it enables
the reader to link that strangeness to changes happening in the present. This, too, contributes
to an interplay between familiarity and strangeness, represented by the present and the future
respectively.
This is well exemplified by the way Robida transforms Paris in his novel while inscribing
it into the logics of other established genres of the period. Paris here refers to both a “real” Paris
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as well as the imaginary of Paris that existed in the literature of the period. Le Vingtième Siècle
comes out of a nineteenth-century tradition of the “city novel” that painstakingly describes the
reality of a contemporary city – usually London or Paris. If science fiction has its own megatext,
so too, arguably, does the city novel: it creates through accumulation a kind of virtual Paris
familiar to the reader who has never visited the capital. The Parisian setting of Le Vingtième
Siècle is thus potentially doubly familiar to a reader, both through inhabiting the French capital
and through the virtual Paris created and popularized by the city novels of Balzac, Zola, Hugo,
Dumas, and even Verne. It is these familiar Parisian topoi that Robida transforms, extensively
describing monuments, the systems of arrondissements and boulevards, and urban staples such
as department stores, while redefining what they refer to – that is, by giving the familiar word in
question a different and unfamiliar referent.
Thus, for example, the Tour Saint-Jacques becomes “Tour Saint-Jacques, station
d’aérocab.” The Arc de Triomphe, too, still stands – but its claim to fame is now not as a
monument of Napoleon’s victory, but as the location of a grand hôtel international that has
been built atop it. The city of Rouen is “la vielle capitale normande devenue faubourg de Paris.”
(42) An important semantic transformation is effected in this way, one that Lacan would refer to
as the “slippage” or glissement that naturally occurs between words. In Saussure’s model of
language, there is a direct (though arbitrary) line between signifier and signified, between the
word “tree” and an actual tree in the world. The post-structuralist model, however, posits “an
incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (Lacan, 145): quite simply, the world “tree”
might call to mind a maple tree for the speaker, and an oak tree for the listener. Thus the
possibility arises “to use [language] to signify something altogether different from what it says.”
(Ibid, 147) Robida provokes precisely this kind of slippage by evoking familiar locations such as
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the Arc de Triomphe or Rouen, yet referring not to the same landmarks that exist in the reader’s
Paris. While the signifiers are the same, the referents have been transformed: Rouen is no
longer “la Vielle capitale normande,” but is instead a neighborhood of Paris; the Tour Saint
Jacques, rather than being a historical monument, is now a station for flying cabs; the Place de
l’Etoile, “couverte entièrement, a été convertie en jardin d’hiver.” (43) This slippage activates,
simultaneously, a sense of recognition (in the familiarity, in the reader’s present, of the
landmarks mentioned) and a sense of estrangement as the realization dawns on the reader that
the referent is no longer the same. It allows for the present to serve as a kind of “repère” that
triggers a comparison between the future moment depicted and the reader’s present. This, in
turn, allows the reader to experience the strangeness of change itself while meaningfully
processing the novelties that change makes possible – enabling a cognitive (in Suvin’s sense of
the word) approach as well as an affective experience of estrangement.
Two transformations of particular Parisian structures, significant in the literature of the
period and which Robida transforms both visually and verbally, are particularly illustrative here.
The first occurs in contrast with Balzac’s Le Père Goriot, which begins with a lengthy description
of the Maison Vauquer, where the majority of the story’s actors live. Beginning with the rez-dechaussée, the description slowly mounts to the third floor, and then the attic, this ascension a
direct reversal of the social hierarchy, given that the most desirable apartments would have
been on the ground floor prior to the advent of electricity and running water. By contrast,
consider this description of the home in Robida’s novel:
Depuis que le grand problème de la direction des aérostats a été victorieusement
résolu, un changement des plus importants dans l’architecture des maisons a été
imposé par l’importance de plus en plus grande de la circulation aérienne. Jadis on
entrait dans les maisons par en bas et les beaux appartements se trouvaient aux étages
inferieurs. …Nous avons changé tout cela. Ce qui était naturel et logique pour nos bons
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et pédestres aïeux, ces gens si terre à terre, devenait impossible pour nous. On entre
maintenant par en haut, bien que forcement l’entrée du rez-de-chaussée ait été
conservée pour les piétons. (40)
Now that flying vehicles have become common, alongside electricity and plumbing, it is the
higher floors that are desirable – and, consequently, the physical hierarchy of the home has,
quite literally, been turned upside down. In Robida’s twentieth century, Père Goriot would likely
have been living on the ground floor. There is therefore something familiar for nineteenthcentury readers here: the layout of the home (and the city) map neatly onto class, and the
physical structure of space continues to provide a framework and a taxonomy for understanding
the social world. At the same time, that use of space is quite literally reversed, with those at the
top of the social hierarchy now at the top of physical space in the city. This brief description in Le
Vingtième Siècle therefore uses a familiar topos of the city novel – mapping society through
space – while completely transforming the content of that map.
Another example grows out of Victor Hugo’s Notre Dame de Paris, inspired by the
Parisian monument of the same name. Throughout his novel, there is an identity between the
book and the cathedral, and it is the book that, in part, effected the restoration of the thencrumbling monument. In short, it is a fiction that anchored in the popular imagination a small
slice of medieval Parisian history. In Robida’s novel, it is utterly transformed – and yet, Robida
subtly invokes references to the medieval monument and its Hugolian rendition. For example,
Hugo’s chapter “Paris à vol d’oiseau” is, in fact, a view of Paris from the cathedral: “c’est la vue
de Paris qu’on découvrait alors du haut de ses tours,” (152) and Hugo describes how, “pour le
spectateur qui arrivait essoufflé sur ce faite, c’était d’abord un éblouissement de toits, de
cheminées, de rues, de points, de places, de flèches, de clochers.” (158) The physicality of this
description cannot be missed, both in the necessity of physically climbing the spiraling staircase
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and the literally blinding view (un eblouissement). Robida provides a similarly detailed view of
the material conditions of Notre Dame in the twentieth century, once again related to science
and technology. Paris is seen “à vue d’aéronef,” but since the protagonists land on the
débarcadère at the top of the cathedral, it is just as likely a view from the towers as the aéronef
itself. Furthermore, though fourteenth-century Parisians would have had to climb “essoufflé à la
faîte” of the towers, “des ascenseurs ont remplacé les petits escaliers de cinq cents marches par
lesquels on grimpait tortueusement et laborieusement au sommet des tours. ” (90) The material
conditions of these two periods in time are distinctly different, subject to their scientific and
technological competencies, but both authors similarly evoke those specific material conditions
and emphasize them as products of a particular moment in time. By extensively referencing
Hugo’s novel, Robida draws attention to the relation between those two specific moments in
time and the change between them, embodied in a cathedral that has survived both of the
centuries in question.
For this reason, Robida’s choice of Notre Dame specifically is a significant one. For Hugo,
Notre Dame is an “édifice de la transition,” which does not belong to one particular period of
history but to many – and it seems to continue being an edifice of transition in Robida’s novel:
“Ce couronnement du poème de pierre des architectes du moyen âge fait le plus grand honneur
aux artistes modernes qui ont été chargés de le compléter.” (90) That is, Robida’s evocation of
Notre Dame is notable because it is, in Hugo’s story, representative of change. Hugo’s novel is
about the birth of a new world, when “ceci tuera cela” – the printing press will destroy the
cathedral. But even as the cathedral itself is a palimpsest, collected over more than a hundred
years, it is still a past that will be left behind. And in Robida’s novel, it, too, remains
representative of change, a palimpsest upon which an aérocab station is built. Notre Dame is
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therefore an apt choice to evoke both stasis (in the cathedral’s permanence and storied history)
and change (as it becomes replaced) – and consequently, to evoke the idea of acclimating to the
very fact of change while retaining its strangeness. As Grubbs notes, Le Vingtième Siècle
“prepares its readers for the changes that will reshape their environments, or more precisely for
the fact of change itself. Futuristic literature participates in the reconfiguration of modern life
that characterizes the latter half of the nineteenth century by acclimatizing readers to the
acceleration of technological culture.” (105) It creates a space for readers to adjust to change
itself.
Importantly, however, it does not fail to emphasize the strangeness of that change by
drawing on the cultural imaginary of Paris. Le Vingtième Siècle is full of images such as “un
quartier embrouillé” (Image 23), which we considered above. This particular caricature depicts
the traffic of a futuristic city with no recognizable landmarks from any city, emphasizing only
change itself. But just as frequent are Robida’s renditions of familiar Parisian landmarks,
palimpsestic images that show the novel quite literally atop the familiar and activate
simultaneously strangeness and recognition. Such palimpsestic imagery therefore activates the
experience of cognitive estrangement: with the strangeness of the technological future and its
innovations literally built atop the familiar present, that future can be traced back to the present
and understood as its product.
Conclusion – Moving Forward

This cognitive approach to science fiction remains pertinent today. In the present
moment, we produce more information than we have at any point in history – so much, in fact,
that even the Library of Congress is incapable of archiving every single Tweet. Some scientists
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even suggest that technologies such as the Internet are quite literally rewiring our brains (Carr),
that our cognitive processes are being transformed, at a very tangible neuroscientific level, by
the technologies we use. I have suggested, in chapter one, that science fiction trains us to read
scientifically: through distance and analysis rather than passive immersion, activating our
cognitive processes and training us to process new technical and scientific information. If
science fiction is a “flight simulator” that can prepare us for novelty and allow us to practice our
responses to it, then such simulation is more crucial in a world with more information than ever
before, in which the very cognitive processes we must practice are changing. In a transforming
world, fiction that simulates novelty is crucial to preparing us for that novelty – but only if it
keeps up with the pace of change.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE CONTINGENCY OF THE HUMAN: TIME, EVOLUTION, AND THE COGNITIVE
GLANCE OF SCIENCE FICTION IN H. G. WELLS’ THE TIME MACHINE

Science fiction, as I suggested in the Introduction, is the literary form of cognitive
estrangement. In the previous chapter, I considered the second part of this formula by exploring
the nature and sources of estrangement. In this chapter, I explore its first part: the “cognitive”
glance, predicated on the notion of difference as a product of forces of change, and its
embodiment as narrative. The nineteenth century witnessed radically new attitudes towards
time and change, and in the Introduction, I showed how discoveries such as evolution and deep
time revealed what might be termed the “contingency of humanity”: that neither its existence
nor its place in the world is eternal or in any way a given. These revelations made possible the
creation of estrangement through the depiction of strange, alien worlds that were the products
of traceable change. Science fiction is the estrangement produced by this cognitive glance
becoming literary form, which I trace through The Time Machine, a text invested in time and
process and change through both its form and its content.
What these revelations about the contingency of humanity truly brought to light was
167

the end of human narrative, and the possibility of narratives that exist beyond, before, and after
the human. Influenced by Wells’ deep investment in the disciplines of evolutionary biology and
geology, The Time Machine is therefore not only the quintessential example of how the
cognitive glance became literary form, but also a narrative about the end of human narrative. It
reveals the strangeness and the otherness of narrative that exists outside of human scale and
human scope by using the tools of traditional human narrative. As such, in The Time Machine
Wells created a perennial example of science fiction: a story producing estrangement by going
far beyond the human world that we know and the human stories we are used to telling.
Time, Change, and Cognitive Estrangement

As the genre of cognitive estrangement, science fiction is interested in otherness: that
is, in that which, by virtue of its difference, makes strange. However, it differs from other
literary forms founded upon estrangement in that the source of that estrangement is not
magical but rational and scientific, as well as fundamentally subject to change.32 As I
summarized in the Introduction, in the myth, the fairytale, and the fantasy, the alternate worlds
and possibilities that produce estrangement simply are; there is no question of how they came
to be that way or whether such a way of the world will last. In science fiction, by contrast,
otherness and difference are the product of natural laws, physical forces, or human

32

The notion of estrangement certainly did not originate in science fiction, but finds its roots in Bertolt
Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt (estrangement effect) and Viktor Shklovsky’s ostranenie (defamiliarization).
However, both Brecht and Shklovksy understood estrangement as the product of a particular way of using
language within an otherwise realistic (non-fantastical) text. Shklovsky argues that while all objects and
actions eventually become automatic and consequently imperceptible due to habituation, art “has
different ways of deautomatizing things” (163) by creating estrangement. It makes everyday objects
unfamiliar through poetic language and stylistic tricks, such as Tolstoy’s method of describing things as if
they are seen for the first time. In science fiction, this attitude of estrangement – “used by Brecht in a
different way, within a still predominantly realistic context – has grown into the formal framework of the
genre.” (Suvin 2017, 118) It has transformed from stylistic choice to the foundation of a fictional world.
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intervention. As Suvin writes, “SF sees the norms of any age, including emphatically its own, as
unique, changeable, and therefore subject to cognitive glance. The myth is diametrically
opposed to the cognitive approach since it conceives human relations as fixed, and
supernaturally determined…” (118) When science fiction depicts worlds different from our own,
whether utopias, dystopias, or alien planets, it is implicit in the foundation of the fiction that
those differences evolved in the context of its environment, produced by concrete,
comprehensible forces and processes. Founded on such a premise, science fiction therefore
provokes a specific mode of reading - a “cognitive glance” that necessarily interrogates how the
norms and assumptions of the fictional world might change, how it has come to be as it is, and
how our own world might one day become like it. As such, science fiction is fundamentally
interested change and transformation, and in investigating difference as a product of it.
In the Introduction, I proposed that nineteenth-century disciplines such as evolutionary
theory and geology, which proposed the possibility of a time before humanity and a time after
humanity, incarnated a new paradigm defined by a cognitive glance. In the form of the
prehistoric past and the post-human future, they opened up vistas onto other, strange – nay,
estranging – worlds that preceded, or might succeed, ours, and consequently revealed what I
termed the “contingency of humanity.” These disciplines were also fundamentally interested in
studying the processes of change through which these other worlds came or ceased to be,
producing or emerging from our own. Science fiction is the product of the cognitive glance
inherent in these disciplines becoming literary form, and this chapter traces that transition by
focusing on Wells’ The Time Machine. Thus, in the same way that the uncanny experience of
technological novelty, as well as satires and caricatures of it, became literary form in Robida’s Le
Vingtième Siècle, the modalities of nineteenth-century geological and evolutionary thought
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crystallized, in The Time Machine, as the literary form that we know today as science fiction.
The Time Machine serves as a pre-eminent example of the translation of this notion of
the contingency of humanity into literary form due to Wells’ deep investment in both biological
and geological thought. A passionate student of both disciplines (as we will see below), Wells
viewed the world with a cognitive glance interested in understanding and describing processes
of change. In The Future of America, for example, he describes his own “prophetic habit of
mind”:
This habit of mind confronts and perplexes my sense of things that simply are, with my
brooding preoccupation with how they will shape presently, what they will lead to, what
seed they will sow, and how they will wear…There are days, indeed, when it makes life
seem so transparent and flimsy, seem so dissolving, so passing on to an equally
transitory series of consequences, that the enhanced sense of instability becomes
restlessness and distress. (quoted in Parrinder, 25)
This is very much a cognitive glance in that Wells’ way of looking at the world is predicated upon
a belief in the fundamental instability of what he sees. Things will not remain as they are, and he
is infinitely preoccupied with how they will one day be different. In the 1907 text “Credo,” he
would later write “I see the Universe in a state of flux, all Being as I conceive it is becoming,”
echoing a sentiment from The Future in America: “There is no Being but Becoming.” (5) For
Wells, just like for Darwin and Lyell, the world is in a constant state of flux, and he is
preoccupied with how to trace and understand those changes, how to envision a different world
that is the product of the one we exist in. In the 1891 essay “Zoological Retrogression,” he
claimed “There is, therefore, no guarantee in scientific knowledge of man’s permanence or
permanent ascendancy,” (168) an apt summary of the Darwinian notion that man’s current
domination of the natural world is but a temporary and random phenomenon – that a strange
and different way of things might replace that which we know. In short, Wells was driven by a
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preoccupation with how both man and the world might be different and even temporary, and
by envisioning this difference.
At the same time, the process of writing The Time Machine was deeply engaged with
temporality and the passage of time. Much like Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires engaged with
the role of technoscience within society through both content and form, The Time Machine
engages intra-diegetically with the nineteenth-century’s new forms of temporal subjectivity
while being, extra-diegetically, a product of them. Wells’ story exists in multiple iterations: it
was first published in 1888 as “The Chronic Argonauts” in the Science Schools Journal, and
subsequently revised and serialized first in 1894, in the National Observer, and then in the New
Review in 1895. Finally, it was published as a book in 1895 by William Heinemann, which is
today taken as the definitive edition by critics. However, other book editions appeared
throughout Wells’ lifetime, including 1924 and 1927 versions that contain minor changes.33 In
short, it is difficult to speak of a singular Time Machine; rather, the novel exists in a state of flux,
more as process than finished product. In this, its form replicates the story’s concerns with
geology, astronomy, and evolution as disciplines interested in process rather than any kind of
stasis or telos, while the various editions of the text form their own kind of fragmentary
geological or historical record through which the literary critic can reconstruct their process of
evolution.
Furthermore, the serialization of the initial story is not an insignificant fact. By its very
nature, serialized fiction is particularly subject to the pressures of the kind of mechanical time
that industrialization necessitated. Thus, for example, Dickens’ concern in his novels with
chronometry and “the pressures attendant on a workforce subjected to the demands of time
33

For notable excerpts of these earlier versions, as well as commentary on the differences, see H.G. Wells:
Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction, ed. Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes.
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reflect[] the pressure of his own publication schedules.” (Ferguson, 4) The Time Machine is
similarly a product of industrial time, as well as Wells’ need to write quickly, impelled to it “not
merely because he needed the money but because he thought he had little time” (Parrinder, 24)
due to an 1887 diagnosis of consumption. Even as Wells extensively “critiqued mechanical
time’s limitations” and argued that “a fixation on productive time and mechanization had a
potentially corrosive effect on human identity,” (Link, 133) the temporal pressures that made up
the story’s process of creation find themselves mirrored in the story’s intra-diegetic interest in
time.
Most importantly, Wells was well-versed in both biology and geology, enabling him to
transform their cognitive glance and their modalities of thought into literary form. A student at
the Normal School of Science, Wells studied under Darwin’s defender and popularizer Thomas
Henry Huxley, and was greatly influenced by evolutionary ideas. He also taught geology classes
at the University Tutorial College and co-write a textbook called Honours Physiography. What I
term the contingency of the human emerged out of the coming together of these two
disciplines, both of which were predicated upon the newly-incarnated concept of deep time: the
spans of geologic time too vast for humanity to comprehend, and lasting eons longer than
human existence. Geology revealed that the Earth’s past was not limited to humanity’s history,
and that the future of the universe was not necessarily one in which humanity would play a
part; evolution focused on the processes of transformation and adaptation that exist before,
after, and regardless of the human. Part of Wells’ genius was therefore to synthesize these two
vistas of the distant, pre-human past and the incomprehensible, inhuman future into one long
narrative in which humanity is but a temporary blip on the radar.34

34

In an earlier version of The Time Machine, the Traveller overshoots his destination on his return
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The Time Machine emerged out of a literary context greatly influenced by evolutionary
and geological thought. Written during “a fugue of the imagination into a myriad invented
Nowheres, Elsewheres, Wonderlands, and Outlands,” (Warner, xvii) it draws on the nineteenthcentury tradition of utopian fiction largely inaugurated by Edward Bellamy’s 1887 Looking
Backward (published the same year Wells began work on “The Chronic Argonauts”). Because of
the influence of evolutionary thought by the end of the century, utopian romances began being
displaced in time rather than space (Wittenberg), thus subjecting strangeness and difference to
a cognitive glance. And yet, despite the influence of evolutionary thought, most of these utopias
were set within the span of historical, rather than geological, time, usually being a project into
the future around the year 2000. By contrast, there is a “combination of biological and historical
timescales” (Parrinder 119) in The Time Machine, allowing Wells to multiply the sources of
otherness as he expands the scope of his gaze through time. In addition to the strangeness of
the geological past, there is the otherness of the historical past, mimicking the way nineteenthcentury historical writing rejected continuity in favor of treating the past as strange and other.
And as Katrina Harack points out, what the Time Traveller confronts “is the ‘uncanniness’ of the
future,” (7) its strange alterity. Wells also drew on the tradition of “last man” novels,” largely
inaugurated by Mary Shelley’s 1826 post-apocalyptic story The Last Man, which depicted the
extinction of humanity through a plague. A whole vogue of similar narratives followed,
presaging Darwin’s 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species, which demonstrated just how

journey, ending up in the distant past, further emphasizing past and future as parts of one lengthy
trajectory, both beyond the scope of regular human perception. As David Sepkoski has demonstrated, in
the late twentieth century, scientists and cultural critics again connected the distant past and a potential
future by drawing connections between the catastrophic extinction of the dinosaurs and Carl Sagan’s
predictions of a nuclear winter following the use of a nuclear bomb. Such apocalyptic thinking was a
continuation of nineteenth-century anxieties around biological and social degeneration, but it also places
into relief the new mode of thinking – the cognitive glance – inaugurated in the nineteenth century, and
in which the distant past and the far future both become part of the long, slow unfolding of deep time.
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incidental man was to the lengthy narrative of life on earth. As Frank McConnell writes, Wells’
“gift was for imagining, for realizing firmly, almost visually, the implications of his age’s
philosophy and science and for communicating those implications to his readers with the
urgency of myth.” (12) Connecting past and future and uniting these various literary traditions,
he situates humanity within the vast and awful expanse of non-human, geological time and
creates a terrifying world predicated, like the disciplines it arose out of, on the contingency of
humanity.
Given the enormous time spans that geology and evolution consider, a kind of
“geological time travel” that imaginatively carries the reader “back into antiquity” (Shackleton,
840) became a commonplace in the period’s geological literature. Wells adopts this conceit into
The Time Machine, making it literal. As its title suggests, it tells the story of a Time Traveller who
has invented a time machine, which he uses to travel first to the year 802,701, then to the year
thirty million. Returning to the present, he tells the story of his adventures – retold to the reader
by the narrator of the novel - before departing again, never to be seen, and his narrative of this
journey “resembles the geological time travel described in Lyell’s Principles of Geology.” (Ibid)
Thus, for example, Lyell exhorts the reader “to trace the same system through various
transformations – to behold it at successive eras adorned with different hills and valleys, lakes
and seas, and peopled with new inhabitants, was the delightful meed of geological
research.”(61) Wells’ romance “provides a very concrete version of such an imaginative
exercise” (Shackleton 841): in the Traveller’s description of his trip to the future, he tells of how
“the fluctuating contours of the land ebbed and flowed” (Wells 86) and “the whole surface of
the earth seemed changed – melting and flowing under my eyes.” (Ibid 19) A form of “time
travel” predominated in a variety of Victorian attractions, such as the “temporal panorama” of a
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series of life-sized sculptures of extinct animals” built in 1853 and displayed in the Crystal Palace
Gardens, and which “allowed visitors to imagine that they were travelling through time as they
strolled from one geological epoch to the next.” (Shackleton, 848) In this, it is reminiscent the
various prehistoric illustrations that circulated in the period, such as Riou’s illustrations for Louis
Figuier’s La Terre avant le deluge (Image 1), as well as of Jules Verne’s Voyages au centre de la
terre. In the latter, the heroes’ descent to the center of the earth is a metaphorical, rather than
literal, journey back in time as they descend through the various layers of the Earth (also
illustrated by Riou).
Such geological time travel naturally revealed a prehistoric past from which the human
was absent, and that was part of both its strangeness and its appeal. Meanwhile, though the
Time Traveller journeys into the future, his journey “in many respects resembles …description of
the mind’s journey back through geological time.” (Shackleton, 844) The Time Machine
therefore moves the conceits of geological writing, which demonstrate the contingency of the
human through worlds that existed before humanity, into the future in order to demonstrate
that same contingency through a world that exists after the human. The fact that the Time
Traveller’s investigative methods of discovering humanity’s history in the future so precisely
resemble the methodologies of geological thought for discovering the past (Shackleton)
emphasizes once more the way past and future come together; drawing on evolutionary,
geological, and astronomical thought, Wells stages the vast expanse of deep time within which
man’s role is miniscule.
In revealing so effectively the contingency of the human, Wells transforms into literary
form what Lyell aptly terms the “scientific imagination” necessitated by geological,
paleontological, and evolutionary thought. The imagination figures strongly in the Principles of
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Geology, as Lyell “recognized the importance of imagination as a means of gaining widespread
acceptance for the idea of a vast geological time,” (Shackleton 840) and The Time Machine
“redeploys such forms of the geological imagination in its fictional tale of the Traveller’s
adventures in deep time.” (Ibid) Similarly, as Claudine Cohen points out, the field of
paleontology also raised questions of methodology and the verification of facts, as “des
elements imponderables” became necessary scientific tools: intuition and imagination were
required to fill in the blanks between the traces, fossils, and the world they inhabited. And Devin
Griffiths emphasizes “the importance of literary modes to the scientific imagination” (8) in the
nineteenth-century, further highlighting the way scientific writers used “literary technologies.”
The Time Machine takes this relation a step further, as the literary technologies and imaginative
modes become literal, and consequently, literary form.
The descriptions of time travel in The Time Machine are particularly revelatory of this
process. Emphasizing “how fatal every error as to the quantity of time must prove to the
introduction of rational views concerning the state of things in former ages,” (66) Lyell provides
an example to illustrate this human limitation: “supposing the annals of civil and military
transactions of a great nation to be perused under the impression that they occurred in a period
of one hundred instead of two thousand years. Such a portion of history would immediately
assume the air of a romance; the events would seem devoid of credibility, and inconsistent with
the present course of human affairs. A crowd of incidents would follow each other in thick
succession. Armies and fleets would appear to be assembled only to be destroyed, and cities
built merely to fall into ruins.” (Ibid). This exaggerated passage of time is precisely what the
Time Traveller experiences on his first voyage: “I saw the sun hopping swiftly across the sky…I
saw trees growing and changing like puffs of vapour….I saw huge buildings rise up faint and fair,
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and pass like dreams.” (Wells, 19) Like Lyell’s cities “built merely to fall into ruins,” Wells’
buildings “rise up..and pass like dreams”; the sun hops swiftly across the sky just as Lyell
suggests a crowd of incidents following each other “in thick succession.” Lyell’s imaginative
exercise therefore becomes literal through the time machine that stands at the heart of Wells’
story.
It is notable that the romance appears so frequently in Lyell’s text, emphasizing as it
does the easy connections between the scientific imagination of geological thought and the
imaginative possibilities of literature. Not only does he evoke it in the above citation, but he also
writes: “but if the interval between two memorable eras could be instantly annihilated; if it
were possible, after a momentary slumber of two hundred years, to display the new world to
the eyes of a spectator who still retained a lively and recent impression of the old, his surprise
and his reflections would furnish the pleasing subject of a philosophical romance.” (68)
Uncannily, Lyell describes here exactly what Well’s romance makes possible: displaying to a
spectator who retains a lively impression of his own time an era distant from his own. Lyell is
here illustrating his theory of uniformitarianism: the earth changes slowly and gradually, but if a
spectator could see side by side, one immediately after the other, two eras, he would see these
slow changes. The very mode of thinking required by the discovery of deep time – a kind of
thinking that necessitates a consideration of slow change over a lengthy span of time – becomes
literary form, and more than that, becomes narrative.
Shackleton argues that “Lyell’s is an imaginative journey, and the geologist is able to
“behold” the changes wrought on the landscape only with the mind’s eye, whereas the Traveller
is literally able to watch these changes.” (841) But as we have seen, science fiction is the
“laboratory of the mind’s eye,” and Shackleton’s apt choice of words here therefore blurs the
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distinction between a literal and virtual journey into time. Rather, the imaginative exercise in
the mind’s eye of the geologist becomes the premise of Wells’ story in the laboratory of the
mind’s eye. And, in fact, the framing of Wells’ fiction recalls this idea of the collective laboratory
and of assent, consequently highlighting the way the exercise of the scientific imagination within
scientific texts about deep time transforms into the literary form of the thought experiment. The
Time Machine positions the Time Traveller’s journey through time as an experiment, and the
novel opens with a dinner party at his house, where a variety of educated men from numerous
professions gather about, and to whom he expounds his notion of time as the Fourth
Dimension:

But I have experimental verification,' said the Time Traveller.
…..
'Experimental verification!' cried I. 'You are going to verify that?'
'The experiment!' cried Filby, who was getting brain-weary.
'Let's see your experiment anyhow,' said the Psychologist, 'though it's all humbug, you
know. (7)
As the narrator recounts, this first instance of “experimental verification” entails the Time
Traveller leading his guests to his laboratory, where they gather around as attentive witnesses
as he demonstrates sending his miniature time machine into the future: “We were all on the
alert. It appears incredible to me that any kind of trick, however subtly conceived and however
adroitly done, could have been played upon us under these conditions.” (8) The narrator, that is,
appears to have given his assent. Later, the Time Traveller’s narrative, rather than a
demonstration itself, becomes the experimental verification: the same guests return, and he
tells them his story of time travel, in the hopes of receiving their assent. There is a kind of
doubling here, as the frame narrative stages the Time Traveller telling a fiction to a collective
audience and therefore inviting witnesses into the virtual laboratory that reproduces the
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experiment (time travel) that he has just engaged in.
The description of the Time Traveller telling his story in front of witnesses also recalls
Joseph Wright of Derby’s An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump (Image 2), which I considered
in the first chapter, and which was acquired by the National Gallery in 1863. Setting the scene,
the narrator describes “the speaker’s white, sincere face in the bright circle of the little
lamp…most of us hearers were in shadow, for the candles in the smoking-room had not been
lighted, and only the face of the Journalist and the legs of the Silent Man from the knees
downward were illuminated.” (17) This chiaroscuro, with the Time Traveller as the focal point,
illuminated and surrounded by darkness, resembles the way Derby’s painting and its
companion, A Philosopher Lecturing on the Orrery, illuminate the scientific apparatus and,
largely, the scientist, while darkness falls around them. That is, it recalls the idea of
experimental fact as subject to collective verification, and harkens towards the idea that the
story just told is the such an experiment in narrative form.35

The Time Machine

Though Wells’ novella emerged from a rich set of literary predecessors and adapted a
variety of conceits at the heart of geological and evolutionary writing, he does make one very
significant innovation: the time machine. It is this innovation that allows him to address the
epistemological concerns at the heart of these new visions of (deep) time and to confront the
knowability of, and human ability to understand, change. In the previous utopian narratives out
of which The Time Machine emerges, travel to the future took place through a variety of means,

35

McConnell also notes that Wells’ books “kept alive an important tradition: the tradition of fiction as
public forum, as a clearinghouse of ideas.” (23) Such a privileging of the social and “moral” over the
aesthetic was one of the sources of Wells’ major rift with contemporary and novelist Henry James.
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some more scientific than others: dream, hallucination, suspended animation. In Wells’ story, it
becomes possible through that ubiquitous symbol of technological modernity: the machine,
which serves “not only as instrumentality of plot but as a focus of symbolism concerning the role
of science.” (Alkon, 34) In fact, even within Wells’ fiction, this innovation is remarkable, for the
rest of Wells’ future history novels “usually take the form of ‘dream books,’” (Parrinder, 22). The
Time Machine is the only one of Wells’ texts where the future is accessible through
technological, mechanical means, and this innovation “brings the entire fable, not just the parts
dealing with geology, astronomy, Darwinian concepts of evolution, and cosmological
speculation about the solar system’s future, into the realm of scientific discourse,” (Ibid, 33),
The opening chapter’s elucidation of the fourth dimension of time thus becomes an extensive
performance of scientific rigor that brings the means of time travel unquestionably into the
industrial present and sets it apart from the rest of Wells’ writings.
This innovation allows the traveler (and, consequently, the author) an unprecedented
freedom of travel between past, present, and future. It is not a one-way trip (as with suspended
animation) or a single back-and-forth (as in many other narratives of the time). It seemingly
opens up the possibility of unprecedented understanding of, and control over, the very
processes of change that had caused such existential and epistemological consternation
throughout the nineteenth century. Evolutionary theory creates a problem of vantage point:
within Darwin’s new paradigm, man’s lifetime was too short, compared to evolutionary and
geological time, to either see or create change. As Gillian Beer notes, Darwin “emphasizes that
man is unfitted by the shortness of his span either to recognize the great extensions of change
in the natural world or to effect change himself.” (16) The world is made up of multiple epochs,
in a constant state of flux – many of which man himself is absent from, and these changes
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happen so slowly that mankind, in one lifetime, quite literally cannot see them. The same is true
of geology: Lyell’s theory of Uniformitarianism is based on the idea of slow, gradual change, and
Lyell himself points out that “our position as observers is essentially unfavorable.” (68) Though
geological formations are endlessly created and eroded, “we cannot watch the process of their
formation...It is, therefore, not surprising that we estimate very imperfectly the result of
operations thus invisible to us.” (Ibid) Again the brief human lifespan becomes insufficient to see
change.
The time machine, with the freedom of movement it implies between epochs, offers a
mechanical solution to this epistemological problem. Through this machine, the Time Traveller
can theoretically escape the single temporality to which man is reduced within Darwin’s
paradigm and observe the transformations of geological time and the evolution of mankind.
That is, if man’s observations alone “will not suffice” (Beer, 17) because the human lifespan is
too short and the point of observation necessarily limited, then the time machine offers the
possibility of observing from multiple points in time. As David Wittenberg notes, “the real
innovation of the machine is its capacity to provide a concrete, visual confirmation of the
evolutionary continuity of all history.” (86) In fact, as Lyell himself notes, we go through time
“without observing the gradual, but incessant, change of human affairs,” (68) but “if the interval
between two memorable eras could be instantly annihilated,” (Ibid) the contrast would be a
striking one and make visible these changes. The time machine is precisely the means through
which this interval can be annihilated, and distant epochs can be immediately juxtaposed in a
way that places into relief the change that has taken place over this time.
Given this freedom of movement, the plot of The Time Machine makes little sense. On
his first journey, the Time Traveller travels to the year 802,701, and then attempts to deduce,
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from the traces of the physical record, what has happened over the intervening years. When he
departs on his voyage, he seems to have no concrete destination in mind. “I told myself that I
could never stop, and with a gust of petulance I resolved to stop forthwith,” (21) he admits,
choosing his destination entirely by chance through the decidedly unscientific means of
petulance. Surely, it would have been much more logical for a scientist in possession of a time
machine that enables multiple trips of any length to go into a point, or points, in the nearer
future and trace change as it is happening, rather than attempting to read the traces of that
change in the far future. And, in fact, with each version of the story, the journey goes
increasingly farther into the future: in “The Chronic Argonauts,” the destination is the year 4003,
while in the National Observer version, the Time Traveller travels to the year 12,203. That is,
each subsequent revision of the story amplifies just how scientifically unsound his journey is,
since with each iteration, he is forced to read more and more of the history of change from an
incomplete physical record. In short, given the power the time machine gives to the Time
Traveller to look beyond the human lifespan and fill in the gaps of time, it is striking that he only
uses it to continue reading an incomplete geological record.
This odd narrative choice takes on meaning if The Time Machine is considered as a text
interested in process rather than product, in the fact and knowability of change. The majority of
Wells’ oeuvre is about the future – that is to say, it extensively depicts particular futures. A
socially-minded writer, Wells was deeply concerned with the kind of future the present was
creating, and throughout his works runs his major preoccupation of “the major disease of
modern man … that his scientific and technological expertise has outstripped his moral and
emotional development.” (McConnell, 11) Consequently, there is undeniable social commentary
in the vision of the future offered by The Time Machine, a future clearly constructed as an
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extrapolation of Victorian technoscentrism. Arriving in the year 802,701, the Time Traveller
eventually discovers that humanity has evolved into two races: the effete, childlike Eloi, who
enjoy an idyllic existence aboveground, and the Morlocks, a degenerate race that toils below the
surface of the Earth and preys on the Eloi. The simplest reading of such a vision, of course, to
see it as taking to an extreme the deep division between the working and aristocratic classes
that was making itself visible in Wells’ time, and of which he himself was deeply aware given his
working-class birth. “Ages ago, thousands of generations ago, man had thrust his brother man
out of the ease and the sunshine. And now that brother was coming back – changed!” (58) the
Traveller exclaims, allowing Wells to challenge the narratives and ideals of progress, hard work,
and technological mastery that defined the Victorian era and instead place front and center
what Wells saw as its deep social divides and moral failings. In Miles Link’s apt summary, then,
The Time Machine, “by depicting humanity’s demise, disavows the Victorian suggestion that the
pinnacle of civilization had been reached.” (140)
However, The Time Machine is less interested in the future itself than in how the Time
Traveller comes to know it, and consequently, in the knowability of the processes that produce
change and the kinds of narratives that result from it. The earlier version of the story, “The
Chronic Argonauts,” was what Parrinder calls “the product of a writer with a desire to be a
prophet without, as yet, any startling truths to reveal.” (20) Its final version, The Time Machine is
his “first authentically prophetic tale,” (Ibid) thus lying at the cusp of his writing about the future
per se. It is the very beginning of Wells the prophet, and consequently a fiction concerned with
the epistemological challenges of understanding change, reading the traces of the past, and
predicting the future.
Wells was interested in the limitations of scientific endeavor, and scholars have
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extensively considered the way Wells stages the limits of science in this novel and other
writings. In a variety of early essays critiquing rigidity of thought, anthropocentrism, and the
biases of theology and belief, he showed how “scientists themselves sometimes perpetrate
distortion, which has its origin in certain deeply enculturated habits of thought permeating the
nature of language itself. (Philmus & Hughes, 14) In the 1903 lecture to the Oxford
Philosophical Society ‘The Skepticism of the Instrument’, published in Mind in 1904, he “calls
into question the capacity of language as it exists to characterize accurately a lived experience
that is in a constant state of flux.” (James, 42). And in The Time Machine, the Time Traveller is a
rather bad scientist: he “does not, as a more careful scientist ought, gradually assemble facts
and then present his conclusions, but stumbles four times from an inaccurate synthesis to a less
inaccurate one.” (Ibid, 52) Despite representing “the pinnacle of late-Victorian scientific
progress and knowledge,” (Harack, 7) he “reveals the deep uncertainties and dangers inherent
in attempting to grasp the unknown.” (ibid, 9) More broadly, though Wells “believed in the
perfectibility of science,” (Link, 143) his scientific romances are all about disaster of one kind or
another – and his “best disasters describe how the balance of social and scientific progress,
which he felt it was absolutely essential to maintain, might deteriorate and crash.” (Ibid)
Wells was equally interested in the human ability to notice and articulate change,
echoing in this the geologists and natural historians who emphasized a similar difficulty. In the
1891 essay “The Rediscovery of the Unique,” for example, he echoes Lyell in writing that it is
“the constant refrain in the teaching of one of the most eminent of living geologists that
everything passes into everything else by ‘insensible gradations.’” (24) Insensible– literally,
unable to be sensed by humans – figures here as the key word. This essay argues that while
each thing is unique, man tends to remain blind to that uniqueness, placing objects into
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categories and likening things to others. The same applies to time, and Wells’ description of the
human perception of it is particularly revelatory: “When [a man] speaks of a thousand years, the
suspicion never crosses his mind that he is referring to a unique series of unique gyrations on
the part of the earth we inhabit; and yet, if he is an educated man, he knows perfectly well that
the shape of the earth’s orbit and the earth’s velocity are things constantly changing!” (26) This
recalls Miles Link’s argument that Wells sought to stamp out a devotion “to the unimportant
details of ‘mechanical’ and ‘sequential’ time.” (135) Arising out of industrialization, this
“mechanical time” was by definition regular and repetitive like clockwork, focusing on the next
hour, the next day, or the next week in an endless cycle at the expense of a perspective of
grander scope that included social and technological forces. Seeing time as an endless series of
repetitions is tantamount to not seeing it at all, Wells argued – and this would be humanity’s
undoing. And in another early essay, “The Cyclic Delusion,” he rebuked the human
“predisposition toward the cyclic view of things,” (111) – a human tendency to expect
recurrence and repetition throughout time, which is “a limitation of our observation.” (112) This
is the very mistake the Time Traveller makes, assuming that the future will be more advanced
than the present – and, by implication, that the current trends of progress he is familiar with will
continue and recur in the future. Needless to say, this recurrence does not manifest itself, and
this assumption almost leaves him stranded in the future.
In other words, The Time Machine is interested in the legibility of the new narratives of
change produced by the ideas of deep time and evolution. Narrative, at its most basic, is
movement in time, a process of change or a sequence of events, and that is fundamentally what
geology and evolutionary theory were concerned with: change. On the Origin of Species “is in a
very precise sense a narrative, because what it describes cannot be correctly described except
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through the medium of time.” (Beer, 59) It is a process rather than a static fact. The same is true
of geological time, which, too, is a narrative – of the “slow, subtle, but all-important grinding
away of the geological, ecological clock.” (McConnell, 72) Nature has long been conceived of as
a book, a conceit that Victorian scientific discourse was particularly fond of, as Simon James
points out – but it was a book whose narratives man ceased to be able to read in the nineteenth
century. Both Lyell and Darwin articulate it as such: Darwin, for example, refers to the geological
record as “a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect….of this
history we possess the last volume alone…of this volume, only here and there a short chapter
has been preserved, and of each page, only here and there a few lines.” (272) Following
Darwin’s metaphor to its logical extent, the geological record becomes a book recording history,
a narrative we cannot see in its completeness. As David Shackleton points out, “Wells mirrored
Lyell and Darwin’s idea of a fragmentary narrative history of the world,” (850) and so
throughout The Time Machine, the Time Traveller is constantly attempting to see, articulate,
and ascertain change – and therefore endlessly attempting to read this narrative of limited
legibility to the human vantage point.
This becomes strikingly evident in the bold choice Wells makes in differentiating The
Time Machine from the other utopian fictions out of which it emerged. As the Time Traveller
confesses, “I had no convenient cicerone in the pattern of the Utopian books.” (48) This simple
justification lies at the heart of the story: while in other Utopian texts, the time traveler would
be guided through the future and have it explained to him, Wells’ Time Traveller must discover
this future on his own. In Bellamy’s Looking Backward, for example, Doctor Leete explains at
length the nature of the future’s socialist utopia, while in Morris’ News from Nowhere,
conversations with numerous inhabitants of the future furnish descriptions. By contrast, Wells’
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Time Traveller must constantly observe and make inferences and deductions, which allows
Wells to foreground the process of knowing rather than the nature of the future itself. To put it
another way: in 1900, Wells wrote the series of essays titled Anticipations, which form a kind of
“history of the future,” predicting what the world will be like in the year 2000. In this, they
resemble historical writing that describes the way the world looked like in the past through a
study of social forces, movements, and technological developments. When the Time Traveller
claims that he had no cicerone, therefore, what he is stating is that the text we are reading is
not Anticipations (a text describing what the future will be like) but rather a text about
discovering what the future will be like. And, in fact, in an earlier version of the story, the
audience’s constant interruptions lead the Time Traveller to exclaim “I am not an annotated
edition of myself.” In other words: this story is not Anticipations, a highly annotated text, full of
facts, figures, and dates, describing the future in extensive detail. It is the story, of discovering
how that future has come to be.
Wells borrows extensively from Lyell’s fifth chapter of Principles of Geology regarding
the difficulties and prejudices that “have retarded the progress of geology.” (62) One of these is
difficulties is the “prejudices arising from our not seeing subterranean changes,” which Lyell
briefly summarizes:
Nor is his position less unfavorable when, beholding a volcanic eruption, he tries to
conceive what changes the column of lava has produced, in its passage upwards, on the
intersected strata; or what form the melted matter may assume at great depths on
cooling; or what may be the extent of the subterranean rivers and reservoirs of liquid
matter far beneath the surface. (69)
This particular difficulty is a fundamental theme running throughout the Time Traveller’s
adventures in the year 802,701, as his theorizing about the future of the human race is
constantly stumped by his lack of information about what is going on below the surface.
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Attempting to understand the nature of the relation between the Morlocks and the Eloi, he puts
forth a series of hypotheses, each of which is subsequently disproved as he acquires new
information. In fact, he can only acquire a complete understanding of the state of humanity in
the future by discovering what lies below the surface: after his descent into this Underworld, he
exclaims “the sudden realization of my ignorance of their ways of thinking and doing came
home to me very vividly in the darkness.” (55) Descending below the surface, he encounters the
Morlocks, and, synthesizing that encounter with his knowledge of the Eloi, he finally discovers
what he believes to be a coherent theory: that the Morlocks were once the subjugated classes –
the “mechanical servants” (57) and the Eloi “the favoured aristocracy,” (Ibid) but through a
lengthy process of evolution, “the old order was…in part reversed” (58) as the Morlocks began
to prey on the helpless Eloi. Notably, in the same passage on subterranean challenges, Lyell
exhorts the reader to “suppose a being entirely confined to the nether world,” (69) and
emphasizes that if such a creature could only see the underground, “he might frame theories
the exact converse of those usually adopted by human philosophers.” (Ibid) Only through a
synthesis of aboveground and belowground views can the geologist come to an accurate
understanding of processes of change. The same would appear to be true of the Time Traveller,
who can only finally formulate a complete theory having seen both what is above and below.
Yet, as the Traveller admits, his final theory “may be as wrong an explanation as mortal wit
could invent.” (79) A doubt remains as to whether he has done as well as the geologist in
reading the traces of change.
As the Traveller narrates of his underground foray, “...striking another match, saw that I
had entered a vast arched cavern, which stretched into utter darkness beyond the range of my
light. The view I had of it was as much as one could see in the burning of a match.” (54) As
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numerous critics have pointed out, this moment resembles a particularly remarkable few lines
from Wells’ 1891 essay “The Rediscovery of the Unique”:
Science is a match that man has just got alight. He thought he was in a room – in moments
of devotion, a temple – and that his light would be reflected from and display walls
inscribed with wonderful secrets and pillars carved with philosophical systems wrought into
harmony. It is a curious sensation, now that the preliminary splutter is over and the flame
bursn up clear, to see his hands lit and just a glimpse of himself and the patch he stands on
visible, and around him, in place of all that human comfort and beauty he anticipated –
darkness still. (30-31)
The interpretation seems easy enough: light has always been a metaphor for knowledge, and in
describing it as a match within darkness, Wells emphasizes the limitations of that knowledge.
But the context of the Traveller lighting a match is significant: he is not simply in any place of
darkness, but underground, in the place that holds the final piece of the puzzle of humanity’s
history, in the form of the Morlocks. Only by descending below the surface, into the place that
holds the Earth’s invisible changes, can he read the history of change that he seeks. But the
match fails to illuminate the entirety of that history, as the underground world stretches “into
utter darkness beyond the range of my light” – just as, in the place of all the comfort and beauty
man has anticipated lies “darkness still.”36 As such, he brings his wide-ranging metaphor of
science being a match that man has just got alight into the underground cavern, into the space
where many of the slow, painstaking processes of geological change occur.
Another difficulty is precisely the slowness with which change happens, and which
makes it imperceptible to the human eye. That is, this challenge lies in a fundamental
incompatibility between the speed at which we (humans) move through time and the speed at
36

These invisible, subterranean changes also harken back to another invisible force dreaded by those in
the nineteenth century: the anarchist, “that outwardly normal, rational man who might, unsuspected, be
harboring thoughts and plans of the most unspeakable violence and hatred.” (McConnell, 48) Within the
anarchist lay the implacable forces of change and revolution, and Wells, “a revolutionary who feared the
apocalyptic moment of revolution itself,” (Ibid, 51) may certainly be alluding to these invisible yet
powerful forces below the surface.
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which geological and evolutionary change happens in time. At a particularly poetic moment, the
Time Traveller contemplates the sky: “Above me shone the stars, for the night was very clear. I
felt a certain sense of friendly comfort in their twinkling. All the old constellations had gone
from the sky, however: that slow movement which is imperceptible in a hundred human
lifetimes, had long since rearranged them in unfamiliar groupings.” (61, emphasis mine) It has
become clear by now, I hope, just how evocative the italicized phrase is of the worldview of
deep time, focused as it is on slow, invisible change. Notably, however, the Traveller does not
see the movement itself. Rather, the fact of the unrecognizable stars in the sky reveals, in their
unrecognizability, that he can never see the process itself through which they came to hold that
position in the sky. Stars run frequently through Wells’ oeuvre, usually providing “man with an
element of permanence against which evolution can be measured,” (Vernier, 81) but to
measure is not quite the same as to see. The movement of the stars provides evidence that a
process has happened without making it possible to trace that process itself.
In fact, even technology cannot solve this epistemological difficulty. The Time Machine
can be understood through the juxtaposition of two technologies that fundamentally alter the
speed of time while lying at opposite ends of the spectrum in relation to it: the camera and the
time machine. When travelling on the machine, the Time Traveller whizzes through the future at
“a year a minute,” (Wells, 20) a speeding up of time. Descending into the Morlocks’
underground dwellings, the Traveller wishes he were in possession of a camera: “If only I had
thought of a Kodak! I could have flashed that glimpse of the underworld in a second, and
examined it at leisure.” (54) As André Bazin notes, the fundamental innovation of the camera is
that it “embalms time,” (8) until “the photographic image is the object itself, the object freed
from the conditions of time and space that govern it.” (8) In other words, the camera freezes
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time. Wells himself was a photographer, and therefore had firsthand experience of the camera’s
particular capacity to freeze time and the consequent new ontology of this particular
invention.37 Both technologies, the Time Traveller believes, can give him greater clarity as to the
future of mankind and the processes of evolution and change. The machine will allow him to
“explore time” (11) while the camera will allow him to freeze “a glimpse” and examine it. He
therefore potentially has three ways of experiencing time: its “normal” speed, faster than
average (the time machine), and slower than average, or even frozen (the camera).38
And yet, all three forms turn out, in their own ways, to be problematic in terms of
seeing and understanding change, and the story’s evocation of these three speeds of passing
through time only highlights the way in which none are sufficient. The “normal” speed is that of
the normal human lifespan, insufficient as we have seen, and it is in this normal time that the
Traveller mostly exists, and in which he at length (and usually incorrectly) reads the traces of
change. The time machine speeds up time, which seemingly “allows the Traveller to watch the
infinitesimally slow changes of geology and astronomy” (Shackleton 841) that normally remain
imperceptible and thus makes “visible slow change through vast periods of time.” (Ibid)
However, through this speeding up, change remains intangible and even unreal: as the Time
Traveller describes travelling through time, the landscape is “misty and vague,” trees grow and
change “like puffs of vapour,” buildings “rise up faint and fair, and pass like dreams,” and
splendid architecture is “built of glimmer and mist,” until he gazes “into the dim elusive world
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In this way, the camera is not unlike the phonograph, which we considered in the previous chapter: the
latter, too, challenged previous ontology in allowing the dead to speak after the moment of death.
38
See also Wells’ story “The New Accelerator,” in which a scientist invents a chemical substance – the
eponymous accelerator - that allows him to move through time so fast that the rest of the world appears
frozen. A similar chemical, the “retarder,” enables “the patient to spread a few seconds over many hours
of ordinary time.” (Quoted in Link, 136). In this 1901 story, Wells is again approaching the question of the
relationship between the human experience of time and their perception of movement and change in the
world.
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that raced and fluctuated before my eyes.”(19) In short, though the time machine at first seems
to solve the problem of seeing invisible change, the Time Traveller does not truly see it in any
sense of seeing something real, and, in fact, by the time he arrives in the future, having seen
these rapid changes makes him no more apt at deciphering the puzzle of humanity’s past.
Meanwhile, the photograph’s relation to time creates a strange incongruity, for it is hardly by
freezing and examining at leisure a single moment in time that a process that spans endless
moments becomes visible. The photograph is like a fossil, a singular trace through which change
is imperceptible.
Wells’ evocation of these two technologies stands at the intersection of art and science,
moving this problematics of temporality into the aesthetic realm. The camera, possessing both
scientific and artistic potential, creates a non-narrative stillness. Meanwhile, the speeding-up of
the time machine is “cinematographic,” as Wells described it in A Modern Utopia, a “sort of epic
movie of future time.” (Wittenberg, 88) Alternatively, Wittenberg suggests understanding it as
“kinetoscopic, in deference to the moving-image technology most widely available in the mid1890s,” (87) but it is also evocative of Eadward Muybridge’s 1880s photographs of a horse in
motion. That is, the two technologies of the camera and the film, through either stillness or
motion, take the passage of time to its extremes and move it from the “real” world into the
aesthetic one, and therefore into the sphere of narrative. In the time machine, Wells creates the
most convenient possible solution to the problem of seeing the slow processes of change, and in
the camera, evokes its opposite, its foil, in order to show how even the most extreme of
technological solutions fails to resolve the epistemological problem in question. The technology
that Victorian society sets so much stock by fails to answer the questions posed by Victorian
science’s new discoveries. And in evoking the ability to technologically alter, freeze, or speed up
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time, Wells correlates time with narrative (or the conspicuous absence of it), thus translating the
impossibility of seeing and recording change into narrative terms.
“A Greater Thing than a Man”: (Human) Time and Narrative

If the narratives of change are illegible to the Time Traveller, it is because they are no
longer human narratives. The Time Traveller therefore confronts the awful possibility of an ahuman narrative, in which humanity figures only tangentially – and proves “ultimately unable to
handle the strain of confronting himself ‘out of time’, of seeing himself in the alterity of the
future.” (Harack 9) This is what the contingency of the human inevitably implies: the end of
human narrative, which was simultaneously too awful to contemplate and yet in many ways the
new paradigm defining the nineteenth-century Weltanschauung. The “emphasis on fixed laws in
nineteenth-century science” (Beer, 39) – laws physical, natural, and chemical – guided the
world. Such laws were, in their own ways, narratives, describing the effect that would result
from a particular cause: an action will precipitate a reaction, an increase in pressure necessitates
an increase in temperature, a system will tend towards entropy. And even evolution, as a theory
of the natural world predicated upon chance and contingency, emerged alongside the rise of
statistics and probability as their own set of laws according to which the world could be
predicted and chance “tamed.” (Hacking 1990) Wells himself maintained that scientific thought
“was inherently predictive, since it was by means of the inferences they entailed for future
events that scientific theories were usually tested.” (Parrinder 28) In other words, science was
narrative in that it predicted sequences of events – and it was by comparing this theoretical
narrative with a record of what actually occurred that scientific truth was adjudicated.
But the nature of such narratives, in the form of social or physical laws, is impersonal;
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even if they describe human life, they reduce it to a level of abstraction at which the human
becomes invisible. For example, “Lyell, and later Darwin, demonstrated in their major narratives
of geological and natural history that it was possible to have plot without man – both plot
previous to man and plot even now regardless of him.” (Beer 17) The equations of physical and
chemicals laws predict change, but the human does not figure in them; meanwhile, statistics is
aptly summarized by Sherlock Holmes’ assertion in The Sign of Four that “while the individual
man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for
example, never foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an
average number will be up to. Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant.” (Doyle 1891,
194) That is, statistical science can only create accurate narratives about the future by rendering
the individual human invisible. Such scientific narratives are therefore what I suggest calling ahuman narratives, which exist above and beyond the human, and in which the human figures
only invisibly or tangentially.
This correlates with the nineteenth century’s prominent concern with objectivity.
George Levine has argued for “the mutual dependence of epistemological ideas and narrative,”
(17) showing that “the ideal of epistemological disinterest or self-sacrifice or self-annihilation
had managed to permeate the [nineteenth-century English] culture’s consciousness.” (12) This
ideal was, as Levine argues, that of the death of the self for the ends of objective knowledge –
or, in other words, the removal of the human self from a necessarily narrative-based scientific
and epistemological practice. If the products of the scientific method are narratives, that is, and
objectivity is the idea(l) of removing the self from the discovery or telling of those narratives,
then it becomes clearer how nineteenth-century science was a set of disciplines interested in ahuman narratives.
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Wells’ Anticipations reveals what non-human narrative might look like, and thus forms a
useful contrast with The Time Machine. A non-fictional text, Anticipations speculates about what
the future will be like through a series of essays, but it would not be entirely accurate to say that
it is a non-narrative text. Rather, it is narrative in the same way that historical writing is
narrative. As Frank McConnell points out, in the nineteenth century history, “it came to be
believed, might be approached with the same analytical rigor and, perhaps, predictive efficiency
that had been so brilliantly employed in the physical sciences since Sir Isaac Newton.
Underneath the surface of time past might be perceived patterns, vectors of force, that properly
understood would yield elementary formulas for the rise and fall of civilizations.” (44) That is,
historical writing entered into the same domain as the “fixed laws” of physics and chemistry that
were understood to rule the world. And futurism, as McConnell notes, has its roots “firmly in
the nineteenth-century discovery of history-writing as science.” (45) Thus, as a history of the
future, it is written in terms of the narratives of scientific writing.
And, just like the narratives of scientific writing, those of Anticipations are not human
narratives. Though focusing on social forces and the development of society, they treat these
subjects at a level of abstraction in which the human becomes invisible. Speaking of the
development of locomotion, for example, Wells writes that it “depends upon a sequence of
ideas arising, and of experiments made, and upon laws of political economy, almost as
inevitable as natural laws.” (5) At a later moment, he claims that it was “not one cause, but a
very complex and unprecedented series of causes, [that] set the steam locomotive going.” (8)
These are fundamentally narrative phrases: they suggest sequences of events, tied together
through causality and an underlying logic. The agents of these narratives, however, are not
human: a sequence of ideas, the steam locomotive, and experiments. In fact, like the plots
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without man of On the Origins of Species, Wells’ essays range back and forth in time to focus on
process: he is interested in describing, for example, the “trend of present forces,” (3) and he
uses heavily Darwinian language to describe the life, development, proliferation, fecundity, and
variability of social and technological developments. Consider, for example, the following
phrase: “Almost certainly the existing lines of railway will develop and differentiate; some in one
direction and some in another, according to the nature of the pressure upon them.” (25) With
its use of vocabulary such as “lines,” “develop,” “differentiate,” “the nature of the pressure
upon them,” the phrase evokes the description of the evolutionary development of an
organism, except that it refers to the inorganic development of the railroad. Language
describing the life and development of other non-human entities continues to proliferate: “it
was a steam-engine whose ancestral stage had developed under conditions that were by no
means exacting,” (11) for example. Steam engines, railway lines, cabs, omnibuses, traffic, capital
– these are the actors in this history of the future, made up of narratives theoretically describing
human life yet practically making it invisible.39
Yet despite how well Anticipations fits into the traditions of nineteenth-century
scientific and historical writing, the idea of a narrative without man remained implicitly a point
of contention in nineteenth-century cultural production. For example, I considered in an earlier
section of this chapter the conceit of “time travel” prevalent in geological fictions; more broadly,
the discoveries of paleontology contributed to the flourishing in this period of a vast genre of art
that aimed to represent the prehistoric earth. (Rudwick) Many Expositions Universelles brought
such time travel to life: the Crystal Palace Gardens offered in 1853 a temporal panorama
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Such a network of human and non-human actors coming together into a vast and complex system both
predates and recalls Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, in which agency is distributed across a network
of human and nonhuman actors.
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consisting of “a series of life-sized sculptures of extinct animals” (Shackleton, 848) that allowed
visitors to “time travel” into the past as they walked through the attraction. Their journey
through the attraction therefore became a time-travel narrative reminiscent of, for example,
Jules Verne’s Voyage au centre de la terre (which it predates), and in which a descent into the
center of the earth becomes a journey through geological time. All of these are, in a sense,
human narrative in that they place the human outside the boundaries of his temporal existence
on earth. Perhaps one of the most important works on deep time was La terre avant le deluge, a
hugely successful 1863 text by science popularizer Louis Figuier. Richly illustrated by Edouard
Riou (who also frequently illustrated Verne’s novels, including Voyage au centre de la terre), the
volume contains more than 300 engravings of scenes from deep time (see Image 1), beginning
with the appearance of life and moving through the emergence of various organisms, plants,
reptiles, and mammals to culminate with the appearance of humans. That is, Figuier’s text and
Riou’s illustrations come together to create a narrative, but importantly, a human narrative.
Published only 4 years after Origin of Species, it is a “réfus du darwinisme,” (Béguet 25) –
refusing in particular his model of plot without man to instead craft a story of strange new
worlds that culminates in the existence of man. By contrast, de la Beche’s 1830 caricature
“Awful Changes” (Image 32) suggests the idea of a narrative without man. Bearing the caption
“Man Found only in a Fossil State - Reappearance of Ichthyosauri,” it depicts a future, more
temperate period of the earth (evidenced by luscious vegetation). Man has gone extinct, and a
“Professor Ichthyosaurus” lectures to other icthyosauri on a mammalian (human) skull. Though,
as an image, it is a frozen moment in time, it bears within it a narrative of human extinction – a
plot centered on the contingency of the human.40
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As another apt example, consider Isaac Asimov’s 1956 short story “The Last Question.” Spanning
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Wells struggled with the possibility of narrative without man from his earliest encounter
with the theory of evolution. Evolution is a “cosmic process,” in the words of Wells’ mentor
Huxley, a vast, inhuman narrative. But, like Huxley, Wells “asserted the necessity of diverting the
evolutionary process into channels devised by man.” (Vernier, 71) Throughout his life, Wells
struggled with whether, or how, this might be possible, and consequently “believed in two
mutually contradictory ideas, the immutability of history and the omnipotence of the will.”
(McConnell, 28) In other words, a “dialectic movement” (Vernier, 81) pervades his stories
between these two contradictory ideas of will and helplessness, and more largely, between
human and inhuman narrative, and humanity’s ability to transform the latter into the former.
Wells was also interested in what man would become: in The Conquest of Time he considered
the birth of the “After-Man, our bodily and mental offspring, of whom this present time is the
Advent,” (quoted in Parrinder, 30) echoing his conviction in First and Last Things that “We are
episodes in an experience greater than ourselves.” (Quoted in Parrinder, 26) The use of
“episode” in particular is striking given its connotations of a single event in a larger sequence –
again suggesting the possibility of a vaster narrative in which man as we understand the idea
today is but temporary.
Within this dialectic, The Time Machine reveals the end of human narrative– something
that, ironically, can only be accomplished through human narrative. It is only by attempting to
insert man into a narrative greater than the human that Wells can show that he has no place
centuries, it shows different human characters repeatedly asking an advanced computer how to avert the
heat death of the universe, the implication of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The computer’s
answer is “insufficient data for meaningful answer.” Finally, humanity merges with the computer (which is
now so advanced that it exists in hyperspace, outside normal space-time), and asks the question one final
time. By the time the computer figures out the answer, the universe is dead, and so the story ends with
the computer’s pronouncement: “’Let there be light.’ And there was light.” Combining two of the
predominant nineteenth-century concerns, the heat death of the universe and evolution, it reframes
what should be an a-human narrative (the extinction of humanity and the death of the universe itself)
into a human-centric narrative, in which humanity becomes the Creator of existence itself.
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there, and therefore elucidate what it truly means to live in a time whose scientific discoveries
have revealed that the narratives of the universe are ones in which humanity figures so
tangentially. Miles Link reads Wells’ work by borrowing Ray Kurzweil’s concept of the failure
mode – “a means of evaluating the soundness of a system by examining how it could collapse.”
(143) The Time Machine can be understood in a similar way: it is a failure mode of human
narrative, a confrontation between human and a-human narrative where the latter wins out.
This, by extension, elucidates the functioning of science fiction as a literary form that reveals the
contingency of the human. Part of the challenge inherent in the idea of deep time, and in the
nineteenth-century’s recalibration of the human place within it, is just how ungraspable it is to
the human mind. Therefore, it is only through confrontation with human scale that the ahumanity of the new narratives underlying existence are revealed. “I can conceive only of man
as altogether the biggest thing in my world,” (20) says the narrator of Wells’ early dialogue “A
Talk with Gryllotalpa,” published in the Science Schools Journal (the same venue which
published “The Chronic Argonauts”). The Time Machine allows the reader to conceive of
precisely the opposite. If the nineteenth century produced a complex set of plots without man,
to borrow Beer’s term, then it is only through plot with man that they become comprehensible
– and this revelation of a-human narrative lies at the foundation of science fiction’s cognitive
glance.
The Time Machine therefore foregrounds itself as a narrative precisely to reveal its
extinction. Robert Crossley asks “how often has it been taken as a story, as a beautiful lie…?”(14)
and draws our attention to the Time Traveller’s justification of his own narration:
No. I cannot expect you to believe it. Take it as a lie – or a prophecy. Say I dreamed it in
the workshop. Consider I have been speculating upon the destinies of our race until I
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have hatched this fiction. Treat my assertion of its truth as a mere stroke of art to
enhance its interest. And taking it as a story, what do you think of it? (87)
Indeed, Crossley reminds us, the frame of The Time Machine foregrounds the fact that the Time
Traveller’s narrative should be regarded as just that, a narrative. The Traveller evokes
“speculating upon the destinies of our race,” something Wells himself has engaged in
extensively in a variety of non-fictional narrative forms, and emphasizes that this particular form
of speculation is, primarily, an aesthetic one. This quotation forces the reader to consider the
story as story.
And as a story, it is one that stages the end of human narrative. Michael Sayeau
suggests that The Time Machine stages the end of narrative itself, entangling “the Time
Traveller, Wells, and the novel itself within a storyless story, a narrative in which nothing
happens and which cannot find its ending.” (433) This concept of the storyless story bears
elucidating. To the Eloi, as Sayeau points out, “the concept of time itself has become
unavailable,” (Ibid) and they have also lost the “capacity for abstract thought” (435) – time and
abstraction being necessary components of story. They live in a “pure present,” (437) recalling
Wells’ criticism of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’s “devotion to the unimportant details of
‘mechanical’ and ‘sequential’ time” at the cost of the ability to think “critically and
conceptually.” (Link 135) Moreover, Wells depicts a world in which “the family, and the
emotions that arise therein, the fierce jealousy, the tenderness for offspring, parental selfdevotion,” (32) no longer exist, and, as Sayeau argues, these are the very things that lie at the
core of story:
Jealousy, intergenerational bonds, “passions of all sorts”—these are more than just the
glue that holds the nuclear family together. They are the very stuff of novelistic fiction,
from its taproot in the medieval romance through 19th-century high realism and
beyond. What sort of novel would result if sexual intrigue, the emotional transactions of
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the family, and the defense of the household against external threats were elided from
the list of ingredients? (440)
No novel at all, Sayeau argues; instead, the future world is the end of literature in more ways
than one.
But it would be more apt to say that The Time Machine stages the end of human
narrative, rather than the end of narrative tout court. Time goes on, and with it the slow
changes of the earth, the movement of the stars, and the processes of evolution. This is, of
course, hardly the stuff of exciting romance or even the realist novel, but it is still narrative at its
most basic level, if considered from the perspective of cognitive science. The human mind is a
storytelling mind, “a crucial evolutionary adaptation” (Gottschall 102) which is “allergic to
uncertainty, randomness, and coincidence. It is addicted to meaning. If the storytelling mind
cannot find meaningful patterns in the world, it will try to impose them.” (Ibid 103) In other
words, the human mind attempts to connect any sequence of events, however unrelated, into a
story; it is wired to shape into a narrative even something so fundamentally non-narrative as the
passage of time itself. For example, when the Time Traveller contemplates the stars in the
future, he describes it thus:
I thought of the great precessional cycle that the pole of the earth describes. Only forty
times had that silent revolution occurred during all the years that I had traversed. And
during these few revolutions all the activity, all the traditions, the complex
organizations, the nations, languages, literatures, aspirations, even the mere memory of
Man as I knew him, had been swept out of existence.” (61)
What he sees here is not the end of narrative, but the end of the narrative of man. The story of
humanity, with all its nations, languages, and aspirations, has ended, but the movement of the
stars and planets continues endlessly, resulting in a night sky unfamiliar to the Time Traveller. By
the year 30 million, the slow process of evolution results in a “huge white butterfly” (82) and a
“monstrous crab-like creature” (Ibid) replace humanity entirely. To borrow again Beer’s apt
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term, what the Traveller discovers here is “plot without man”: the wheels of change will
continue turning, albeit at a glacial page, and the human mind, attuned through the pressures of
evolution to see patterns and causality even where none exists, understands this as a slowly
unfolding story written on the cast canvas of the universe itself.
As Paul Ricoeur argued in his monumental Time and Narrative, “Time becomes human
time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of narrative.” (3) That is to say, it is
through narrative that we make time into human time. In The Time Machine, however, narrative
is unable to humanize time; rather, the vast expanses of deep time are experienced from the
human vantage point to show just how inhuman the great abyss of time remains. “Not until The
Time Machine did the real power, and the real terror, of evolutionary theory find adequate
expression in fiction,” (80) McConnell writes of The Time Machine; similarly, praising the lyricism
of Wells’ description of the end of the world, Crossley calls it a “secular scripture. Lord Kelvin’s
thermodynamics, like all good formulations in physics, has the power of elegantly quantitative
abstraction, but the second law can neither visualize entropy nor reconcile us to it.” (24) In their
praise of Wells is a deep admiration for his ability to enable his reader to grasp the ungraspable,
make tangible the vast, intangible abstractions of deep time and the end of the world. And they
are not incorrect. William Thomson’s 1852 paper on thermodynamics, which articulated the
universe’s inevitable tendency toward entropy, is indeed clinical and abstract:
Within a finite period of time past, the earth must have been, and within a finite period
of time to come the earth again must be, unfit for habitation of man as at present
constituted, unless operations have been, or are to be performed, which are impossible
under the laws to which the known operations going on at present in the material world
are subject.
This statement is a narrative one, in that it encompasses past, present, and future: how the
earth “must have been” and what it “again must be,” with a nod to what is “at present
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constituted.” It suggests a sequence of events, but despite its brief evocation of man, the
emphasis remains on the narrative of the earth’s changes and the operations and laws to which
the material world is subject. Again we are confronted not just with a world-shattering
abstraction (as evolutionary theory and the second law of thermodynamics were), but also with
a narrative without man.
This is what Wells makes tangible. Consider, for example, his evocative portrayal of the
twilight of the world near the end of the story, drawn quite obviously from the Victorians’
preoccupation with the implications of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the heat death
of the universe. Reaching the year thirty million, the Time Traveller stops “very gently and
s[i]t[s] upon the Time Machine, looking around.” (80) (This, it must be noted, is an intriguing
perspective, as the Traveller is simultaneously immersed in the future world by the openness of
the time machine, described as having a saddle, and removed from it by the fact that he is on
the machine, able to leave at any time.) Describing his sensations, he says “there was a sense of
oppression in my head, and I noticed that I was breathing very fast. The sensation reminded me
of my only experience of mountaineering, and from that I judged the air to be more rarefied
than it is now.” (82) This is perhaps one of the most important moments in The Time Machine,
for this air too rarefied to meet human need represents a fundamental incompatibility of man
and the environment. Whereas the pre-nineteenth-century view of the world was one in which
man and the natural world were divinely created and fit for each other, this is its exact opposite.
The Earth has evolved through slow, gradual change – its story continuing while man’s has not.
In that moment of incompatibility therefore lies encapsulated narrative without man, in the idea
of time going on without him, but it is only by placing a human on that desolate beach that this
incompatibility can be truly represented.
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This, as Frank McConnell aptly points out, is an adaptation of the Romantic idea of the
sublime. “The Traveller is confronted with the future in much the same way the Romantic poet
finds himself confronted with the inhospitable rockface of nature: a mute, gigantic, threatening,
and absolutely uncommunicative presence, about which one can only speculate, only entertain
notions.” (83) Indeed, the eighteenth-century idea of the sublime that lies in the heart of
Romantic texts is a world too grand and awful (in the literal sense of that word) for the human
mind to grasp. Importantly, however, Wells’ sublime is a secular one. The Romantics frequently
evoked the idea of nature as a book, but here, at the end of the world, the Romantic sublime
becomes the “abyss of geological time,” (McConnell) still vaster and greater than man can
comprehend, but now lacking an inherent meaning. In that moment, Wells becomes “the
chosen poet of the abyss, the perfect lyricist of entropy.” (McConnell, 86)
Our human default is to see the world as narrative, to create patterns and schema (as
we saw in the previous chapter), to string together a series of events into a sequence. Wells did
not refuse this human tendency, but rather, transposed it so that the sequence of events in
question went far beyond the human. Writing on the cusp of modernism, he shows not the
breakdown of narrative, but its transposition into non-human terms. Wells reportedly had little
patience for narrative experimentation, and the general plots of his stories tend to be quite
simple and follow the conventions of romance in many ways: the plot of The Time Machine, for
example, depicts a journey to two points in the future and straight back, with none of the
paradoxes that later time travel fiction would acquire. He adopted the tropes of previous forms
– such as the frame narrative of the Gothic form or the sublime trope of Romantic writing – but
translates them into the mode of a-human narrative. It is for this reason that The Time Machine
might be considered a quintessential work of science fiction: because, like the best works of the
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genre, it reveals the contingency of humanity and of the world we know it by translating human
experience, temporality, and perspective into the strangeness of non-human and post-human
narrative.
Conclusion

In the 1941 edition of The War in the Air, Wells included a preface in which he penned
his own ‘epitaph’: “I told you so. You damned fools.” Published in the midst of the Second World
War and late into Wells’ life, it reflected the overarching concerns of his life: where the
combination of technological and social forces was taking the future of humanity, as well as the
fear that nobody was listening to his warnings of the consequences of “the major disease of
modern man…that his scientific and technological expertise has outstripped his moral and
emotional development.” (McConnell, 11) He would therefore likely be happy to know just how
present and active science fictional writing is today in helping us to consider the future. For
example, the Twelve Tomorrows series, now published by MIT press, assembles writers of
science fiction to pen “science fiction inspired by today’s emerging technologies,” as its cover
claims. Launched in 2011, the series’ purpose has been “to zero in on today’s most important
emerging technologies – the same kinds of inventions chronicled in the pages of MIT Technology
Review – and recruit talented science fiction authors to play with their implications.” (Roush, vii)
In the corporate world, the company SciFutures keeps a staff of science fiction authors on-hand,
hiring them to pen visions of the future for clients from Google to Nike, enabling them to make
better research, development, and marketing decisions. In Hollywood, feature films offer
opportunities for engineers and scientists to create what David Kirby terms “diegetic
prototypes” that enable inventors to find investors to develop these technologies. In this way,
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for example, the science fiction film Minority Report led to actual tactile interface technology.
And more recently, science fiction author Malka Older has coined the term “Speculative
Resistance,” referring to the way that political and civic resistance requires not only stories that
warn against certain futures, but also positive visions of what the future should be like,
collective narratives of what to strive for. A direct opposition to Wells’ failure modes (Link),
these are stories not about how things might fall apart but, instead, about how they might hold
together. Science fiction has become a concrete tool to speculate about the future.
Most of these texts, envisioning estranging new worlds, have a narrative component.
Even prototypes for new technologies must exist first as “diegetic prototypes” – that is, within a
diegesis or story showing humans interacting with these technologies. But all are interested in
using the possibilities of science fiction – speculating about the future in a way that involves
both the technological and the social – as a way to make decisions about the future. Frequently,
these narratives deal with the near future, enabling relatively short-term decisions in spheres
such as policy and corporate research and development. But it is also imperative that we learn
from Wells the capacity to think in non-human terms and to tell broad, inhuman narratives
about the future. Wells is often cited in contemporary eco-criticism41 because, in representing
geological and evolutionary time, he confronted a challenge similar to that of depicting climate
change in the present moment: representing, in human terms, something so strikingly vast and
inhuman. In fact, the irony inherent in the notion of the “Anthropocene” is that the climate
change created by man has become too grand, powerful, and all-encompassing for the human
mind and human narrative to comprehend. Amitav Gosh argues in The Great Derangement that
the modern realist novel finds itself incapable of representing climate change because it is so
41

It would be impossible to cite the entirety of this vast body of scholarship; see, for example, Benjamin
Morgan’s forthcoming In Human Scale.
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unthinkable, so improbable, that it strains credulity. To attempt such representation is “to court
eviction from the mansion in which serious fiction has long been in residence; it is to risk
banishment to the humbler dwellings that surround the manor house – those generic outhouses that were once known by names such as ‘the Gothic,’ ‘the romance,’ or ‘the melodrama,’
and have now come to be called ‘fantasy,’ ‘horror,’ and ‘science fiction.’’ (24) In this “age of
emergency,” as science fiction author Monica Byrne has termed the present moment, Wells
demonstrates that it is precisely the “unrealistic” and imaginative possibilities of the science
fiction and the romance that have the power to represent these vast and implacable forces by
translating traditional human narrative into a different kind of storytelling. Wells believed that it
was only by a constant exertion of the will that humanity could counter the forces of geological
and evolutionary change and survive: “the odds are against man,” he claimed, but “it is still
worthwhile in spite of the odds.” (quoted in Harack, 8) However, it is only by thinking in terms
outside the human that we might eventually learn to do what the Time Traveller struggled to
accomplish: going “beyond pre-existing imaginative limits.” (Harack, 9) Ironically, only through
the telling of a-human narratives can humanity turn the odds in its favor and continue its own
human story in spite of the implacable forces of the universe.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has considered the way that the past has looked to the future – a
future that has now become our past or our present: Verne’s novels are overwhelmingly set in a
future very near the date of publication; Robida’s take place in 1952; the majority of Wells’
fictions, as well as those of his utopian predecessors, tend to center around the year 2000. But
examining how the nineteenth century understood and made sense of its future provides a lens
to understand our relationship to ours. The transformation of the world through technoscience
following the industrial revolution yielded a new literary form that expressed this change,
offering a laboratory to examine the socio-cultural response to a new world order. Today,
historians of science speak of this industrial revolution as the first of many, arguing that we live
today in the era of the fourth such revolution, marked by technologies that blur the line
between the physical and digital worlds, such as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, the
Internet of Things, and autonomous vehicles. As such, the moment when industrialization
ushered in a new and unprecedented technoscientific paradigm can shed light on another
iteration of this process, happening in our present. With the first industrial revolution,
technoscience burst onto a world largely untouched by it and reshaped it; today, our world is
saturated with technology and with narratives about it. What better way to understand the role
of technoscience within our present - a moment when the ubiquity of technology requires a
recalibration of the very concept of novelty - then a time when technological novelty felt truly
new?
Such an approach, however, requires serious and critical attention to science fiction,
which has all too frequently been considered a frivolous genre, lacking the literary merit that
would make it worthy of academic attention unless an argument could be made for it as
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Literature. Despite the existence of several journals and associations dedicated to the genre
(Science Fiction Studies, Extrapolation), this is a status quo changing much too slowly. And in the
field of STS (science, technology, and society), science fiction appears much too rarely in
scholarship on science within culture, a subfield specifically dedicated to understanding our
beliefs, narratives, and collective cultural understandings of technoscience. But science fiction is
a fundamental part of such narrative and beliefs, as I have argued by emphasizing its role in the
sociotechnical imaginaries that shape our understanding of the present and our construction of
the future. Today even more so than in the past, it is inseparable from the collective cultural
lexicon of technoscience that we share as a society. By integrating my analysis of science fiction
so deeply with its socio-cultural context, I hope to show how it contributes to the beliefs and
practices that make up our social life within technological modernity – in the nineteenth century
and today.
There are many ways the past can elucidate our present and help us understand the
technological trends taking us into the future. The most interesting connection lies in the sphere
of communication technologies and their relation to fiction and narrative. In Verne’s Robur-leconquérant, we saw the world transforming into a “global village” through the means of the
telegraph; in Robida’s Le Vingtième Siècle, this happened through the means of the
telephonoscope. Naturally, these communication technologies transformed the very nature of
fiction: mass print culture allowed for fictions to serve as “virtual realities”; Verne’s novels
positioned themselves as scientific texts while appearing alongside popular science texts and
news; fictions published in newspapers often tended towards a realist style, with readers
mistaking fiction for fact. Today, we have another global village: the World Wide Web, which
enables an almost instantaneous spread of information (and misinformation), allowing
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individuals to throw themselves into virtual worlds of which Verne’s careful maps and
illustrations were the precursors. Nineteenth-century readers mistook Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes
stories for fact because they were published alongside the news; today, the most successful
social media celebrities are successful precisely because they succeed at carefully crafting an
“authentic” narrative of their lives, again blurring the line between fact and fiction in a medium
in which the boundaries between the two are porous. And the science fictional megatext – the
collective cultural lexicon – of technoscientific terms that began in the newspapers of the
nineteenth century continues to proliferate, as science fiction increasingly enters into popular
culture, mixes with advertisements that draw on the iconography of science fiction, and spreads
virally through memes. These offer the possibility to investigate questions such as how
technology blurs the line between fiction and reality, and the means through which
technoscientific knowledge is disseminated to the lay public outside of the “traditional” means
of science education.
Another important connection lies in the nature and role of discourses of wonder. In the
nineteenth century, science fiction’s emergence out of the fantastic allowed for a sense of
technology a source of the uncanny to underlie rhetoric around novelty. Today, our saturation
with technology has recalibrated this relationship: for example, advertisements for the most
ubiquitous technologies, such as cell phones, have begun to use the iconography of science
fiction (robots are the most popular) as shorthand for technological advancement and
modernity. Such a proliferation of “science fictional” imagery naturally reworks our relationship
to novelty, our sense of wonder regarding it, and its capacity to provoke an experience of
estrangement. It raises numerous questions: what do our discourses of wonder look like today?
Do we have the capacity to make the novel feel strange in a world so saturated with it, and in
210

which real-world novelties are so closely tied to their fictional counterparts? And, most
importantly, has our oversaturation with technology and the ubiquity of narratives around it
made us blind to the ways in which it is reshaping our lives?
Such questions remain pressing as we move swiftly into an uncertain future. Today, our
very notion of being human is being reformed through technology, with the advent of
cybernetic augmentations, predictive text technologies, virtual reality, and myriad other
novelties that blur the line between ourselves and the tools we use. How we think about the
future we are creating – in fact, whether we think about it at all – will decide whether that
future is one of utopian possibility or dystopian destruction.
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229

Image 32: “poisson aérien” presented to Nadar

Image 33 : Navire aérien le poisson volant, inventé et exécuté par Camille Vert,
ingénieur-mécanicien,1859
230

Image 34 : Awful Changes, Henry de la Beche

231

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, Sarah C. 2015. Victorian Literature and the Physics of the Imponderable. New York:
Routledge.
Alkon, Paul. 2001.“Was the Time Machine Necessary?” In H.G. Wells’ Perennial Time Machine
Selected Essays from the Centenary Conference “The Time Machine: Past, Present, and Future,”
Edited by George Slusser, Patrick Parrinder, and Daniel Chatelain, 27-38. Athens: University of
Georgia Press.
--. 1987. Origins of Futuristic Fiction. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. New York: Verso.
Andia, Béatrice de. 2005. “Visages d’Avenir.” In Les Expositions Universelles à Paris de 1855 à
1937, edited by Myriam Bacha. Paris : Action Artistique de la Ville de Paris.
Angenot, Marc. 2017. “The Absent Paradigm: an introduction to the semiotics of science
fiction.” In Science Fiction Criticism, edited by Rob Latham, 128-138. London: Bloomsbury
Academic.
Appadurai, Ajun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Asimov, Isaac. “The Last Question.” In Digital Rapture, edited by James Patrick Kelly and John
Kessel, 16-28. San Francisco: Tachyon Publications.
Barel-Moisan, Claire. “Introduction.” Nineteenth-Century French Studies 43, no. 3&4 (SpringSummer): 174-177.
Barthes, Roland. 1989. “The Reality Effect.” In The Rustle of Language, translated by Richard
Howard, 141-148. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bazin, André. 1960. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” trans. Hugh Gray. Film Quarterly
13, no. 4 (Summer): 4-9.
Beer, Gillian. 2000. Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and
Nineteenth-Century Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Begley, Adam. 2017. The Great Nadar. New York: Tim Duggan Books.
Béguet, Bruno. 1990. La Science pour tous : sur la vulgarisation scientifique en France de 1850 à
1914. Paris : Bibliothèque du Conservatoire national des arts et métiers.

232

Beltran, Alain & Carré, Patrice A. 1991. La fée et la servante : la société française face à
l’électricité, XIXème-XXème siècle. Paris: Bellin.
Bender, John & Marrinan, Michael. 2010. The Culture of Diagram. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Bensaude-Vincent, Bernadette. 1993. “Un public pour la science: l’essor de la vulgarisation
scientifique au XIXème siècle.” Réseaux 11, no. 58: 47-66.
Broderick, Damien. 2017. “Reading sf as a mega-text.” In Science Fiction Criticism, edited by Rob
Latham, 139-148. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Capitanio, Sarah. 2000. “‘L’ici-bas’ and ‘l’Au-dela’…but not as they Knew it. Realism, Utopianism,
and Science Fiction in the Novels of Jules Verne.” In Jules Verne: Narratives of Modernity, edited
by Edmund Smyth, 60-77. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Carr, Nicholas. 2010. “Author Nicholas Carr: The Web Shatters Focus, Rewires Brains.” Wired,
May 24, 2010. https://www.wired.com/2010/05/ff-nicholas-carr/
Chesneaux, Jean. 1972. The Political and Social Ideas of Jules Verne, trans. Thomas Wikeley,
London: Thames and Hudson.
Clément, Charles. « Nouvelles publications illustrées de la Librairie Hetzel. » Journal des débats,
December 27, 1877.
Cohen, Claudine. 2011. La Méthode de Zadig : la trace, le fossile, la preuve. Paris : Seuil.
Cohen, Margaret, and Dever, Carolyn. 2002. “Introduction.” In The Literary Channel : The InterNational Invention of the Novel, edited by Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever, 1-34. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Compère, Daniel. 1996. “Le jeu avec les références scientifiques dans les romans de Jules
Verne.” In De la science en Littérature à la Science-Fiction, edited by Danielle Jacquart, 170-179.
Amiens: Editions du CTHS.
Comte, Auguste. 1975. Cours de philosophie positive. Paris : Hermann.
Corday, Michel. 1900. “Visions Lointaines.” Revue de Paris, March 15, 1900.
Csicsery-Ronay, Istvan. 2008. The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction. Middletown, Connecticut:
Wesleyan University Press.
Crossley, Robert. 2001. “Taking it as a Story: The Beautiful Lie of the Time Machine.” In H.G.
Wells’ Perennial Time Machine Selected Essays from the Centenary Conference “The Time
Machine: Past, Present, and Future,” edited by George Slusser, Patrick Parrinder, and Daniel
Chatelain, 12-26. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
233

Culkin, John M. 1967. “A schoolman's guide to Marshall McLuhan.” The Saturday Review, March
18, 1967.
Daly, Nicholas. 2004. Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Darwin, Charles. 1860. On the Origin of Species, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the
Struggle for Life. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
Daston, Lorraine. 1991. “The Ideal and the Reality of the Republic of Letters in the
Enlightenment.” Science in Context 4:2, pp. 367-386.
--- & Galison, Peter. 2007. Objectivity. New York: Zone Books.
David, A. 1878. “Revue theatrale.” La Presse, December 30, 1878.
Doyle, Conan Arthur. 2003. Sherlock Holmes: The Complete Novels and Stories, Volume II. New
York: Bantam Dell.
--. 1891. The Sign of Four. Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz.
Dumas, Alexandre. 1861. Les Mille et Un Fantômes. Paris: Michel-Lévy Frères.
“Echoes from Dead Voices.” New York Sun, November 6, 1877.
“The Electroscope.” New York Sun, March 29, 1877.
Evans, Arthur. 2007. “Jules Verne’s America.” Extrapolation 48, no. 1 (Spring): 35-43.
--. 2005. “A Bibliography of Jules Verne’s English Translations.” Science Fiction Studies 32, no.1
(March): 105-141.
--. 1998. “The Illustrators of Jules Verne’s Voyages extraordinaires.” Science Fiction Studies 25,
no. 2: 241-270.
--. 1989. “Functions of Science in French Fiction,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 22, no. 1
(Spring): 79-100.
--.1988. Jules Verne Rediscovered: Didacticism and the Scientific Novel. Westport: Greenwood
Press.
Ferguson, Trish. 2013. “Introduction.” In Victorian Time: Technologies, Standardizations,
Catastrophes, edited by Trish Ferguson, 1-15. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Freud, Sigmund. 1955. “The Uncanny.” In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917-1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works,
translated by James Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press.
234

Frischmann, Brett. 2015. “Will the Internet of Things result in predictable people?” Cardozo
News, August 11, 2015. https://cardozo.yu.edu/news/professor-brett-frischmann-will-internetthings-result-predictable-people.
--. 2016. “Thoughts on Techno-Social Engineering of Humans and the Freedom to Be Off (or Free
from Such Engineering).” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 17, no. 2: 535-561.
Gallagher, Catherine. 2006. “The Rise of Fictionality.” In The Novel, Volume I: History,
Geography, and Culture, edited by Franco Moretti, 336-363. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Gernsback, Hugo. 2017. “Editorial: A new sort of magazine.” In Science Fiction Criticism, edited
by Rob Latham, 11-12. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Gosh, Amitav. 2016. The Great Derangement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gottschall, Jonathan. 2012. The Storytelling Animal. New York: Mariner Books.
Griffiths, Devin. 2016. The Age of Analogy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Grubbs, Caroline. 2015. “Cultures of Time in Fin-de-Siècle France : The Popular Literature and
Graphic Art of Albert Robida (1848-1926).” PhD diss, University of Pennsylvania.
Gunning, Tom. 1998. “Re-newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature and the
Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century.” Remarks at the MIT Aesthetics
of Transition forum, February 24-26, 1998. http://web.mit.edu/m-it/articles/index_gunning.html
Hacking, Ian. 1990. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hamon, Philippe. 1992. Expositions. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Harack, Katrina. 2007. “Limning the Impossible: Time Travel, the Uncanny and Destructive
Futurity in H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine.” In H. G. Wells’ Fin-de-Siècle: Twenty-first Century
Reflections on the Early H. G. Wells, edited by John S. Partington, 7-16. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Harpold, Terry. 2005. “Verne’s Cartographies.” Science Fiction Studies, 32, no. 1 (March): 18-42.
Hetzel, Pierre-Jules. 1866.“Avertissement de l’éditeur.” In Voyages et aventures du capitaine
Hatteras by Jules Verne, 1-2. Paris : Hetzel.
Hughes, David Y. & Philmus, Robert, M, ed. 1977. H.G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and
Science Fiction. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses.
James, Simon J. 2012. Maps of Utopia: H.G. Wells, Modernity and the End of Culture. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

235

Jameson, Frederic. 2017. “Progress versus Utopia; or, can we imagine the future?” In Science
Fiction Criticism, edited by Rob Latham, 211-224. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2015. “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of
Modernity.” In Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of
Power, edited by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, 1-33. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Gordon. 1904. “Jules Verne at Home.” Temple Bar 129 (June): 664-671.
Kirby, David. 2013. Lab Coats in Hollywood. Cambridge: the MIT Press.
Kirstukas, Alex. 2015-2016. “With Verne in Icaria: Two Sources for Robur-le-conquérant.”
Verniana 8: 57-70.
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Future. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1964. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
--. 2012. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuntz, Damien. 2011. “Étonner pour séduire : l'électricité dans les grandes expositions du
XIXe siècle. » Annales historiques de l’électricité 1, no. 9: 81-105.
Lacan, Jacques. 2007. Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. New York: Norton.
Langford, David, Brian M. Stableford, Jonathan Clements and John Clute. "Sherlock Holmes." The
Encyclopedia of Science Fiction. Eds. John Clute, David Langford, Peter Nicholls and Graham
Sleight. Gollancz, 12 Aug. 2018. Web. 9 Feb. 2019. <http://www.sfencyclopedia.com/entry/sherlock_holmes>.
Lange, André. 2006. “Entre Edison et Zola : Albert Robida et l'imaginaire des technologies de
communication.” In Albert Robida du passé au futur : un écrivain-illustrateur sous la IIIe
République, edited by Daniel Compère, 89-116. Amiens: Encrage.
Legrand, P. 1890. “La Tour du monde dans 72 Jours.” La Science illustrée, June 1 1890.
Link, Miles. 2013. “’The Honest Application of the Obvious’: The Scientific Futurity of H.G.
Wells.” In Victorian Time, edited by Trish Ferguson, 132-152. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Luckhurst, Roger. 2005. Science Fiction. Cambridge: Polity.
Lucet, Raoul. 1886. “Sic Itur Ad Astra.” Le XIXème Siècle, December 27, 1886.
--. 1886. “L’adoucissement des tempêtes.” Le XIXème siècle. December 6, 1886.
236

Lyell, Charles. 1854. Principles of Geology, or, The Modern Changes of the Earth and its
Inhabitants Considered as Illustrative of Geology. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
Maestripieri, Dario. 2019. Literature’s Contributions to Scientific Knowledge: How Novels
Explored New Ideas about Human Nature. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
McConnell, Frank. 1981. The Science Fiction of H.G. Wells. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLuhan, Marshall. 1965. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Millot, Léon. 1881. “En Ballon!” Le Beaumarchais. March 18, 1881.
Montel, Albert. 1909. “Le Quinzaine Littéraire. ” Le XIXème Siècle, December 24, 1909.
Morgan, Benjamin. In Human Scale: the Aesthetics of Climate Change (forthcoming).
Noiray, Jacques. 1982. Le Romancier et la machine. Paris: José Corti.
Oatley, Keith. 2011. Such Stuff as Dreams: The Psychology of Fiction. West Sussex: WileyBlackwell.
O’Brien, James. 2013. The Scientific Sherlock Holmes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Neil, Cathy. 2017. Weapons of Math Destruction. New York: Broadway Books.
O’Neil-Henry, Anne. 2017. “Spectacular Energy at the 1900 Exposition Universelle.” Paper
Presented at the Interdisciplinary Nineteenth-Century Studies Conference, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, March 16-19, 2017.
Parrinder, Patrick. 1995. Shadows of the Future: H.G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy.
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
--. 2001. “From Rome to Richmond: Wells, Universal History, and Prophetic Time.” In H.G. Wells’
Perennial Time Machine Selected Essays from the Centenary Conference “The Time Machine:
Past, Present, and Future,” Edited by George Slusser, Patrick Parrinder, and Daniel Chatelain,
110-121. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Pecqueur, Constantin. 1839. Économie sociale: des intérêts du commerce de l'industrie et de
l'agriculture, et de la civilisation en général, sous l'influence des applications de la vapeur :
machines fixes, chemins de fer, bateaux à vapeur, etc. Paris: Desessart.
Pinker, Steven. 1997. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton.
Poe, Edgar Allan. 2008. Selected Tales, edited by David Van Leer. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

237

--. 1846. “Mesmerism ‘in articulo mortis’: an astounding & horrifying narrative, shewing the
extraordinary power of mesmerism in arresting the progress of death.” London: Short & Co.
Rabkin, Eric. 2008. “Defining science Fiction.” In Reading Science Fiction, edited by James Gunn,
Marleen S. Barr & Matthew Candelaria, 15-22. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Roberts, Ivy. 2017. “Edison’s Telephonoscope’: the visual telephone and the satire of electric
light mania.” Early Popular Visual Culture 15, no.1: 1-25.
Robida, Albert. 1883. Le Vingtième Siècle. Paris: Georges Decaux.
--. 1892. Le Vingtième Siècle : la Vie électrique. Paris: La Librairie illustrée.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1984. Time and Narrative, Volume I, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David
Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Roush, Wade. 2018. “Preface.” In Twelve Tomorrows, edited by Wade Roush, vii-ix. Cambridge:
the MIT Press.
Rudwick, Martin J.S. 1995. Scenes from Deep Time: Early Pictorial Representations of the
Prehistoric World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Saler, Michael. 2012. As If: Modern Enchantment and the Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Samuels, Maurice. 2004. The Spectacular Past. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sayeau, Michael. 2005. “H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine and the ‘Odd Consequence’ of
Progress.” Contemporary Justice Review 8, no. 4: 431-445.
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 1986. The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in
the 19th Century. Los Angeles: The University of California Press.
Serres, Michel. 1974. Jouvences sur Jules Verne. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
Shelley, Mary. 2003. Frankenstein, or, the Modern Prometheus. London: Penguin.
Shackleton, David. 2017. “H.G. Wells, Geology, and the Ruins of Time.” Victorian Literature and
Culture 45, no. 4 (December): 839-855.
Shapin, Steven. 2016. “Invisible Science.” The Hedgehog Review, 18, no. 3 (Fall).
--. 2017. “Keynote.” Science In Public, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK, July 10-12, 2017.
(personal notes).
Shapin, Steven and Shaffer, Simon. 2011. Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the
Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

238

Shklovsky, Victor. 2015. “Art, as Device,” translated by Alexandra Berlina. Poetics Today 36, no. 3
(September): 151-174.
Stableford, Brian. 1985. The Scientific Romance. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Suvin, Darko. 2017. “On the poetics of the science fiction genre.” In Science Fiction Criticism,
edited by Rob Latham, 116-127. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
---. 2016. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction. Bern: Peter Lang.
Talairach-Vielmas, Laurence. 2014. Fairy Tales, Natural History and Victorian Culture. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Taylor, Charles. 2003. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke University Press.
Thomson, William. 1852. “On a Universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of Mechanical
Energy.” The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 4, no.
25: 304-306. https://doi.org/10.1080/14786445208647126.
Tissandier, Gaston. “Le phonographe d’Edison au boulevard des Capucines. La nature: revue des
sciences et de leurs applications aux arts et à l’industrie, April 22nd, 1878
Todorov, Tzvetan. 1973. The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. by
Richard Howard. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press.
“Thought Experiment.” 1995. Encyclopedia of Science Fiction, ed. John Clute, David Langford,
Peter Nicholls, and Graham Sleight. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
Tresch, John. 2012. The Romantic Machine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Gerard L’E. 2002. “Teaching by Demonstration: The Development of Popular Science,
Science Teaching, and Its Apparatus in Eighteenth-Century Europe.” In The Art of Teaching
Physics: The Eighteenth-Century Demonstration Apparatus of Jean Antoine Nollet, edited by
Jean-François Gauvin and Lewis Pyenson, 1-10. Sillery: Septentrion.
Turner, Kate. 2003. “Balloons Over Bismarck: The Interplay of Fact and Fiction in
Representations of the Fabulous History of the Balloon during the Siege of Paris.” In
Visions/Revisions: Essays on Nineteenth-Century French Culture, edited by Nigel Harkness, 139156. Oxford: Peter Lang.
Unwin, Timothy. 2005a. “Jules Verne: Negotiating Change in the Nineteenth Century.” Science
Fiction Studies 32, no. 1 (March): 5-17.
--. 2005b. Journeys in Writing. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
--. 2000a. “Technology and Progress in Jules Verne, or Anticipation in Reverse.” Journal of the
Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association 93, no. 1: 17-35.
239

--. 2000b. “The Fiction of Science, or, the Science of Fiction.” In Jules Verne : Narratives of
Modernity, edited by Edmund J. Smyth, 46-59. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Verne, Jules. 2004. Le Chateau des Carpathes. Paris : La bibliothèque Gallimard.
---. Vingt mille lieues sous les mers. Paris: Livre de Poche, 1990.
---. Robur-le-conquérant. Paris: Livre de Poche, 2004.
--. Voyage au centre de la terre. Paris: Livre de Poche, 2001.
-- & Hetzel, Pierre-Jules. 2002. Correspondance Inedite de Jules Verne et de Pierre-Jules Hetzel
(1863-1886). Vol 3 (1879-1886). Geneva: Slatkine.
Vernier, J.P. 1977. “Evolution as a Literary Theme in H.G. Wells’s Science Fiction.” In H.G. Wells
and Modern Science Fiction, edited by Darko Suvin and Robert M. Philmus, 70-89. Cranbury,
New Jersey: Associated University Presses.
Vierne, Simone. 1989. Jules Verne: mythe et modernité. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Villiers de l’Isle Adam. 1993. L’Eve Future. Paris: Gallimard.
Wagner, E.J. 2006. The Science of Sherlock Holmes: from Baskerville Hall to the Valley of Fear,
the real forensics behind the great detective's greatest cases. Hoboken: Wiley.
Warner, Marina. 2005. “Introduction.” In The Time Machine by H.G. Wells, xiii-xxviii. London:
Penguin.
Wells, H.G. 2005. The Time Machine. London: Penguin.
--. 1901. Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life
and Thought. New York: Harper & Brothers.
--.1975. “A Talk with Gryllotalpa.” H.G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction,
edited by Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes, 19-21. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
--. 1975. “The Rediscovery of the Unique.” In H.G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science
Fiction, edited by Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes, 22-31. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
--. 1975. “The ‘Cyclic Delusion’. In H.G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction,
edited by Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes, 110-113. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
--. 1975. “Zoological Retrogression.” In H.G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction,
edited by Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes, 158-168. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
240

--. 2017. “Preface to The Scientific Romances.” In Science Fiction Criticism, edited by Rob Latham,
13-16. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Willems, Philippe. 1999. “A Stereoscopic Vision of the Future: Albert Robida’s Twentieth
Century.” Science Fiction Studies 26, no. 1 (November): 354-378.
--. 2004. “Introduction.” The Twentieth Century by Albert Robida, translated by Philippe Willems,
xiii-lxii. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
Williams, Rosalind. 1991. Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Nineteenth-Century France.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
--. 2013. The Triumph of Human Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Willis, Martin. 2006. Mesmerists, Monsters, & Machines: Science Fiction and the Cultures of
Science in the Nineteenth Century. Kent: Kent State University Press.
Wittenberg, David. 2013. Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative. New York: Fordham
University Press.
Zola, Emile. 1880. Le Roman expérimental. Paris : G. Charpentier et Cie, Editeurs.

241

